A vulnerability in actix-http's HTTP/1.1 request parser allows an unauthenticated remote client to smuggle requests in deployments where a front-end HTTP intermediary and the Actix backend disagree about whether Content-Length or Transfer-Encoding: chunked defines the request body length.
Medium.
This is an HTTP request smuggling vulnerability that can be triggered over the network without application-level credentials. Exploitation requires a specific proxy topology: an upstream proxy, WAF, load balancer, or similar intermediary must use Content-Length framing while forwarding the conflicting Transfer-Encoding: chunked request to an Actix backend over a reused HTTP/1.1 connection.
actix-http: versions up to and including 3.12.0HTTP/1.1 requests that contain both Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding: chunked are ambiguous and must be rejected by recipients to avoid request smuggling.
Affected versions of actix-http accepted a request with a syntactically valid Content-Length header and Transfer-Encoding: chunked on the same HTTP/1.1 message. The parser then selected chunked decoding instead of rejecting the conflicting framing signals.
In a CL.TE proxy topology, an intermediary may treat bytes after the declared Content-Length body as part of the first request, while the Actix backend stops at the terminating chunk marker and parses the remaining bytes on the backend connection as a second HTTP request. This creates a backend-side request desynchronization primitive.
The issue is limited to HTTP/1.1 request parsing.
HTTP request smuggling
actix-http versions behind an HTTP/1.1 intermediary that forwards ambiguous Content-Length plus Transfer-Encoding: chunked requests and reuses backend connections.No direct confidentiality, availability, or subsequent-system impact is scored for this advisory.
This issue is fixed in actix-http 3.12.1.
The fix rejects HTTP/1.1 requests that contain both Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding: chunked instead of choosing one framing interpretation.
Users should upgrade to actix-http 3.12.1 or later.
Applications that depend on actix-http through actix-web, awc, or another Actix crate should ensure dependency resolution selects actix-http 3.12.1 or later. For example:
cargo update -p actix-http
If an immediate upgrade is not possible, configure all upstream HTTP intermediaries to reject HTTP/1.1 requests that contain both Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding, and avoid forwarding ambiguous request framing to Actix backends.
Actix thanks mufeedvh who disclosed this issue through coordinated disclosure.
A security vulnerability is a weakness in software, hardware, or configuration that can be exploited to compromise confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Many vulnerabilities are tracked as CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures), which provide a standardized identifier so teams can coordinate patching, mitigation, and risk assessment across tools and vendors.
CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) estimates technical severity, but it doesn't automatically equal business risk. Prioritize using context like internet exposure, affected asset criticality, known exploitation (proof-of-concept or in-the-wild), and whether compensating controls exist. A "Medium" CVSS on an exposed, production system can be more urgent than a "Critical" on an isolated, non-production host.
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