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CVSS estimates technical severity, but it does not automatically equal business risk. Prioritize using context like internet exposure, asset criticality, known exploitation, and whether compensating controls exist. A Medium CVSS on an exposed production system can be more urgent than a Critical on an isolated non-production host.

Vulnerability Database

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A security vulnerability is a weakness in software, hardware, or configuration that can be exploited to compromise confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Many vulnerabilities are tracked as CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures), which provide a standardized identifier so teams can coordinate patching, mitigation, and risk assessment across tools and vendors.

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Use a repeatable triage model: focus first on externally exposed assets, high-value systems (identity, VPN, email, production), vulnerabilities with known exploits, and issues that enable remote code execution or privilege escalation. Then enforce patch SLAs and track progress so remediation is steady, not reactive.

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396,228

Total vulnerabilities in the database

Langflow: SSRF in URL-taking components (protection disabled by default / warn-only, not applied to RSS, SearXNG, Web Search, Home Assistant, Glean, Docling) — langflow

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Summary

Before Langflow 1.10.3, several built-in components sent server-side HTTP requests to URLs the flow author controls, with no SSRF enforcement. An authenticated user who can build or run flows could make the Langflow server reach loopback, RFC 1918 / private networks, link-local addresses and cloud metadata endpoints (for example http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/), and in many cases read the response back through the component output.

Two things combined to cause this:

Protection disabled / warn-only. The SSRF guard (lfx/utils/ssrf_protection.py, added in 1.7.0 by #10544) shipped with ssrf_protection_enabled = False, and its only caller, the API Request component, called validate_url_for_ssrf(url, warn_only=True). So even with protection turned on, blocked URLs were only logged.
Inconsistent coverage. Other components that take a user-supplied URL or base URL did not call the guard at all: RSS Reader, SearXNG, Web Search (fetching result / RSS URLs), Home Assistant, Glean Search and Docling Serve (remote).

The problem was fixed across several PRs and is fully fixed in Langflow 1.10.3 (and 1.11.0+). With the default settings, outbound requests from these components are now validated after DNS resolution, pinned to the validated IP (to prevent DNS rebinding) and blocked when they target private, loopback, link-local or metadata addresses, unless the operator allowlists the host.

Affected versions

| Package (PyPI) | Vulnerable | Patched | |---|---|---| | langflow | < 1.10.3 | 1.10.3 | | langflow-base | < 0.10.3 | 0.10.3 | | lfx | < 1.10.3 | 1.10.3 | | lfx-docling (Docling Serve component) | < 0.1.2 | 0.1.2 |

How the fix rolled out:

| Release | Change | |---|---| | < 1.7.0 | No SSRF guard. All URL-taking components make unrestricted requests. | | 1.7.0 – 1.9.2 | Guard exists, but ssrf_protection_enabled=False by default and API Request uses warn_only=True. | | 1.9.3 | #13016: protection on by default, API Request blocks (DNS pinning / anti-rebinding). Other components still unprotected. | | 1.10.1 | #13395 (RSS Reader, SearXNG) and #13643 (Home Assistant, Glean, plus model-provider URL components) route requests through SSRF-safe helpers. | | 1.10.3 | #14033 (Docling Serve) and #14071 (Web Search result/RSS fetching). All components cited in this report are protected. |

Details

Vulnerable pattern (for example rss.py before #13395):

response = requests.get(self.rss_url, timeout=self.timeout)

API Request before #13016:

# TODO: In next major version (2.0), remove warn_only=True to enforce blocking
validate_url_for_ssrf(url, warn_only=True)

with ssrf_protection_enabled: bool = False in the settings.

Clarifications on the original report. Some sinks in the report are not exploitable SSRF:

web_search.py: the DuckDuckGo search request and the Google News RSS request, and news_search.py:131. The host is hard-coded (html.duckduckgo.com / news.google.com) and user input only goes into quote_plus-encoded path and query segments, so the destination cannot be redirected. The real Web Search sink was fetching the result URLs, which is fixed in #14071.
langflow/load/utils.py get_flow(): this is a client-side SDK helper (from langflow.load import get_flow) that the caller runs against their own Langflow URL. No API route calls it, so it is not a backend SSRF endpoint.

PoC (vulnerable versions)

Log in as any user who can create flows.
Add an RSS Reader (or SearXNG / Home Assistant / Glean / Docling Serve) component and set its URL to http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ (or an internal host such as http://10.0.0.1/).
Run the component. The Langflow server issues the request, and the response or error is shown in the component output.

On patched versions the same run fails with SSRFProtectionError: Access to IP address 169.254.169.254 is blocked by SSRF protection.

Impact

Access to cloud instance metadata (IAM credentials / tokens) on AWS, GCP and Azure deployments.
Probing and interaction with internal services and private networks reachable from the Langflow host.
Requires an authenticated account with permission to build or run flows. Deployments where every user is already fully trusted are less affected.

Fix

#13016: sets ssrf_protection_enabled = True by default, changes warn_only to default False, drops warn_only=True from API Request, and adds validate_and_resolve_url() plus SSRFProtectedTransport (DNS pinning).
- ssrf_protection_enabled: bool = False + ssrf_protection_enabled: bool = True
#13395: adds lfx.utils.ssrf_requests.ssrf_safe_get (per-hop validation and pinning for requests) and uses it in RSS Reader and SearXNG.
- response = requests.get(self.rss_url, timeout=self.timeout) + response = ssrf_safe_get(self.rss_url, timeout=self.timeout)
#13643: adds lfx.utils.ssrf_httpx (ssrf_safe_httpx_get/post, protected client kwargs) and applies it to Home Assistant, Glean and the model-provider base-URL components.
#14033: Docling Serve builds its httpx.Client with ssrf_protected_httpx_client_kwargs_for_url(base_url).
#14071 (release-1.10.3) / #14073 (forward-port to 1.11.0): Web Search validates and pins each result URL before fetching it, with redirects disabled.

Note: connector-style components (for example Home Assistant, Ollama, LM Studio) keep a documented loopback exemption (#14146), so a self-hosted user can reach a local service on localhost. Private-network and metadata addresses stay blocked. Operators can tighten or relax this with LANGFLOW_SSRF_ALLOWED_HOSTS and LANGFLOW_CONNECTOR_SSRF_VALIDATION_ENABLED.

Remediation

Upgrade to langflow >= 1.10.3 (or langflow-base >= 0.10.3 / lfx >= 1.10.3 / lfx-docling >= 0.1.2).
Do not set LANGFLOW_SSRF_PROTECTION_ENABLED=false. If you need to reach internal hosts on purpose, allowlist only those hosts with LANGFLOW_SSRF_ALLOWED_HOSTS.
On versions that cannot be upgraded right away, restrict outbound network access from the Langflow host (for example, block 169.254.169.254 and use IMDSv2 on AWS).

Published: Oct 6, 2026
Updated: Oct 7, 2026
GHSA: GHSA-j8f7-x8jm-wmm4
Severity: Medium
Exploit:
CISA KEV:

No technical information available.

CWEs:

CWE-918

Affected Software
References

Software	Affected versions
langflow	`< 1.10.3`
langflow-base	`< 0.10.3`
lfx	`< 1.10.3`
lfx-docling	`< 0.1.2`

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Frequently Asked Questions

What is a Vulnerability (CVE) and why does it matter?

A security vulnerability is a weakness in software, hardware, or configuration that can be exploited to compromise confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Many vulnerabilities are tracked as CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures), which provide a standardized identifier so teams can coordinate patching, mitigation, and risk assessment across tools and vendors.

CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) estimates technical severity, but it doesn't automatically equal business risk. Prioritize using context like internet exposure, affected asset criticality, known exploitation (proof-of-concept or in-the-wild), and whether compensating controls exist. A "Medium" CVSS on an exposed, production system can be more urgent than a "Critical" on an isolated, non-production host.

A vulnerability is the underlying weakness. An exploit is the method or code used to take advantage of it. A zero-day is a vulnerability that is unknown to the vendor or has no publicly available fix when attackers begin using it. In practice, risk increases sharply when exploitation becomes reliable or widespread.

Recurring findings usually come from incomplete Asset Discovery, inconsistent patch management, inherited images, and configuration drift. In modern environments, you also need to watch the software supply chain: dependencies, containers, build pipelines, and third-party services can reintroduce the same weakness even after you patch a single host. Unknown or unmanaged assets (often called Shadow IT) are a common reason the same issues resurface.

Use a simple, repeatable triage model: focus first on externally exposed assets, high-value systems (identity, VPN, email, production), vulnerabilities with known exploits, and issues that enable remote code execution or privilege escalation. Then enforce patch SLAs and track progress using consistent metrics so remediation is steady, not reactive.

SynScan combines attack surface monitoring and continuous security auditing to keep your inventory current, flag high-impact vulnerabilities early, and help you turn raw findings into a practical remediation plan.