> Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.
Title: Incomplete Fix for CVE-2026-27486: Unvalidated SIGKILL in !stop Chat Command via shell-utils.ts
Description:
The !stop (and /bash stop) chat command kills background bash processes using SIGKILL directly, without first sending SIGTERM to allow graceful shutdown. This is because bash-command.ts imports killProcessTree() from src/agents/shell-utils.ts, which still contains the pre-CVE-2026-27486 aggressive kill logic, rather than from the patched src/process/kill-tree.ts.
CVE-2026-27486 fixed unsafe process termination by introducing a graceful shutdown sequence in src/process/kill-tree.ts — sending SIGTERM first, waiting a configurable grace period (default 3 seconds), then escalating to SIGKILL only if the process is still alive.
However, an identical copy of the unpatched killProcessTree function remains in src/agents/shell-utils.ts (lines 170–192). This function sends SIGKILL immediately with no SIGTERM:
// src/agents/shell-utils.ts:170-192
export function killProcessTree(pid: number): void {
// ... Windows handling ...
try {
process.kill(-pid, "SIGKILL"); // Immediate hard kill, no SIGTERM
} catch {
try {
process.kill(pid, "SIGKILL");
} catch {
// process already dead
}
}
}
The !stop chat command handler in src/auto-reply/reply/bash-command.ts imports and calls this vulnerable version at line 302:
// src/auto-reply/reply/bash-command.ts:5
import { killProcessTree } from "../../agents/shell-utils.js";
// src/auto-reply/reply/bash-command.ts:300-304
const pid = running.pid ?? running.child?.pid;
if (pid) {
killProcessTree(pid); // Calls the UNPATCHED version
}
markExited(running, null, "SIGKILL", "failed");
Compare this to the patched version in src/process/kill-tree.ts:
// src/process/kill-tree.ts:46-78
function killProcessTreeUnix(pid: number, graceMs: number): void {
// Step 1: Try graceful SIGTERM to process group
try {
process.kill(-pid, "SIGTERM");
} catch { /* ... */ }
// Step 2: Wait grace period, then SIGKILL if still alive
setTimeout(() => {
if (isProcessAlive(-pid)) {
try { process.kill(-pid, "SIGKILL"); } catch { /* ... */ }
}
}, graceMs).unref();
}
This PoC demonstrates the difference between the vulnerable and patched code paths inside a running OpenClaw Gateway container.
Setup:
# Build and start the gateway container
cd CVE-2026-27486-variant-exp/
docker compose up -d
sleep 5
Exploit (vulnerable killProcessTree from shell-utils.ts):
The following script is injected into the container and executed. It starts a bash process that traps SIGTERM for graceful shutdown, then kills it using the same code path as !stop:
// exploit_sigkill.cjs — replicates src/agents/shell-utils.ts:183-190
const { spawn } = require('child_process');
const fs = require('fs');
try { fs.unlinkSync('/tmp/graceful_shutdown.txt'); } catch {}
const child = spawn('/bin/bash', ['-c',
'trap \'echo GRACEFUL_SHUTDOWN > /tmp/graceful_shutdown.txt; exit 0\' SIGTERM; while true; do sleep 1; done'
], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore' });
child.unref();
setTimeout(() => {
// VULNERABLE: same as shell-utils.ts — SIGKILL only
try { process.kill(-child.pid, 'SIGKILL'); } catch {
try { process.kill(child.pid, 'SIGKILL'); } catch {}
}
setTimeout(() => {
if (fs.existsSync('/tmp/graceful_shutdown.txt')) {
console.log('[BLOCKED] SIGTERM was received.');
process.exit(1);
} else {
console.log('[EXPLOITED] SIGKILL sent directly — SIGTERM never delivered.');
process.exit(0);
}
}, 2000);
}, 1000);
Run:
python3 poc_exploit.py
Exploit output (SIGKILL only, no graceful shutdown):
[*] Running exploit (vulnerable killProcessTree from shell-utils.ts)...
[*] Victim PID: 78
[*] Calling vulnerable killProcessTree (SIGKILL only, no SIGTERM)...
[EXPLOITED] SIGKILL sent directly — SIGTERM never delivered.
[EXPLOITED] Graceful shutdown handler was NEVER invoked.
[SUCCESS] CVE-2026-27486 variant confirmed:
killProcessTree() in shell-utils.ts sends immediate SIGKILL,
bypassing the graceful shutdown fix in process/kill-tree.ts.
Control output (SIGTERM first, graceful shutdown works):
[*] Running control (patched killProcessTree from process/kill-tree.ts)...
[*] Victim PID: 93
[*] Calling patched killProcessTree (SIGTERM first, then SIGKILL after grace)...
[NORMAL] SIGTERM received — graceful shutdown completed. Flag: GRACEFUL_SHUTDOWN
[NORMAL] Control confirmed: patched killProcessTree sends SIGTERM first,
allowing graceful shutdown before escalating to SIGKILL.
When !stop is used, background processes are killed instantly via SIGKILL with no chance to perform cleanup. This can result in:
This is the same class of impact that CVE-2026-27486 was filed for — the fix simply missed the shell-utils.ts copy of the function.
| Permalink | Description |
| :--- | :--- |
| https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/f2849c2417/src/agents/shell-utils.ts#L170-L192 | The vulnerable killProcessTree function that sends immediate SIGKILL without SIGTERM. |
| https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/f2849c2417/src/auto-reply/reply/bash-command.ts#L5 | Import statement pulling the vulnerable killProcessTree from shell-utils.ts instead of the patched kill-tree.ts. |
| https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/f2849c2417/src/auto-reply/reply/bash-command.ts#L300-L304 | The !stop handler calling the vulnerable killProcessTree(pid). |
| https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/f2849c2417/src/process/kill-tree.ts#L46-L78 | The patched killProcessTreeUnix with graceful SIGTERM → grace period → SIGKILL sequence (for reference). |
| Software | From | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
openclaw
|
- | 2026.3.24 |
A security vulnerability is a weakness in software, hardware, or configuration that can be exploited to compromise confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Many vulnerabilities are tracked as CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures), which provide a standardized identifier so teams can coordinate patching, mitigation, and risk assessment across tools and vendors.
CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) estimates technical severity, but it doesn't automatically equal business risk. Prioritize using context like internet exposure, affected asset criticality, known exploitation (proof-of-concept or in-the-wild), and whether compensating controls exist. A "Medium" CVSS on an exposed, production system can be more urgent than a "Critical" on an isolated, non-production host.
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Recurring findings usually come from incomplete Asset Discovery, inconsistent patch management, inherited images, and configuration drift. In modern environments, you also need to watch the software supply chain: dependencies, containers, build pipelines, and third-party services can reintroduce the same weakness even after you patch a single host. Unknown or unmanaged assets (often called Shadow IT) are a common reason the same issues resurface.
Use a simple, repeatable triage model: focus first on externally exposed assets, high-value systems (identity, VPN, email, production), vulnerabilities with known exploits, and issues that enable remote code execution or privilege escalation. Then enforce patch SLAs and track progress using consistent metrics so remediation is steady, not reactive.
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