In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring: don't flood a cancelling task with task_work
io_ring_exit_work() asks each task which has used the ring to remove its tctx node, by task_work, and repeats that until the list is empty. io_tctx_exit_cb() doesn't touch the node while the task is in io_uring_cancel_generic(), which removes all the nodes at its end. So the work item queues the callback again as soon as it has completed, for nothing.
That is more than a waste of time. task_work_run() only returns when it finds the list empty. If the rings are released from inside the cancellation, because requests of other rings held the last references to their files, up to 64 work items keep sending callbacks to the one task which is running them. It never finds the list empty, never gets back to the cancellation, the nodes stay, and so it goes on: a task with 60 pairs of rings which poll each other ran 280000 callbacks in 5 seconds, 20 seconds after exit_group(). It ends when all the senders happen to be late at the same time. Until then the task keeps a CPU and the work items busy.
An exiting task can't be killed meanwhile. execve() cancels the requests in the same way, so a live task can get stuck there as well, for minutes. If it takes more than five, the work items run into the WARN_ON_ONCE(time_after(jiffies, timeout)) of io_ring_exit_work(). No privilege is needed for any of this.
If the callback has met a task in cancellation, wait a little before it is sent again. Nobody has to wake the work item up for that: either the node is gone by then, or it is the turn of the next round.
No affected software listed.
A vulnerability database tells you what is broken. Attack surface management tells you where it is running: it discovers your internet-facing assets and flags the ones affected by issues like this one.
What is attack surface management? →A security vulnerability is a weakness in software, hardware, or configuration that can be exploited to compromise confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Many vulnerabilities are tracked as CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures), which provide a standardized identifier so teams can coordinate patching, mitigation, and risk assessment across tools and vendors.
CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) estimates technical severity, but it doesn't automatically equal business risk. Prioritize using context like internet exposure, affected asset criticality, known exploitation (proof-of-concept or in-the-wild), and whether compensating controls exist. A "Medium" CVSS on an exposed, production system can be more urgent than a "Critical" on an isolated, non-production host.
A vulnerability is the underlying weakness. An exploit is the method or code used to take advantage of it. A zero-day is a vulnerability that is unknown to the vendor or has no publicly available fix when attackers begin using it. In practice, risk increases sharply when exploitation becomes reliable or widespread.
Recurring findings usually come from incomplete Asset Discovery, inconsistent patch management, inherited images, and configuration drift. In modern environments, you also need to watch the software supply chain: dependencies, containers, build pipelines, and third-party services can reintroduce the same weakness even after you patch a single host. Unknown or unmanaged assets (often called Shadow IT) are a common reason the same issues resurface.
Use a simple, repeatable triage model: focus first on externally exposed assets, high-value systems (identity, VPN, email, production), vulnerabilities with known exploits, and issues that enable remote code execution or privilege escalation. Then enforce patch SLAs and track progress using consistent metrics so remediation is steady, not reactive.
SynScan combines attack surface monitoring and continuous security auditing to keep your inventory current, flag high-impact vulnerabilities early, and help you turn raw findings into a practical remediation plan.