Vulnerability Database

375,699

Total vulnerabilities in the database

CVE-2026-56836 — praisonai

Improper Authentication

PraisonAI recipe serve Typer command bypasses the non-localhost authentication guard

Summary

PraisonAI's installed console entrypoint is Typer-first. In current releases, the recipe command is registered in the Typer app and praisonai recipe serve dispatches to the deprecated Typer command in src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/recipe.py.

That Typer command can start the Recipe HTTP server on a non-localhost interface with no authentication:

praisonai recipe serve --host 0.0.0.0 --admin

It prints a deprecation warning, then launches the server with:

{ "host": "0.0.0.0", "config": { "cors_origins": "*", "enable_admin": true } }

Because config.auth is absent, create_app() does not attach the API-key or JWT middleware. Unauthenticated requests can then reach the recipe API and, when enabled, /admin/reload.

This is an incomplete hardening / sibling-callsite issue. The legacy feature handler in src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/recipe.py rejects the same non-localhost/no-auth combination, and current create_auth_middleware() now fails closed if API-key/JWT auth is selected without a secret. The installed Typer command bypasses both expectations by never requiring or setting auth.

Affected product

  • Repository: MervinPraison/PraisonAI
  • Package: praisonai
  • Component:
    • src/praisonai/praisonai/__main__.py
    • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/app.py
    • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/recipe.py
    • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/recipe.py
    • src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/serve.py

Confirmed affected:

v4.6.58 1ad58ca02975ff1398efeda694ea2ab78f20cf3e v4.6.57 e90d92231853161ad931f3498da57651a9f8b528 v4.6.56 d3c4a2afadfbf3a3e172e460e607ba4efad263a6 v4.6.34 e5928449f73f66cc8af1de61621aa974ab255133 v4.6.33 dfbb8d78ec7e8dc7118bc722ab1b2524bc98ddab v4.6.10 4b1b17b963cbd0625e41394a30168c95b26429b2 v4.5.128 b4e3a8a84ade44ac3dd9102b792cdb4311a95937 v4.5.112 bfe3d94bad6db92fc2927c2e3c081ae8303e209e

Suggested affected range: praisonai >= 4.5.112, <= 4.6.58.

The lower bound is conservative and based on sampled tags. Maintainers should confirm the exact introduction point before publishing a final range.

Root cause

The installed entrypoint routes registered Typer commands before falling back to the legacy dispatcher:

if first_cmd in _get_typer_commands(): _run_typer(argv) else: _run_legacy(argv)

cli/app.py registers commands.recipe as the recipe Typer command:

from .commands.recipe import app as recipe_app ... app.add_typer(recipe_app, name="recipe", help="Recipe management")

The deprecated Typer recipe serve implementation accepts a remote host, defaults CORS to *, and only enables authentication when --api-key is explicitly provided:

host: str = typer.Option("127.0.0.1", "--host", "-h", ...) api_key: str = typer.Option(None, "--api-key", ...) cors: str = typer.Option("*", "--cors", ...) admin: bool = typer.Option(False, "--admin", ...) ... serve_config = {} ... if api_key: serve_config["api_key"] = api_key serve_config["auth"] = "api-key" if cors: serve_config["cors_origins"] = cors if admin: serve_config["enable_admin"] = True ... serve(host=host, port=port, reload=reload, config=serve_config, workers=workers)

There is no equivalent to the hardened non-localhost guard in the legacy feature handler:

if host != "127.0.0.1" and host != "localhost" and auth == "none": self._print_error("Auth required for non-localhost binding. Use --auth api-key or --auth jwt") return self.EXIT_POLICY_DENIED

The Recipe server only installs auth middleware when config["auth"] is set:

auth_type = config.get("auth") if auth_type and auth_type != "none": auth_middleware = create_auth_middleware(...) if auth_middleware: middleware.append(Middleware(auth_middleware))

On current v4.6.58, the selected-auth paths fail closed correctly:

  • auth=api-key with no key returns 503.
  • auth=api-key with a key but no request header returns 401.

The vulnerable Typer path does not select auth at all.

Local-only PoV

Run from the harness checkout:

uv run \ --with starlette --with httpx --with typer --with rich --with pyyaml \ --with sse-starlette --with click --with python-dotenv \ python submission-bundle/praisonai-prai-cand-016-recipe-serve-typer-auth-bypass/poc/pov_prai_cand_016_recipe_serve_typer_auth_bypass.py \ --repo artifacts/repos/praisonai-v4.6.58 \ --label v4.6.58

The PoV does not bind a socket. It monkey-patches the recipe server launcher, invokes the real praisonai.__main__.main() entrypoint with recipe serve --host 0.0.0.0 --admin, captures the launch config, and then uses Starlette's in-process test client to exercise the resulting app.

Observed v4.6.58 result:

{ "candidate": "PRAI-CAND-016", "entrypoint_exit_code": 0, "typer_recipe_command_registered": true, "captured_launch": { "host": "0.0.0.0", "port": 8765, "config": { "cors_origins": "*", "enable_admin": true } }, "bypass": { "admin_reload": { "path": "/admin/reload", "status": 200 }, "openapi": { "path": "/openapi.json", "status": 200 } }, "controls": { "auth_api_key_no_secret": { "admin_reload": { "status": 503 } }, "auth_api_key_no_header": { "admin_reload": { "status": 401 } } }, "feature_handler_nonlocalhost_noauth_exit": 4, "auth_fail_closed_current_control": true, "ok": true }

Stored evidence:

  • evidence/current-v4.6.58.json
  • evidence/version-sweep.tsv

Why this is not intended behavior

This is not only a disagreement about whether operators should configure auth.

PraisonAI's current security documentation says recent hardening changed API servers so anonymous requests return 401 and servers bind to 127.0.0.1 by default. Recipe server docs say auth: api-key should be used for production, admin endpoints require auth, and public servers should not run without authentication.

The implementation also shows the intended boundary:

  • create_auth_middleware() now returns 503 if API-key/JWT auth is selected without a secret.
  • RecipeHandler.cmd_serve() refuses non-localhost binding when auth is none.
  • The vulnerable Typer command is marked deprecated and tells users to use the newer command, but the installed entrypoint still routes praisonai recipe to that Typer command before the legacy handler can enforce the guard.

The official local HTTP sidecar docs describe the sidecar as communicating over localhost and "no external network required", but the Docker example still uses:

CMD ["praisonai", "recipe", "serve", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "8765"]

That command exposes the Typer path above and does not enable auth, even if PRAISONAI_API_KEY is present in the environment, because this path only sets auth when --api-key is passed or a config file sets auth.

Impact

If an operator follows the vulnerable command path on a reachable interface, any network caller that can reach the Recipe HTTP server can access recipe runner endpoints without credentials.

Affected endpoints include:

  • GET /v1/recipes
  • POST /v1/recipes/run
  • POST /v1/recipes/stream
  • POST /v1/recipes/validate
  • optional POST /admin/reload when admin endpoints are enabled

The exact impact depends on configured recipes and deployment context. At a minimum, an attacker can enumerate recipes and trigger recipe validation or execution flows intended for local or authenticated callers. In deployments with powerful recipes, tool-enabled recipes, or admin endpoints, this can cause unauthorized workflow execution, model/API spend, state changes, or recipe registry reload operations.

This report does not claim arbitrary code execution by default.

Suggested fix

Prefer one canonical Recipe server CLI path and enforce the same preflight for every wrapper.

Recommended changes:

  1. Remove or hard-disable the deprecated Typer praisonai recipe serve command, or make it delegate to the hardened RecipeHandler.cmd_serve() code path.
  2. Add the same non-localhost/no-auth guard to cli/commands/recipe.py.
  3. Treat PRAISONAI_API_KEY as a secret only when auth=api-key is selected; do not rely on the env var's presence alone unless the command also enables auth explicitly.
  4. Fix the deprecated command's help examples so remote binding always includes auth.
  5. Consider changing --cors default from * to no CORS or localhost origins.
  6. Add regression tests that invoke the installed praisonai.__main__.main() entrypoint, not only the legacy feature handler:
    • praisonai recipe serve --host 0.0.0.0 fails before launch unless auth is selected and configured;
    • praisonai recipe serve --host 0.0.0.0 --admin cannot expose /admin/reload without auth;
    • selected but misconfigured auth still returns 503;
    • configured auth with no header returns 401.

CVSS v3:

  • Severity: High
  • Score: 8.2
  • AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

CWEs:

OWASP TOP 10:

Software From Fixed in
Python icon praisonai 4.5.112 4.6.59

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