recipe.run_stream() skips dangerous-tool policy enforcementPraisonAI recipe execution blocks default-denied dangerous tools unless the
caller explicitly passes allow_dangerous_tools=True. The normal recipe.run()
path enforces this with _check_tool_policy(). The streaming path,
recipe.run_stream(), loads the same recipe, checks dependencies, and then
calls _execute_recipe() without running the dangerous-tool policy check.
As a result, a recipe that honestly declares execute_command in
TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools is denied by recipe.run(), but reaches the
execution engine through recipe.run_stream() with
allow_dangerous_tools=False.
The local PoV uses a harmless printf canary, explicitly unsets
PRAISONAI_AUTO_APPROVE, and avoids network access.
MervinPraison/PraisonAIpraisonaisrc/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/core.pysrc/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/serve.pysrc/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/recipe.pysrc/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/workflows/yaml_parser.pysrc/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/workflows/workflows.pyValidated affected:
2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1
(v4.6.57-4-g2f9677ab)v4.6.57v4.6.56v4.6.10v4.6.9v4.5.128v4.5.120v4.5.96v4.5.87Suggested affected range: >= 4.5.87, <= 4.6.57.
PyPI lists PraisonAI 4.6.57 as the latest release on 2026-06-13.
Earlier tested tags through v4.5.85 failed in this source checkout before the
tested workflow path due an unrelated praisonaiagents.output.models import
error. They are not claimed fixed or unaffected.
recipe.run() enforces the dangerous-tool gate:
if not options.get("allow_dangerous_tools", False):
policy_error = _check_tool_policy(recipe_config)
if policy_error:
return RecipeResult(..., status=RecipeStatus.POLICY_DENIED, ...)
recipe.run_stream() has a sibling execution path. It loads the recipe and
checks dependencies, but then goes directly to execution:
recipe_config = _load_recipe(name, offline=options.get("offline", False))
...
output = _execute_recipe(recipe_config, merged_config, session_id, options)
There is no equivalent _check_tool_policy() call in run_stream() before
execution or before the dry-run shortcut.
The CLI exposes this path via praisonai recipe run <recipe> --stream, and the
recipe HTTP server exposes it as POST /v1/recipes/stream.
The normal recipe path clearly treats declared dangerous tools as denied by
default. A control recipe with TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools: [execute_command] returns:
Tool 'execute_command' is denied by default. Use allow_dangerous_tools=True to override.
That operator-facing override should not depend on whether the caller requests streaming output. PraisonAI's own docs describe approval as requiring a human or configured channel before risky tools run, describe security environment variables as opt-in access for dangerous operations with secure defaults, and describe policy controls as blocking dangerous operations.
This is distinct from the prior report PRAI-CAND-011:
PRAI-CAND-011 covers workflow tool declarations that are omitted from
TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools.TEMPLATE.yaml correctly declares the dangerous tool.It is also distinct from the published Recipe-server authentication fail-open advisory. That advisory covers missing authentication secrets. This report assumes the attacker has whatever access is already needed to invoke recipe streaming and focuses on the missing dangerous-tool policy guard.
Run:
python3 poc/pov_prai_cand_012_stream_policy_bypass.py
Expected output includes:
{
"ok": true,
"policy_error": "Tool 'execute_command' is denied by default. Use allow_dangerous_tools=True to override.",
"control_recipe_status": "policy_denied",
"execution_reached": [
{
"recipe": "declared-dangerous-stream",
"declared_required_tools": ["execute_command"],
"allow_dangerous_tools": false
}
],
"workflow_approve_tools": ["execute_command"],
"runner_tool_names": ["execute_command"],
"command_stdout": "PRAI-CAND-012-CANARY",
"operator_env_auto_approve": null
}
The PoV creates a temporary recipe that declares execute_command in
TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools.
Control:
recipe.run(..., options={"force": True}) returns policy_denied.Bypass:
recipe.run_stream(..., options={"force": True}) emits the executing
event and reaches _execute_recipe() while allow_dangerous_tools remains
false.execute_command and preserves
approve: [execute_command].printf PRAI-CAND-012-CANARY.The PoV monkey-patches _execute_recipe() only to prove that
run_stream() crosses the policy boundary without invoking an LLM. The command
canary is executed directly through the same resolved workflow tool and
approval context to keep the proof deterministic and local-only.
If an operator runs an untrusted recipe through streaming mode, or exposes the
recipe streaming API to users who can choose recipe names or URIs, the recipe
can reach execution with default-denied tools even though the caller did not
set allow_dangerous_tools=True.
If the workflow reaches the approved execute_command tool call, commands run
with the privileges of the PraisonAI process. The exact trigger depends on the
workflow and model/tool-call path, but the dangerous-tool policy boundary is
already bypassed before execution.
The HTTP recipe sidecar is documented as a localhost REST API with SSE
streaming and optional API-key/JWT authentication. This report does not claim
default unauthenticated network RCE. In authenticated or exposed sidecar
deployments where lower-trust users can invoke /v1/recipes/stream, the same
policy gap can become a remote recipe-execution issue.
Centralize recipe preflight enforcement so every execution mode uses the same guard:
_check_tool_policy(recipe_config) in run_stream() unless
options["allow_dangerous_tools"] is true.recipe.run().recipe.run();recipe.run_stream();allow_dangerous_tools=True preserves the intended opt-in behavior;/v1/recipes/stream maps a policy denial to a non-success SSE event or
equivalent HTTP failure.| Software | From | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
praisonai
|
4.5.87 | 4.6.59 |
A security vulnerability is a weakness in software, hardware, or configuration that can be exploited to compromise confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Many vulnerabilities are tracked as CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures), which provide a standardized identifier so teams can coordinate patching, mitigation, and risk assessment across tools and vendors.
CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) estimates technical severity, but it doesn't automatically equal business risk. Prioritize using context like internet exposure, affected asset criticality, known exploitation (proof-of-concept or in-the-wild), and whether compensating controls exist. A "Medium" CVSS on an exposed, production system can be more urgent than a "Critical" on an isolated, non-production host.
A vulnerability is the underlying weakness. An exploit is the method or code used to take advantage of it. A zero-day is a vulnerability that is unknown to the vendor or has no publicly available fix when attackers begin using it. In practice, risk increases sharply when exploitation becomes reliable or widespread.
Recurring findings usually come from incomplete Asset Discovery, inconsistent patch management, inherited images, and configuration drift. In modern environments, you also need to watch the software supply chain: dependencies, containers, build pipelines, and third-party services can reintroduce the same weakness even after you patch a single host. Unknown or unmanaged assets (often called Shadow IT) are a common reason the same issues resurface.
Use a simple, repeatable triage model: focus first on externally exposed assets, high-value systems (identity, VPN, email, production), vulnerabilities with known exploits, and issues that enable remote code execution or privilege escalation. Then enforce patch SLAs and track progress using consistent metrics so remediation is steady, not reactive.
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