On March 27, 2026, a threat actor used compromised PyPI credentials to publish malicious versions 4.87.1 and 4.87.2 of the telnyx Python package directly to PyPI. These versions contain credential-stealing malware and were not published through the legitimate GitHub release pipeline.
| Version | Published (UTC) | Quarantined (UTC) | Exposure | |---------|-----------------|-------------------|----------| | 4.87.1 (broken) | 2026-03-27 03:51 | 2026-03-27 10:13 | 6h 22m | | 4.87.2 (functional) | 2026-03-27 04:07 | 2026-03-27 10:13 | 6h 6m |
Both versions were quarantined by PyPI at 2026-03-27 10:13 UTC.
Note: Version 4.87.1 contained a typo that prevented the malware from executing. Only 4.87.2 was fully functional.
You may be affected if:
telnyx Python package between 03:51 UTC and 10:13 UTC on March 27, 2026pip install telnyx without pinning a version and received 4.87.1 or 4.87.2telnyx as a transitive, unpinned dependencyYou are NOT affected if:
The attacker obtained the PyPI API token and uploaded malicious packages directly to PyPI, bypassing the GitHub release pipeline entirely. No malicious commits exist in the GitHub repository.
The malware is injected into telnyx/_client.py (74 additional lines) and executes on import telnyx:
Linux/macOS:
Windows:
msbuild.exe in Startup folder for persistence| Version | Status | Notes |
|---------|--------|-------|
| 4.87.1 | Broken | Typo: Setup() instead of setup() caused NameError |
| 4.87.2 | Functional | Attacker uploaded 16 minutes later to fix their own casing error; full attack chain operational |
| Version | File | SHA-256 |
|---------|------|--------|
| 4.87.0 | telnyx-4.87.0-py3-none-any.whl | 5aeb8172c29ade224e6c2d166713f304596aa21e3dbfa5b6b2b028e6997f6bd2 |
| 4.87.0 | telnyx-4.87.0.tar.gz | 3f093a85c313c2b779594f99fc07f453f1a7fd8785878d963688c531ff94d03a |
# Check installed version
pip show telnyx | grep Version
# Check pip cache for telnyx versions
pip cache list telnyx 2>/dev/null
# Check when telnyx was installed (modification time)
ls -la $(python -c "import site; print(site.getsitepackages()[0])")/telnyx* 2>/dev/null
pip uninstall telnyx
If there is any possibility that version 4.87.1 or 4.87.2 was installed in your environment, treat all accessible secrets as compromised:
# Check for malicious systemd service
systemctl --user status audiomon 2>/dev/null
ls -la ~/.config/audiomon/ 2>/dev/null
# Check state file
ls -la /tmp/.initd_state 2>/dev/null
# Check Startup folder
Get-ChildItem "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\msbuild.exe"
pip install telnyx==4.87.0
Or in requirements.txt:
telnyx==4.87.0
| File | SHA-256 |
|------|--------|
| telnyx-4.87.1-py3-none-any.whl | 7321caa303fe96ded0492c747d2f353c4f7d17185656fe292ab0a59e2bd0b8d9 |
| telnyx-4.87.2-py3-none-any.whl | cd08115806662469bbedec4b03f8427b97c8a4b3bc1442dc18b72b4e19395fe3 |
| IoC | Type |
|-----|------|
| 83.142.209.203 | C2 IP address |
| http://83.142.209.203:8080/ringtone.wav | Payload endpoint (Linux/macOS) |
| http://83.142.209.203:8080/hangup.wav | Payload endpoint (Windows) |
| http://83.142.209.203:8080/raw | Persistence polling endpoint |
| Path | Platform | Purpose |
|------|----------|--------|
| ~/.config/audiomon/audiomon.py | Linux/macOS | Persistence implant |
| ~/.config/systemd/user/audiomon.service | Linux | Persistence service |
| /tmp/.initd_state | Linux/macOS | State tracking |
| %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\msbuild.exe | Windows | Persistence binary |
| msbuild.exe.lock | Windows | 12-hour cooldown lock |
tpcp.tar.gzX-Filename: tpcp.tar.gzThis attack is attributed to TeamPCP with high confidence based on:
tpcp.tar.gz archive naming convention (TeamPCP signature)RSA Key Hash:
4eceb569b4330565b93058465beab0e6d5ea09cfba8e7f29d7be1b5a2abd958a| Software | From | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
telnyx
|
4.87.1 | 4.87.2.x |
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