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Centrifugo's InsecureSkipTokenSignatureVerify flag silently disables JWT verification with no warning — github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/v6

Improper Authorization

Summary

Centrifugo supports a configuration flag insecure_skip_token_signature_verify that completely disables JWT signature verification. When enabled, Centrifugo accepts any JWT token regardless of signature validity — including tokens signed with wrong keys, random signatures, or no signature at all. Critically, no warning is logged at startup or runtime when this flag is active, making it invisible to operators and security auditors.

Note: This vulnerability requires the operator to have explicitly set insecure_skip_token_signature_verify=true. The core issue is the absence of any warning when this flag is active, making accidental production exposure undetectable.

Details

The flag is defined in internal/configtypes/types.go:

InsecureSkipTokenSignatureVerify bool `mapstructure:"insecure_skip_token_signature_verify"`

It is passed directly to token verification in internal/client/handler.go:

token, err := h.tokenVerifier.VerifyConnectToken(e.Token, cfg.Client.InsecureSkipTokenSignatureVerify)

In token_verifier_jwt.go, when skipVerify=true the entire signature block is bypassed:

if !skipVerify { // This block never executes err = verifier.verifySignature(token) }

The flag is configurable via multiple vectors making accidental exposure likely:

  • Config file: insecure_skip_token_signature_verify: true
  • Environment variable: CENTRIFUGO_INSECURE_SKIP_TOKEN_SIGNATURE_VERIFY=true
  • YAML, TOML config formats

Despite hmac_secret_key being configured, startup logs show "enabled JWT verifiers" — falsely implying verification is active.

PoC

Config with legitimate HMAC key but skip flag enabled:

{ "client": { "insecure_skip_token_signature_verify": true, "token": { "hmac_secret_key": "legitimate-production-secret-key" } } }

Token signed with completely wrong key is fully accepted:

VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED! Connected as user: {'client': '899dec73...', 'version': '0.0.0 OSS'}

No security warning emitted when insecure_skip_token_signature_verify=true: 1

Token signed with wrong key accepted, authentication bypass confirmed: 2

skipVerify flag propagated from config to all token verification calls: 3

Impact

  • Any unauthenticated user can connect as any arbitrary user ID
  • Complete authentication bypass — attacker sets any sub claim value
  • No indicators in logs that the server is operating insecurely
  • Easily triggered accidentally via environment variable injection in containerized deployments (e.g. misconfigured Kubernetes secrets)
  • Affects all connection types: WebSocket, HTTP-streaming, SSE, GRPC

Suggested Fix

  1. Emit a loud startup warning when flag is enabled:
if cfg.Client.InsecureSkipTokenSignatureVerify { log.Warn().Msg("SECURITY WARNING: JWT signature verification is " + "DISABLED via insecure_skip_token_signature_verify - " + "DO NOT use in production!") }
  1. Consider requiring an additional explicit insecure_mode: true flag to prevent accidental single-flag misconfiguration
  2. Log a warning on every accepted token when skip is active
  • Published: Mar 13, 2026
  • Updated: Mar 14, 2026
  • GHSA: GHSA-q926-c743-49qj
  • Severity: Low
  • Exploit:
  • CISA KEV:

CVSS v3:

  • Severity: Unknown
  • Score:
  • AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N

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