gh-action-pypi-publish makes use of GitHub Actions expression expansions (i.e. ${{ ... }}) in contexts that are potentially attacker controllable. Depending on the trigger used to invoke gh-action-pypi-publish, this may allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code within the context of a workflow step that invokes gh-action-pypi-publish.
gh-action-pypi-publish contains a composite action step, set-repo-and-ref, that makes use of expression expansions:
- name: Set repo and ref from which to run Docker container action
id: set-repo-and-ref
run: |
# Set repo and ref from which to run Docker container action
# to handle cases in which `github.action_` context is not set
# https://github.com/actions/runner/issues/2473
REF=${{ env.ACTION_REF || env.PR_REF || github.ref_name }}
REPO=${{ env.ACTION_REPO || env.PR_REPO || github.repository }}
REPO_ID=${{ env.PR_REPO_ID || github.repository_id }}
echo "ref=$REF" >>"$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "repo=$REPO" >>"$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "repo-id=$REPO_ID" >>"$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
shell: bash
env:
ACTION_REF: ${{ github.action_ref }}
ACTION_REPO: ${{ github.action_repository }}
PR_REF: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}
PR_REPO: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name }}
PR_REPO_ID: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.repo.id }}
Permalink: https://github.com/pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish/blob/db8f07d3871a0a180efa06b95d467625c19d5d5f/action.yml#L114-L125
In normal intended operation, these expansions are used to establish a correct priority for outputs like ref and repo-id.
However, these expansions have a side effect: because they're done with ${{ ... }} and not with ${...} (i.e. normal shell interpolation), they can bypass normal shell quoting rules. In particular, if both env.ACTION_REF and env.PR_REF evaluate to empty strings, then the expression falls back to github.ref_name, which can be an attacker controlled string via a branch or tag name.
For example, if the attacker is able to set a branch name to something like innocent;cat${IFS}/etc/passwd, then the REF line may expand as:
REF=innocent;cat${IFS}/etc/passwd
which would set REF to innocent and then run the attacker's code.
Additional information about dangerous expansions can be found in zizmor's template-injection rule documentation.
The impact of this vulnerability is very low: the expression in question is unlikely to be evaluated in normal operation, since env.ACTION_REF should always take precedence.
In particular, the action is not vulnerable in many popular configurations, i.e. those where pull_request or release or a push: tags event is used to call the action.
A vulnerability database tells you what is broken. Attack surface management tells you where it is running: it discovers your internet-facing assets and flags the ones affected by issues like this one.
What is attack surface management? →A security vulnerability is a weakness in software, hardware, or configuration that can be exploited to compromise confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Many vulnerabilities are tracked as CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures), which provide a standardized identifier so teams can coordinate patching, mitigation, and risk assessment across tools and vendors.
CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) estimates technical severity, but it doesn't automatically equal business risk. Prioritize using context like internet exposure, affected asset criticality, known exploitation (proof-of-concept or in-the-wild), and whether compensating controls exist. A "Medium" CVSS on an exposed, production system can be more urgent than a "Critical" on an isolated, non-production host.
A vulnerability is the underlying weakness. An exploit is the method or code used to take advantage of it. A zero-day is a vulnerability that is unknown to the vendor or has no publicly available fix when attackers begin using it. In practice, risk increases sharply when exploitation becomes reliable or widespread.
Recurring findings usually come from incomplete Asset Discovery, inconsistent patch management, inherited images, and configuration drift. In modern environments, you also need to watch the software supply chain: dependencies, containers, build pipelines, and third-party services can reintroduce the same weakness even after you patch a single host. Unknown or unmanaged assets (often called Shadow IT) are a common reason the same issues resurface.
Use a simple, repeatable triage model: focus first on externally exposed assets, high-value systems (identity, VPN, email, production), vulnerabilities with known exploits, and issues that enable remote code execution or privilege escalation. Then enforce patch SLAs and track progress using consistent metrics so remediation is steady, not reactive.
SynScan combines attack surface monitoring and continuous security auditing to keep your inventory current, flag high-impact vulnerabilities early, and help you turn raw findings into a practical remediation plan.