Vulnerability Database

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Total vulnerabilities in the database

CVE-2026-80919

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amdgpu: fix recursive ww_mutex acquire in amdgpu_devcoredump_format

When dumping IB contents from a hung job, amdgpu_devcoredump_format() acquired the VM root PD's reservation via amdgpu_vm_lock_by_pasid() and then, for each IB, called amdgpu_bo_reserve() on the BO backing the IB. Both reservations are reservation_ww_class_mutex objects and neither used a ww_acquire_ctx, which trips lockdep:

WARNING: possible recursive locking detected

kworker/u128:0 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88838b16e1f0 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: amdgpu_devcoredump_format+0x1594/0x23f0 [amdgpu]

but task is already holding lock: ffff8882f82681f0 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: amdgpu_devcoredump_format+0x1594/0x23f0 [amdgpu]

Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex);

*** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation

Workqueue: events_unbound amdgpu_devcoredump_deferred_work [amdgpu] Call Trace: __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.0 ww_mutex_lock amdgpu_bo_reserve amdgpu_devcoredump_format+0x1594 [amdgpu] amdgpu_devcoredump_deferred_work+0xea [amdgpu]

The two reservations are on different BOs in the captured trace, so the splat is a lockdep-correctness warning, not an observed deadlock. It becomes a real self-deadlock whenever the IB BO shares its dma_resv with the root PD (the always-valid case, see amdgpu_vm_is_bo_always_valid()): amdgpu_bo_reserve(abo) re-acquires the same ww_mutex without a ticket and blocks forever. With amdgpu.gpu_recovery=0 the timeout handler refires every ~2 s and each invocation produces this splat, drowning the kernel ring buffer.

Now that amdgpu_vm_lock_by_pasid() takes a drm_exec context, move the IB dumping into a separate helper that locks the root PD and every IB BO together in a single drm_exec ticket. DRM_EXEC_IGNORE_DUPLICATES handles IB BOs that share a dma_resv (e.g. always-valid BOs, or two IBs backed by the same BO). Every lock is now a top-level acquire under one ww_acquire_ctx, so the recursive ww_mutex condition is gone, and the per-IB amdgpu_bo_reserve()/amdgpu_bo_unref() dance -- including a BO refcount leak on the amdgpu_bo_reserve() failure path -- is removed.

(cherry picked from commit d6bf4242731219ee08ce54c365631e395486651e)

  • Published: Sep 9, 2026
  • Updated: Sep 12, 2026
  • CVE: CVE-2026-80919
  • Exploit:
  • CISA KEV:

No technical information available.

No CWE or OWASP classifications available.

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