296,748
Total vulnerabilities in the database
The MCP Server at https://github.com/akoskm/create-mcp-server-stdio is written in a way that is vulnerable to command injection vulnerability attacks as part of some of its MCP Server tool definition and implementation.
The MCP Server exposes the tool which-app-on-port which relies on Node.js child process API exec which is an unsafe and vulnerable API if concatenated with untrusted user input.
Vulnerable line of code: https://github.com/akoskm/create-mcp-server-stdio/blob/main/src/index.ts#L24-L40
server.tool("which-app-on-port", { port: z.number() }, async ({ port }) => {
const result = await new Promise<ProcessInfo>((resolve, reject) => {
exec(`lsof -t -i tcp:${port}`, (error, pidStdout) => {
if (error) {
reject(error);
return;
}
const pid = pidStdout.trim();
exec(`ps -p ${pid} -o comm=`, (error, stdout) => {
if (error) {
reject(error);
return;
}
resolve({ command: stdout.trim(), pid });
});
});
});
When LLMs are tricked through prompt injection (and other techniques and attack vectors) to call the tool with input that uses special shell characters such as ; rm -rf /tmp;# (be careful actually executing this payload) and other payload variations, the full command-line text will be interepted by the shell and result in other commands except of ps executing on the host running the MCP Server.
Reference example from prior security research on this topic:

User initiated and remote command injection on a running MCP Server.
exec. Use execFile instead, which pins the command and provides the arguments as array elements.-- notation to terminate command and command-line flag, and indicate that the text after the -- double dash notation is benign value.Disclosed by Liran Tal
| Software | From | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
@akoskm / create-mcp-server-stdio
|
- | 0.0.13 |