296,379
Total vulnerabilities in the database
> Vulnerability Overview >
The project's OIDC redirect handling logic constructs the host and protocol of the final redirect URL based on the X-Forwarded-Host or Host headers and the X-Forwarded-Proto value. In deployments where a reverse proxy forwards client-supplied X-Forwarded-* headers to the origin as-is, or where the origin trusts them without validation, an attacker can inject an arbitrary host and trigger an open redirect that sends users to a malicious domain.
> Vulnerable Code Analysis >
const internalRedirectUrlString = await oidcService.getInteractionResult(uid, result);
log('OIDC Provider internal redirect URL string: %s', internalRedirectUrlString);
let finalRedirectUrl;
try {
finalRedirectUrl = correctOIDCUrl(request, new URL(internalRedirectUrlString));
} catch {
finalRedirectUrl = new URL(internalRedirectUrlString);
log('Warning: Could not parse redirect URL, using as-is: %s', internalRedirectUrlString);
}
return NextResponse.redirect(finalRedirectUrl, {
headers: request.headers,
status: 303,
});
https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/blob/aa841a3879c30142720485182ad62aa0dbd74edc/src/app/(backend)/oidc/consent/route.ts#L113-L127
> curl Example >
curl -i 'http://localhost:3210/oidc/callback/desktop?code=abc&state=test123' \
-H 'X-Forwarded-Host: google.com' \
-H 'X-Forwarded-Proto: https'
<img width="1504" height="304" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b71d937d-7be2-49db-8f3d-e07371912800" />
Software | From | Fixed in |
---|---|---|
![]() |
- | 1.130.1 |