A low-privileged authenticated AgenticMail agent can enumerate another agent's pending/claimed tasks by supplying the target agent name to GET /api/agenticmail/tasks/pending?assignee=<name>. The returned task objects include the task IDs and payloads. The same task IDs can then be used with the capability-style task mutation endpoints (/tasks/:id/claim, /tasks/:id/result, /tasks/:id/complete, /tasks/:id/fail) to claim, complete, or fail tasks assigned to a different agent.
Because ordinary authenticated agents can discover agent names through GET /api/agenticmail/accounts/directory, the task ID effectively stops being a secret capability. This turns the intended capability model into a cross-agent authorization bypass.
Package: @agenticmail/api
Observed version: 0.9.62
Repository: agenticmail/agenticmail
Relevant code paths:
packages/api/src/app.ts: createAuthMiddleware(...) is mounted before createAccountRoutes(...) and createTaskRoutes(...), so these routes are reachable by any valid bearer token.packages/api/src/routes/accounts.ts: GET /accounts/directory is available to any authenticated user and returns agent names.packages/api/src/routes/tasks.ts: GET /tasks/pending?assignee=name resolves arbitrary agent names and returns that agent's pending/claimed tasks.packages/api/src/routes/tasks.ts: /tasks/:id/claim, /tasks/:id/result, /tasks/:id/complete, /tasks/:id/fail, and /tasks/:id do not check whether the authenticated caller is the task assignee, assigner, or otherwise authorized for the task.An attacker only needs a valid agent API key. They can:
/accounts/directory./tasks/pending?assignee=<victimName>.I reproduced this locally with a focused Vitest test mounted directly on createTaskRoutes. The test creates two agents, Alice and Bob, and one pending task assigned to Bob. Alice authenticates with her own agent key and performs the following sequence:
GET /api/agenticmail/tasks/pending?assignee=Bob with Authorization: Bearer ak_alice.task-for-bob, { "task": "secret task intended for Bob" }.POST /api/agenticmail/tasks/task-for-bob/complete with her own bearer token and an attacker-controlled result.completed and the stored result is controlled by Alice.The local verification command was:
npm run test --workspace=@agenticmail/api -- task-routes-authz.test.ts
Result:
PASS src/__tests__/task-routes-authz.test.ts (1 test)
Task listing and task mutation endpoints should enforce an authorization relationship between the authenticated caller and the task. For example:
GET /tasks/pending?assignee=<name> should either be restricted to the current agent, master/admin callers, or an explicit delegated relationship./tasks/:id/claim, /tasks/:id/result, /tasks/:id/complete, /tasks/:id/fail, and /tasks/:id should verify that the caller is the assignee, assigner, master/admin, or otherwise explicitly authorized.Please credit the finder as: Yaohui Wang
| Software | From | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
@agenticmail / api
|
- | 0.9.64 |
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