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383,371

Total vulnerabilities in the database

CVE-2026-56827 — shopper / framework

Missing Authorization

Summary

Five Filament groupedBulkActions blocks across the Shopper admin Livewire pages omit the ->authorize(...) permission gate, while their per-record sibling actions (and other Shopper Index pages such as Pages/Settings/Currencies.php, Pages/Reviews/Index.php, Pages/Collection/Index.php, and Pages/Discount/Index.php) correctly chain ->authorize(...). Each affected page's mount() only requires the read-only browse_* permission, so a low-privilege staff user holding only the read permission can drive the bulk endpoint via the standard Livewire callTableBulkAction flow and execute state-mutating operations they were never granted. The vulnerability is the same class as GHSA-f946-9qp6-vgch and GHSA-j328-xmgp-j4q3 (read-only permission gating a write action), just on a different surface (Filament 4 groupedBulkActions rather than top-level Livewire methods).

A staff user holding only browse_attributes can permanently delete every product attribute in the catalog (cascading break of every dependent product variant). A user holding only browse_tags can permanently delete every product tag. Users holding browse_brands, browse_categories, or browse_suppliers can flip the visibility (is_enabled) of every brand/category/supplier in bulk, sabotaging storefront catalog visibility.

CVSS 3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H = 8.1 High. CWE-285 (Improper Authorization) and CWE-862 (Missing Authorization). The attacker has low privilege (browse-only staff role), no user interaction, network reachable.

Vulnerable components (paths relative to repo root)

All references are HEAD = commit ac9a760 on master (the very commit that closed the previous wave of authorization-drift bugs from GHSA-j328-xmgp-j4q3).

1) `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Attribute/Browse.php`

Mount at line 36–39 requires only browse_attributes.

Lines 106–122: DeleteBulkAction::make() has NO ->authorize(...) chain (the surrounding per-record delete action at lines 95–104 correctly does ->authorize('delete_attributes')).
Lines 123–138: BulkAction::make('enabled') has NO ->authorize(...).
Lines 139–155: BulkAction::make('disabled') has NO ->authorize(...).

Net effect: a browse_attributes-only user can delete every row in the attributes table, and toggle is_enabled on every attribute in one request. Deleting an attribute cascades into every product variant that references it via the attribute_product pivot.

2) `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Tag/Index.php`

Mount at line 39 requires only browse_tags.

Lines 96–108: DeleteBulkAction::make() has NO ->authorize(...) chain (the per-record delete action at lines 79–94 correctly does ->authorize('delete_tags')).

Net effect: a browse_tags-only user can delete every ProductTag row.

3) `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Brand/Index.php`

Mount at line 37–40 requires only browse_brands.

Lines 97–112: BulkAction::make('enabled') has NO ->authorize(...).
Lines 113–129: BulkAction::make('disabled') has NO ->authorize(...).

Net effect: a browse_brands-only user can flip is_enabled on every brand. Disabling all brands removes them from the storefront catalog. The per-record edit/delete actions and the DeleteBulkAction at lines 130–148 are correctly ->authorize(...) gated — only the visibility bulk actions were missed.

4) `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Category/Index.php`

Mount at line 38–41 requires only browse_categories.

Lines 102–117: BulkAction::make('enabled') has NO ->authorize(...).
Lines 118–133: BulkAction::make('disabled') has NO ->authorize(...).

Net effect: a browse_categories-only user can flip is_enabled on every category. Same shape as Brand.

5) `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Supplier/Index.php`

Mount at line 38 requires only browse_suppliers.

Lines 93–108: BulkAction::make('enabled') has NO ->authorize(...).
Lines 109–125: BulkAction::make('disabled') has NO ->authorize(...).

Net effect: a browse_suppliers-only user can flip is_enabled on every supplier.

Reference comparison: places that ARE correctly gated

For reference, here is what the same pattern looks like in files that DID get the fix:

packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Settings/Currencies.php lines 90–129: every BulkAction chains ->authorize('access_setting').
packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Reviews/Index.php lines 105–119: DeleteBulkAction chains ->authorize('delete_reviews').
packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Collection/Index.php lines 109–128: DeleteBulkAction chains ->authorize('delete_collections').
packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Discount/Index.php lines 126–145: DeleteBulkAction chains ->authorize('delete_discounts').

The convention is established and applied elsewhere — these five files just missed it.

Proof of Concept

The attached file tests/Admin/Livewire/Pages/Brand/AuthBypassPocTest.php (added in this report) contains seven Pest tests, each acting as a browse_*-only staff user and invoking the bulk endpoint. All seven pass on master @ ac9a760:

   PASS  Tests\Admin\Livewire\Pages\Brand\AuthBypassPocTest
  ✓ it SHOPPER-2 PoC: read-only viewer can mass-DISABLE all brands via unguarded BulkAction
  ✓ it SHOPPER-2 PoC: read-only viewer can mass-ENABLE all brands via unguarded BulkAction
  ✓ it SHOPPER-2 PoC: read-only viewer can mass-DISABLE all categories via unguarded BulkAction
  ✓ it SHOPPER-2 PoC: read-only viewer can mass-DISABLE all suppliers via unguarded BulkAction
  ✓ it SHOPPER-2 PoC: read-only viewer can DELETE all attributes via unguarded DeleteBulkAction
  ✓ it SHOPPER-2 PoC: read-only viewer can mass-DISABLE all attributes via unguarded BulkAction
  ✓ it SHOPPER-2 PoC: browse_tags viewer can DELETE all product tags via unguarded DeleteBulkAction

  Tests:    7 passed (32 assertions)

Each test seeds three records, signs in a user holding only the corresponding browse_* permission, calls Livewire::test(<Page>::class)->callTableBulkAction(...), and asserts the side effect (records flipped or deleted). For example, the attribute mass-delete test:

$this-&gt;viewer = User::factory()-&gt;create();
$this-&gt;viewer-&gt;givePermissionTo(&#039;browse_attributes&#039;);
$this-&gt;actingAs($this-&gt;viewer);

Attribute::factory()-&gt;count(3)-&gt;create();
expect($this-&gt;viewer-&gt;can(&#039;delete_attributes&#039;))-&gt;toBeFalse();

Livewire::test(AttributeBrowse::class)
    -&gt;callTableBulkAction(\Filament\Actions\DeleteBulkAction::class, Attribute::pluck(&#039;id&#039;)-&gt;toArray())
    -&gt;assertHasNoErrors();

expect(Attribute::count())-&gt;toBe(0);

The call uses the same callTableBulkAction helper Shopper's own test suite uses everywhere, which in turn drives the same Livewire update payload the browser would emit — so this is a faithful HTTP-level reproduction.

Suggested fix

Add ->authorize(<correct_permission>) to each of the five vulnerable groups, mirroring the pattern already used elsewhere:

 // Pages/Attribute/Browse.php
 -&gt;groupedBulkActions([
     DeleteBulkAction::make()
+        -&gt;authorize(&#039;delete_attributes&#039;)
         -&gt;label(__(&#039;shopper::forms.actions.delete&#039;))
         -&gt;requiresConfirmation()
         -&gt;action(function (Collection $records): void { /* ... */ }),
     BulkAction::make(&#039;enabled&#039;)
+        -&gt;authorize(&#039;edit_attributes&#039;)
         -&gt;label(__(&#039;shopper::forms.actions.enable&#039;))
         -&gt;action(function (Collection $records): void { /* ... */ }),
     BulkAction::make(&#039;disabled&#039;)
+        -&gt;authorize(&#039;edit_attributes&#039;)
         -&gt;label(__(&#039;shopper::forms.actions.disable&#039;))
         -&gt;action(function (Collection $records): void { /* ... */ }),
 ])

Apply the equivalent change to Pages/Tag/Index.php (delete_tags), Pages/Brand/Index.php (edit_brands for enable/disable), Pages/Category/Index.php (edit_categories), and Pages/Supplier/Index.php (edit_suppliers).

A regression test for each file (acting as a browse_*-only user and expecting assertHasErrors/AuthorizationException) would lock in the fix, matching the regression tests added for #514.

Resources

Prior advisories of the same class (read-only permission gating a write action): GHSA-f946-9qp6-vgch, GHSA-j328-xmgp-j4q3 / GHSA-vw82-3966-f9mr.
Same-shape fix: commit ac9a760 (PR #514). Five Filament bulk-action groups did not receive the corresponding ->authorize(...) chain.
CWE-285 Improper Authorization, CWE-862 Missing Authorization.

Credits

Reported by Vishal Shukla(@shukla304) using sechub.dev AI Agent

Support

If this disclosure was useful and userswould like to support continued open-source security research and responsible-disclosure work, they can sponsor at https://github.com/sponsors/therawdev — Shopper is thankful for those keeping open source safe.

Published: Sep 11, 2026
Updated: Sep 12, 2026
CVE: CVE-2026-56827
GHSA: GHSA-243p-f3cv-c5wh
Severity: High
Exploit:
CISA KEV:

CVSS v3:

Severity: High
Score: 8.1
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

CWEs:

CWE-862

Affected Software
References

Software	Affected versions
shopper / framework	`< 2.9.2`

https://github.com/shopperlabs/shopper/security/advisories/GHSA-243p-f3cv-c5wh

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Frequently Asked Questions

What is a Vulnerability (CVE) and why does it matter?

A security vulnerability is a weakness in software, hardware, or configuration that can be exploited to compromise confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Many vulnerabilities are tracked as CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures), which provide a standardized identifier so teams can coordinate patching, mitigation, and risk assessment across tools and vendors.

CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) estimates technical severity, but it doesn't automatically equal business risk. Prioritize using context like internet exposure, affected asset criticality, known exploitation (proof-of-concept or in-the-wild), and whether compensating controls exist. A "Medium" CVSS on an exposed, production system can be more urgent than a "Critical" on an isolated, non-production host.

A vulnerability is the underlying weakness. An exploit is the method or code used to take advantage of it. A zero-day is a vulnerability that is unknown to the vendor or has no publicly available fix when attackers begin using it. In practice, risk increases sharply when exploitation becomes reliable or widespread.

Recurring findings usually come from incomplete Asset Discovery, inconsistent patch management, inherited images, and configuration drift. In modern environments, you also need to watch the software supply chain: dependencies, containers, build pipelines, and third-party services can reintroduce the same weakness even after you patch a single host. Unknown or unmanaged assets (often called Shadow IT) are a common reason the same issues resurface.

Use a simple, repeatable triage model: focus first on externally exposed assets, high-value systems (identity, VPN, email, production), vulnerabilities with known exploits, and issues that enable remote code execution or privilege escalation. Then enforce patch SLAs and track progress using consistent metrics so remediation is steady, not reactive.

SynScan combines attack surface monitoring and continuous security auditing to keep your inventory current, flag high-impact vulnerabilities early, and help you turn raw findings into a practical remediation plan.