Vulnerability Database

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CVE-2026-23342 — linux / linux_kernel

Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Fix race in cpumap on PREEMPT_RT

On PREEMPT_RT kernels, the per-CPU xdp_bulk_queue (bq) can be accessed concurrently by multiple preemptible tasks on the same CPU.

The original code assumes bq_enqueue() and __cpu_map_flush() run atomically with respect to each other on the same CPU, relying on local_bh_disable() to prevent preemption. However, on PREEMPT_RT, local_bh_disable() only calls migrate_disable() (when PREEMPT_RT_NEEDS_BH_LOCK is not set) and does not disable preemption, which allows CFS scheduling to preempt a task during bq_flush_to_queue(), enabling another task on the same CPU to enter bq_enqueue() and operate on the same per-CPU bq concurrently.

This leads to several races:

  1. Double __list_del_clearprev(): after bq->count is reset in bq_flush_to_queue(), a preempting task can call bq_enqueue() -> bq_flush_to_queue() on the same bq when bq->count reaches CPU_MAP_BULK_SIZE. Both tasks then call __list_del_clearprev() on the same bq->flush_node, the second call dereferences the prev pointer that was already set to NULL by the first.

  2. bq->count and bq->q[] races: concurrent bq_enqueue() can corrupt the packet queue while bq_flush_to_queue() is processing it.

The race between task A (__cpu_map_flush -> bq_flush_to_queue) and task B (bq_enqueue -> bq_flush_to_queue) on the same CPU:

Task A (xdp_do_flush) Task B (cpu_map_enqueue)


bq_flush_to_queue(bq) spin_lock(&q->producer_lock) /* flush bq->q[] to ptr_ring / bq->count = 0 spin_unlock(&q->producer_lock) bq_enqueue(rcpu, xdpf) <-- CFS preempts Task A --> bq->q[bq->count++] = xdpf / ... more enqueues until full ... / bq_flush_to_queue(bq) spin_lock(&q->producer_lock) / flush to ptr_ring / spin_unlock(&q->producer_lock) __list_del_clearprev(flush_node) / sets flush_node.prev = NULL / <-- Task A resumes --> __list_del_clearprev(flush_node) flush_node.prev->next = ... / prev is NULL -> kernel oops */

Fix this by adding a local_lock_t to xdp_bulk_queue and acquiring it in bq_enqueue() and __cpu_map_flush(). These paths already run under local_bh_disable(), so use local_lock_nested_bh() which on non-RT is a pure annotation with no overhead, and on PREEMPT_RT provides a per-CPU sleeping lock that serializes access to the bq.

To reproduce, insert an mdelay(100) between bq->count = 0 and __list_del_clearprev() in bq_flush_to_queue(), then run reproducer provided by syzkaller.

  • Published: Mar 25, 2026
  • Updated: Apr 25, 2026
  • CVE: CVE-2026-23342
  • Severity: Low
  • Exploit:
  • CISA KEV:

CVSS v3:

  • Severity: Low
  • Score: 4.7
  • AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

CWEs:

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