Affected: GitPython 3.1.61 (latest release) and main — git/objects/submodule/base.py. git diff 3.1.61 origin/main -- git/objects/submodule/ is empty, so both are identical here.
The fix for GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc added Submodule._validated_name() and wired it into update() and five siblings, closing the .gitmodules name → .git/modules/<name> traversal. The other attacker-controlled .gitmodules field, path, is read raw:
# git/objects/submodule/base.py:172-177
def _set_cache_(self, attr):
if attr in ("path", "_url", "_branch_path"):
reader = self.config_reader()
self.path = reader.get("path") # raw .gitmodules value
and GitPython's own containment guard is applied in only two of the places that consume it:
400: def _to_relative_path(cls, parent_repo, path) # the guard (abspath + commonpath containment)
542: path = cls._to_relative_path(repo, path) # add() — guarded
1041: module_checkout_path = self._to_relative_path(self.repo, module_path) # move() — guarded
update() validates only the name and then uses the path-derived absolute location directly:
788: self._validated_name(self.name) # NAME only
801: checkout_module_abspath = self.abspath # derived from self.path — unguarded
821: os.makedirs(checkout_module_abspath, exist_ok=True)
So path = ../../../tmp/escaped in an attacker-authored .gitmodules selects the directory that gets created and, on the clone path, populated from the submodule URL. The same absolute location is what force_remove hands to shutil.rmtree.
The asymmetry is the argument: this is not a missing concept — the project wrote _to_relative_path() precisely for this, and add()/move() use it. update() does not.
Repo.clone_from(...) → repo.submodules → sm.update(init=True) re-derives path from a canonical tree lookup, and real git refuses to check out a tree containing a .. component, so an evil .gitmodules never lands in the working tree in the first place. A reachable trigger therefore requires the victim's code to name a non-HEAD commit (a historical-commit API such as submodule_update(previous_commit=...)).update(), and the unguarded abspath → os.makedirs() flow at 3.1.61 == main.Apply the guard the project already has, wherever the path is consumed:
# in update(), before deriving abspath (and in any other consumer of self.path):
checkout_rel = self._to_relative_path(self.repo, self.path) # raises if it escapes the working tree
Better still, validate at the boundary: reject a .gitmodules entry whose path is absolute or contains a .. component when the section is first read in _set_cache_()/iter_items(), so no consumer can be added later without the check. A regression test with path = ../escaped alongside the existing name test would pin both fields.
GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc (this is a residual of its fix, in the sibling field, not a re-report) plus the repository's 30 published advisories — none mentions the path field or _to_relative_path. Searched issues and PRs for _to_relative_path, gitmodules path and submodule traversal: no report of this.
kta1kri.
EVIDENCE_gitpython_path_unguarded_20260901.txt (inlined; advisories accept no attachments)=== EVIDENCE: GitPython — the .gitmodules 'path' field reaches os.makedirs()/clone unguarded ===
Mon Aug 31 18:45:22 UTC 2026
--- artifact: tag 3.1.61 (latest release); git diff 3.1.61 origin/main -- git/objects/submodule/ is empty ---
--- the containment guard GitPython owns, and its only two call sites ---
33: _to_relative_path,
400: def _to_relative_path(cls, parent_repo: "Repo", path: PathLike) -> PathLike:
407: path = _to_relative_path(parent_repo.working_tree_dir, path)
542: path = cls._to_relative_path(repo, path)
1041: module_checkout_path = self._to_relative_path(self.repo, module_path)
--- the parent fix (_validated_name) call sites: it validates the NAME ---
309: def _validated_name(cls, name: str) -> str:
321: name = cls._validated_name(name)
541: cls._validated_name(name)
788: self._validated_name(self.name)
1040: self._validated_name(self.name)
1181: self._validated_name(self.name)
1439: self._validated_name(self.name)
1440: self._validated_name(new_name)
1489: self._validated_name(self.name)
--- update(): name validated, path not; abspath -> os.makedirs ---
try:
self._validated_name(self.name)
# ENSURE REPO IS PRESENT AND UP-TO-DATE
# END early abort if init is not allowed
checkout_module_abspath = self.abspath
module_abspath = self._module_abspath(self.repo, self.path, self.name)
# ``git submodule deinit`` leaves the repository in
# ``.git/modules`` and empties the checkout. Reconnect that retained
# repository instead of trying to clone over it.
if not dry_run and osp.isdir(module_abspath):
try:
git.Repo(module_abspath)
except InvalidGitRepositoryError:
pass
else:
if osp.lexists(checkout_module_abspath) and (
osp.islink(checkout_module_abspath)
or not osp.isdir(checkout_module_abspath)
or os.listdir(checkout_module_abspath)
):
raise OSError(
"Module directory at %r does already exist and is non-empty" % checkout_module_abspath
)
os.makedirs(checkout_module_abspath, exist_ok=True)
self._write_git_file_and_module_config(checkout_module_abspath, module_abspath)
mrepo = git.Repo(checkout_module_abspath)
--- where self.path comes from (raw .gitmodules value) ---
def _set_cache_(self, attr: str) -> None:
if attr in ("path", "_url", "_branch_path"):
reader: SectionConstraint = self.config_reader()
# Default submodule values.
try:
self.path = reader.get("path")
except cp.NoSectionError as e:
| Software | Affected versions |
|---|---|
GitPython
|
< 3.1.62 |
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