Total vulnerabilities in the database
The default landing page contained HTML to display a sample curl
command which is made visible if the full landing page bundle could not be fetched from Apollo's CDN. The server's URL is directly interpolated into this command inside the browser from window.location.href
. On some older browsers such as IE11, this value is not URI-encoded. On such browsers, opening a malicious URL pointing at an Apollo Router could cause execution of attacker-controlled JavaScript.
This only affects Apollo Server with the default landing page enabled. Old browsers visiting your server may be affected if ANY of these apply:
plugins
option of new ApolloServer
.ApolloServerPluginLandingPageLocalDefault()
or ApolloServerPluginLandingPageProductionDefault()
to the plugins
option of new ApolloServer
.Browsers visiting your server are NOT affected if ANY of these apply:
ApolloServerPluginLandingPageDisabled()
to the plugins
option of new ApolloServer
.ApolloServerPluginLandingPageGraphQLPlayground()
to the plugins
option of new ApolloServer
.renderLandingPage
hook to the plugins
option of new ApolloServer
.This issue was introduced in v3.0.0 when the landing page feature was added.
To avoid this, the sample curl
command has been removed in release 3.10.1.
Disabling the landing page removes the possibility of exploit:
import { ApolloServerPluginLandingPageDisabled } from 'apollo-server-core';
new ApolloServer({
plugins: [ApolloServerPluginLandingPageDisabled()],
// ...
});
A similar issue exists in the landing page of Apollo Router. See the corresponding Apollo Router security advisory.
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
This issue was discovered by Adrian Denkiewicz of Doyensec.