RFC 5322 comments nest. addressparser ended a comment at the first ), including the one that closes a nested comment, and parsed the rest of the outer comment as header text. Victim (x(y) <[email protected]>) <[email protected]> names [email protected] with x(y) <[email protected]> as a comment, and Nodemailer read it as the address [email protected]. This is the same shape as the escaped parenthesis fixed in 10.1.2, reached through nesting instead of a quoted-pair. Affected: 3.0.0 through 10.1.3.
The attacker controls the text of an address that an application passes to Nodemailer, or the From or To header of an inbound message parsed with mailparser. No access to the application, its configuration or its credentials is needed. The value is a syntactically valid RFC 5322 address that conformant parsers accept without defects.
An application validates a submitted address with a conformant parser and allows only its own domain. The attacker submits Victim (x(y) <[email protected]>) <[email protected]>, which validates as [email protected]. Nodemailer delivers to [email protected]. In the inbound direction, a DMARC or display layer built on a conformant parser and a mail client built on mailparser disagree on the author of the same message, which is the setting for sender spoofing. The boundary crossed is the application's recipient allow list, or the author check of the receiving side.
const addressparser = require('nodemailer/lib/addressparser');
console.log(addressparser("Victim (x(y) <[email protected]>) <[email protected]>"));
// [ { address: '[email protected]', name: 'Victim) [email protected]' } ]
Python's email._header_value_parser.get_address_list reads the same value as [email protected] with the display name Victim, with no defects reported.
The envelope a message gets is built from the same parse, so sendMail({ to: "Victim (x(y) <[email protected]>) <[email protected]>" }) issues the RCPT TO shown above.
Mail intended for an approved recipient is delivered to an attacker chosen domain, disclosing its content, and parsers built on this module report a different author than conformant ones. The misreading only occurs on values a conformant validator approves, so correct validation is bypassed. Affected are applications that pass user influenced addresses to Nodemailer and consumers of the standalone parser such as mailparser.
The fix counts comment depth and ends a comment only at the ) that closes the outermost one.
Found in an internal review of addressparser on 2026-10-18. Verified on 3.0.0, 6.9.16 and 10.1.3.
A vulnerability database tells you what is broken. Attack surface management tells you where it is running: it discovers your internet-facing assets and flags the ones affected by issues like this one.
What is attack surface management? →A security vulnerability is a weakness in software, hardware, or configuration that can be exploited to compromise confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Many vulnerabilities are tracked as CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures), which provide a standardized identifier so teams can coordinate patching, mitigation, and risk assessment across tools and vendors.
CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) estimates technical severity, but it doesn't automatically equal business risk. Prioritize using context like internet exposure, affected asset criticality, known exploitation (proof-of-concept or in-the-wild), and whether compensating controls exist. A "Medium" CVSS on an exposed, production system can be more urgent than a "Critical" on an isolated, non-production host.
A vulnerability is the underlying weakness. An exploit is the method or code used to take advantage of it. A zero-day is a vulnerability that is unknown to the vendor or has no publicly available fix when attackers begin using it. In practice, risk increases sharply when exploitation becomes reliable or widespread.
Recurring findings usually come from incomplete Asset Discovery, inconsistent patch management, inherited images, and configuration drift. In modern environments, you also need to watch the software supply chain: dependencies, containers, build pipelines, and third-party services can reintroduce the same weakness even after you patch a single host. Unknown or unmanaged assets (often called Shadow IT) are a common reason the same issues resurface.
Use a simple, repeatable triage model: focus first on externally exposed assets, high-value systems (identity, VPN, email, production), vulnerabilities with known exploits, and issues that enable remote code execution or privilege escalation. Then enforce patch SLAs and track progress using consistent metrics so remediation is steady, not reactive.
SynScan combines attack surface monitoring and continuous security auditing to keep your inventory current, flag high-impact vulnerabilities early, and help you turn raw findings into a practical remediation plan.