Vulnerability Database

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

VMCI: Fix memcpy() run-time warning in dg_dispatch_as_host()

Syzkaller hit 'WARNING in dg_dispatch_as_host' bug.

memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 56) of single field "&dg_info->msg" at drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_datagram.c:237 (size 24)

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1555 at drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_datagram.c:237 dg_dispatch_as_host+0x88e/0xa60 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_datagram.c:237

Some code commentry, based on my understanding:

544 #define VMCI_DG_SIZE(_dg) (VMCI_DG_HEADERSIZE + (size_t)(_dg)->payload_size) /// This is 24 + payload_size

memcpy(&dg_info->msg, dg, dg_size); Destination = dg_info->msg ---> this is a 24 byte structure(struct vmci_datagram) Source = dg --> this is a 24 byte structure (struct vmci_datagram) Size = dg_size = 24 + payload_size

{payload_size = 56-24 =32} -- Syzkaller managed to set payload_size to 32.

35 struct delayed_datagram_info { 36 struct datagram_entry entry; 37 struct work_struct work; 38 bool in_dg_host_queue; 39 / msg and msg_payload must be together. */ 40 struct vmci_datagram msg; 41 u8 msg_payload[]; 42 };

So those extra bytes of payload are copied into msg_payload[], a run time warning is seen while fuzzing with Syzkaller.

One possible way to fix the warning is to split the memcpy() into two parts -- one -- direct assignment of msg and second taking care of payload.

Gustavo quoted: "Under FORTIFY_SOURCE we should not copy data across multiple members in a structure."