In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/kexec: Disable KCOV instrumentation after load_segments()
The load_segments() function changes segment registers, invalidating GS base (which KCOV relies on for per-cpu data). When CONFIG_KCOV is enabled, any subsequent instrumented C code call (e.g. native_gdt_invalidate()) begins crashing the kernel in an endless loop.
To reproduce the problem, it's sufficient to do kexec on a KCOV-instrumented kernel:
$ kexec -l /boot/otherKernel $ kexec -e
The real-world context for this problem is enabling crash dump collection in syzkaller. For this, the tool loads a panic kernel before fuzzing and then calls makedumpfile after the panic. This workflow requires both CONFIG_KEXEC and CONFIG_KCOV to be enabled simultaneously.
Adding safeguards directly to the KCOV fast-path (__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc()) is also undesirable as it would introduce an extra performance overhead.
Disabling instrumentation for the individual functions would be too fragile, so disable KCOV instrumentation for the entire machine_kexec_64.c and physaddr.c. If coverage-guided fuzzing ever needs these components in the future, other approaches should be considered.
The problem is not relevant for 32 bit kernels as CONFIG_KCOV is not supported there.
[ bp: Space out comment for better readability. ]
| Software | From | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| linux / linux_kernel | 6.6 | 6.18.22 |
| linux / linux_kernel | 6.19 | 6.19.12 |
| linux / linux_kernel | 7.0-rc1 | 7.0-rc1.x |
| linux / linux_kernel | 7.0-rc2 | 7.0-rc2.x |
| linux / linux_kernel | 7.0-rc3 | 7.0-rc3.x |
| linux / linux_kernel | 7.0-rc4 | 7.0-rc4.x |
| linux / linux_kernel | 7.0-rc5 | 7.0-rc5.x |
| linux / linux_kernel | 7.0-rc6 | 7.0-rc6.x |
A security vulnerability is a weakness in software, hardware, or configuration that can be exploited to compromise confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Many vulnerabilities are tracked as CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures), which provide a standardized identifier so teams can coordinate patching, mitigation, and risk assessment across tools and vendors.
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